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Competition Flashback Q3 2024 – EU and Dutch competition law developments

This is the Competition Flashback Q3 2024 by bureau Brandeis, featuring a selection of the key EU and Dutch competition law developments of the past quarter (see the original version here).

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Overview Q3 2024


Merger control

Regulating digital markets (DMA)

Cartels and vertical restraints

Abuse of a dominant position

Damages claims for competition law infringements

Aviation

State aid and FSR

Consumer law


Overview highlights merger cases

On 3 July 2024, the Commission cleared the proposed acquisition of ITA Airways by Lufthansa and the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance subject to conditions. In its statement of objections, the Commission expressed its concerns that competition for short-haul flights between Italy and Central Europe (where ITA’s and Lufthansa’s hubs are located) would be reduced (see also CF Q1 2024). In addition, the Commission considered it possible that competition on long-haul flights between Italy, on the one hand, and the United States and Canada, on the other, would be reduced as a result of the transaction. Finally, the acquisition would strengthen ITA’s dominance at Milan airport, the Commission said. To address these concerns, ITA and Lufthansa offered to divest logistical resources for long- and short-haul flights between Italy, Central Europe and North America as well as landing and take-off slots at certain airports. Under these conditions, the Commission approved the acquisition.

In another airline merger, the Commission announced that International Airlines Group (“IAG”) has withdrawn its proposed acquisition to acquire Air Europa. IAG owns several airlines, including Iberia and Vueling, making it the largest airline operator in Spain (see also CF Q1 2024). Air Europa is the third largest airline in Spain. On 24 January 2024, the Commission had announced the opening of a second phase investigation into the proposed acquisition. On 26 April 2024, IAG received a statement of objections. The Commission was concerned that the proposed acquisition would impede competition on domestic routes in Spain, short routes between Spain and countries in Europe and the Middle East, and long routes between Spain and the Americas. IAG subsequently offered remedies, but these were insufficient for the Commission to address the concerns. Thereupon, IAG withdrew its notification of the proposed acquisition.

Bunge’s acquisition of Viterra has been conditionally approved by the Commission. Both parties are vertically integrated agricultural companies active in the sourcing, trading and processing of agricultural products. Specifically, there is significant overlap between the parties’ activities in oilseeds (such as sunflower seeds, soybean or rapeseed). Based on its investigation, the Commission concludes that the proposed transaction would reduce competition in the markets for oilseeds. In particular, the acquisition would result in a concentration of processing facilities in Central Europe, with potential adverse consequences for both farmers and customers. To address the Commission’s competition concerns, both parties offered to divest Viterra’s oilseed business in Hungary and Poland including some logistical assets. Under these conditions, the Commission approved the acquisition.

The Commission announced on 24 September 2024 its conditional approval of e&’s acquisition of PFF Telecom under the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (“FSR”).  This is the first time a merger notification under the FSR has been approved after an in-depth investigation by the Commission. In June 2024, the Commission launched its investigation into this acquisition due to indications that e& (based in the United Arab Emirates) had received foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (see also our CF Q2 2024). The Commission found that e& had indeed received foreign subsidies in the form of an unlimited guarantee, loans, grants and other debt instruments. While these subsidies did not lead to reduced competition in the acquisition, as e& itself had the funds to do so and there were no other bidders, the subsidies could lead to a distortion of competition in the market after the acquisition. The subsidies could potentially artificially strengthen the position of e& and PPF Telecom in the telecoms market relative to their competitors. e& has offered to waive the unlimited guarantee and not to use e&’s funding for PPF’s EU operations, despite PPF Telecom not being active in the whole of the EU. Moreover, e& has agreed to notify future acquisitions not falling under the FSR notification obligation to the Commission.

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Greater legal certainty in M&A transactions: Court of Justice strikes down Article 22 referrals in Illumina v Grail

Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 3 September 2024

On 3 September 2024, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) ruled that the European Commission (“Commission”) is not authorised to encourage or accept referrals of proposed concentrations without a European dimension from national competition authorities where those authorities are not competent to examine those proposed concentrations under their own national laws. This judgment once and for all brings an end to the long saga of Illumina/Grail (see also our Competition Flashbacks (“CF”) of Q3 2022, Q3 2023 and Q4 2023). As a result of this judgment, national competition authorities have withdrawn their pending referral requests to the Commission to investigate certain acquisitions.

On 21 September 2020, Illumina, a US company specialising in genetic analysis solutions, announced its intention to acquire Grail, a US company developing blood tests for the early detection of cancer. As the concentration had no European dimension, in particular because Grail did not generate any revenue yet in the European Union or elsewhere in the world, the transaction was not notified to the Commission nor to any national competition authority within the EU. After receiving a complaint about this concentration, the Commission requested the Member States to submit to it requests to examine this proposed concentration under Article 22 of the Merger Regulation nevertheless. The competition authorities of several Member States, including the ACM, subsequently filed such a request and the Commission launched an investigation and ordered the parties to await the Commission’s approval before implementing the transaction. When Illumina and Grail implemented the proposed merger nonetheless, the Commission imposed a record fine of € 432 million and decided that Illumina should unwind it.

Illumina and Grail unsuccessfully appealed to the General Court of the European Union (“General Court”). The CJEU now sets aside the General Court’s judgment and the Commission’s decisions. The CJEU finds that the General Court erred in concluding that a literal, historical, contextual and teleological interpretation of the Merger Regulation allows national competition authorities to ask the Commission to examine a concentration that not only lacks a European dimension but also falls outside their own national jurisdiction. In particular, the CJEU held that the Merger Regulation does not provide for a “corrective mechanism” under which such concentrations – which do not meet either the European or national notification thresholds – can still be investigated. In particular, this would run counter to the principles of foreseeability and legal certainty: undertakings should be able to easily determine in advance when and to which authority they will have to notify a concentration. The turnover thresholds are an important guarantee of that foreseeability and legal certainty. This cannot be circumvented through referral requests under Article 22 of the Merger Regulation, the CJEU held.

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General Court dismisses ByteDance’s appeal against Commission decision to designate TikTok as gatekeeper under DMA

General Court of the European Union, judgment of 17 July 2024

On 17 July 2024, the General Court dismissed ByteDance’s appeal against the Commission’s decision of 5 September 2023 to designate TikTok as a gatekeeper. ByteDance, the parent company of social networking service TikTok, argued in its appeal that, despite TikTok meeting the quantitative thresholds of section 3(2) Digital Markets Act (“DMA”), TikTok did not meet the qualitative thresholds of section 3(1) DMA.

First, ByteDance argued that TikTok does not have a significant impact on the internal market (Article 3(1)(a) DMA) because most of its turnover derives from China. The Court stated that this does not preclude the conclusion that ByteDance’s high annual turnover, combined with the number of TikTok users in the EU, reflects its financial strength and its potential to monetise TikTok users.

Second, ByteDance argued that TikTok does not constitute an important gateway for business users to reach end-users (Article 3(1)(b) DMA) because it has no ecosystem and does not benefit from so-called network effects or lock-in effects. Again, the Court rejects the argument. Despite these circumstances, ByteDance has been able to grow the number of TikTok users exponentially since 2018 and TikTok already reached half the size of Facebook and Instagram by 2022, without such an ecosystem.

Finally, ByteDance argued that it does not hold a firmly entrenched and durable position (section 3(1)(c) DMA), but is a challenger contesting the position of Meta and Alphabet. The Court noted that TikTok was indeed a challenger in 2018, but that it rapidly consolidated its market position, and in recent years has continued to build on that position, well exceeding the quantitative thresholds of section 3(2)(b) DMA. For these reasons, the General Court upholds the Commission’s decision to designate ByteDance as a gatekeeper under the DMA in respect of the social networking service TikTok.

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Apple’s ecosystem under fire: third-party access to contactless payments on iPhone devices

European Commission, press release of 11 July 2024

The Commission made commitments by Apple regarding mobile wallets legally binding on 11 July 2024. Apple offered the commitments after the Commission raised concerns that Apple was not making available to third parties the technology that enables contactless payments through iPhone devices (aka: the “tap-and-go” technology). Based on its investigation, which started in 2020, the Commission provisionally concluded that Apple was abusing its dominant position in the mobile wallet market on iPhone devices. Apple has created a closed ecosystem on its iPhone devices and can reserve markets for different services within that ecosystem for itself, such as the market for mobile wallets, it said.

Apple now pledges to open up this market by allowing third parties to access mobile wallets on iPhone devices. The Commission tested the proposed commitments and invited third-party market participants to submit their responses. In response to the outcome of that inquiry, Apple amended the commitments. Third parties can now not only offer mobile wallets, but will also have access, for example, to functionalities on iPhone devices that facilitate the payment process, such as facial recognition to validate the payment. The modified commitments have been made binding by the Commission.

Moreover, following a Commission investigation into compliance with the DMA, Apple says it is in the process of improving its pricing and terms and conditions for the use of its App Store. Lately it also announced that it had given Epic Games’ new app store access to its iOS and iPadOS system.

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CJEU clarifies framework object restrictions in case of information exchanges

Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 29 July 2024

In a preliminary reference in the Portuguese banks case, the CJEU further elaborated on when an information exchange between competitors has the object of restricting competition. In 2019, the Portuguese Competition Authority (“AdC”) fined Banco BPN, BPI, Santander, Barclays, Caixa and several other Portuguese banks for exchanging information on commercial conditions on a large-scale and on a monthly basis. In particular, the banks exchanged information on current and future credit spreads and risk variables, on the basis of which the banks set the indicative interest rate eventually offered to customers. In addition, there was a ‘stand-alone’ information exchange on past sales volumes between the banks.

The CJEU first reiterates its established case law that information exchanges between competitors result in a restriction of competition by object if the information exchange leads to coordination whereby competitors no longer compete in the same way as they would without coordination. In order for a market to operate under normal conditions, each operator must (i) be obliged to determine its market behaviour independently, and furthermore (ii) be uncertain at least as to the timing, extent and details of any future changes in the conduct of its competitors on the market. Removing this uncertainty may cause market participants to tacitly follow the same course of conduct, the CJEU repeats.

The CJEU subsequently finds that both the information on credit spreads and future changes in risk variables qualify as strategic information, so that their exchange has the object of restricting competition. Although it is unlikely that information relating to past sales volumes can reveal the future intentions of the banks by itself, its strategic nature can be inferred when considered in conjunction with the other types of information exchanges. Therefore, it is also irrelevant that the exchanges occurred only very sporadically or concerned only one of the components of the final interest rate. What matters, according to the CJEU, is that the information exchange was able to reduce uncertainty about the (future) behaviour of the other banks. The fact that none of the banks actually changed its rate after receiving the information does not alter this conclusion, as the concrete effects need not to be examined in case of a restriction of competition by object.

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Price parity clauses Booking.com violate EU competition law

Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 19 September 2024

On 19 September 2024, the CJEU answered in the negative the preliminary question whether price parity clauses qualify as ancillary restraints and are therefore compatible with European competition law. The District Court of Amsterdam referred these questions in the context of a dispute between Booking.com and 63 German hotels on the validity of price parity clauses used by Booking.com in its agreements with these hotels. These clauses prohibited accommodations from offering rooms on their own sales channel at a price lower than offered on Booking.com (‘narrow parity clauses’), or even on third-party sales channels (‘wide parity clauses’).

Under the ancillary restraints doctrine, a clause – which, taken in isolation, may potentially infringe competition law – may fall outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU, provided that the restrictive clause is objectively necessary for the achievement of the (primary) agreement in which it is included and proportionate to its objective. While stressing that Booking.com’s provision of online hotel reservation services (the primary activity) appears to have had a neutral or even positive effect for consumers, as it increases and facilitates consumer choice, the CJEU held that price parity clauses do not qualify as ancillary restrictions.

According to the CJEU, the clauses were not shown to be objectively necessary for the achievement of Booking.com’s online hotel reservation services and proportionate to the objective pursued thereby. Thus, the CJEU finds that broad price parity clauses may restrict competition between hotel reservation platforms. Moreover, there is a risk that small and new platforms could be forced out of the market as a result of parity clauses. The same applies to narrow parity clauses. While these clauses are prima facie less restrictive of competition and are intended to mitigate the risk of free-riding behaviour, they too are not objectively necessary to ensure the economic viability of hotel reservation platforms. The case is now back at the national court to rule on Booking.com’s parity clauses, taking into account the CJEU’s judgment.

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CJEU confirms abuse of Google by favouring its own product comparison service

Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 10 September 2024

Seven years after the Commission imposed a record fine on Google for abusing its dominant position by positioning Google Shopping more prominently and attractively on Google’s search results pages than competing services, the fining decision became final on 10 September 2024.

The CJEU confirms the General Court’s judgment of 10 July 2019 in which it held that the Commission was right to find that Google’s behaviour (self-preferencing) in the context of this particular market (Google Search infrastructure and data traffic as an indispensable input for product comparison services) constituted an abuse. The CJEU stressed that all relevant facts must be considered in the analysis, as it cannot be generally assumed that a dominant company’s more favourable treatment of its own products or services is always abusive.

Google’s argument that the Commission should have applied the Bronner criteria is (also) rejected by the CJEU. Indeed, this case does not involve a refusal to supply and does not force a company that has developed its own infrastructure to enter into an agreement with a competitor. The behaviour in this case concerns an independent form of abuse through ‘leveraging’ in a market with high barriers to entry in which competition has already been weakened by the presence of a dominant party, the CJEU said. The fact that Google could potentially eliminate the abuse by granting competing product comparison services access to the special ‘boxes’ (in which Google Shopping is displayed) does not change this. There is no automatic link between the criteria for the legal classification of the abuse and the corrective measures enabling it to be remedied.

The CJEU does not use the terms ‘abnormality of the conduct’ and ‘superdominance’ as the General Court did, but nevertheless finds that such elements are not necessary to reach a finding (these terms were also not part of the disputed fining decision). In order to establish abuse it is sufficient that the unjustified difference in treatment, given the characteristics of the market, meant that Google did not compete on the merits. The Commission proved this conclusively.

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General Court confirms Qualcomm’s predatory pricing strategy of UMTS chipsets for Huawei and ZTE

General Court of the European Union, judgment of 18 September 2024

On 18 September 2024, the General Court largely upheld the € 242 million fine imposed on chip manufacturer Qualcomm. Following a 2009 complaint by Icera – later acquired by Nvidia – the Commission found in 2019 that Qualcomm abused its dominant position in the global UMTS chipset market between 1 July 2009 and 30 June 2011 by maintaining predatory prices for three types of chips to customers Huawei and ZTE. These chips are mainly used to connect phones, tablets and other devices to mobile telecommunications networks. The Commission found that such low prices (below the so-called long-run average incremental costs per unit) were intended to drive the then less powerful competitor Icera out of the market, in violation of Article 102 TFEU.

In the wide-ranging judgment, the General Court discusses all 15 of Qualcomm’s grounds of appeal, which concern, inter alia, the long duration of and flaws in the Commission’s investigation, the definition of the relevant market and Qualcomm’s position thereon, (the interpretation of) the evidence regarding the analysis of Qualcomm’s cost-price structure and the cost benchmark used by the Commission to establish that Qualcomm’s prices were of a predatory nature.

Whereas Qualcomm was successful before the General Court in 2022 with regard to exclusivity payments for its LTE chipsets (see CF Q2 2022), the General Court now finds that Qualcomm has not demonstrated that its defence rights were infringed by the Commission’s failure to record or document (in full) certain interviews with third parties. All grounds of appeal relating to the procedure, Qualcomm’s dominance and abuse are rejected. However, the Court does follow Qualcomm’s argument that the Commission when setting the amount of the fine wrongly departed from its 2006 Fining Guidelines without stating reasons. According to the General Court, the Commission had to justify why, in this case, it used the turnover during the entire infringement period instead of the general practice of using the turnover for the previous calendar year and multiplying it by the number of years of participation in the infringement. For that reason, the General Court reduces the fine to € 238.7 million.

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General Court overturns Google AdSense decision due to inadequate investigation Commission

General Court of the European Union, judgment of 18 September 2024

Google’s appeal against the Commission’s fine decision on AdSense was upheld by the General Court on 18 September 2024. In March 2019, the Commission found that Google and parent company Alphabet (collectively: “Google”) had abused its dominant position in the advertising market and imposed on Google a fine of € 1.5 billion. With this judgment, the General Court annuls the Commission’s fining decision. The case revolves around Google’s online advertising intermediary service – AdSense for Search (“AFS”). Websites with integrated search engines (“Direct Partners”) can use this service to serve ads on results pages related to the end user’s search query. An end-user on a website such as Tripadvisor, for example, after entering a search query, will not only see results generated by the website, but also ads in the form of a search result matching the search query.

In that context, Google entered into agreements with Direct Partners containing exclusivity clauses from 2006 onwards that prevented Direct Partners from buying search advertising services from Google’s competitors. From 2009 on, Google began replacing these exclusivity clauses with ‘placement clauses’ and/or ‘authorisation clauses’. The placement clauses stipulated that the main (highest featured) ad space on a website had to be reserved for the ads delivered by AFS. The authorisation clauses required the Direct Partners to first seek permission from Google if they wanted to change the design and layout of their ads, this applied to ads supplied by Google but also its competitors. By way of these three clauses, Google could control the placement and form of both AFS and competitor ads. The Commission concluded that the imposition of these three clauses together constituted a single and continuous infringement of Article 102 TFEU.

The General Court first held that there is no overall market for all forms of online advertising, as Google argued. The Commission had rightly defined a separate market for search-related ads. As for the three clauses that Google imposed on Direct Partners, the Commission stated that competitors of AFS were excluded from the online advertising market by preventing Direct Partners from doing business with competitors, given in particular the exclusivity clause. According to the Commission, this resulted in a discouragement of innovation and a strengthening of Google’s dominant position. The General Court finds that, in doing so, the Commission erred in taking into account the cumulative period of the agreements (from 2006-2016) without assessing whether there were opportunities for the Direct Partners to renegotiate or terminate the agreements in the meantime, allowing them to choose a competitor of AFS. In addition, the Commission failed to prove that the three clauses actually covered a significant part of the market in 2016. The General Court therefore fully annuls the Commission’s decision.

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Gazprom commitments upheld on appeal

Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 26 September 2024

On 26 September 2024, the CJEU dismissed appeals by Orlen, Poland’s largest gas and oil company, against the General Court’s judgment on the Gazprom commitments. Orlen had appealed to the General Court against a Commission decision declaring commitments by Gazprom to be binding. Those commitments were made by Gazprom in 2018 after the Commission carried out an investigation into the functioning of the gas markets in Central and Eastern Europe between 2011 and 2015. Based on that investigation, the Commission came to the preliminary conclusion that Gazprom was abusing its dominant position on national markets for upstream wholesale gas supply in some Central and Eastern European countries in violation of Article 102 TFEU.

According to Orlen, the commitments, which the Commission declared binding by decision on 24 May 2018, are insufficient to address the competition concerns identified by the Commission. The General Court had identified some shortcomings in the commitments but ultimately upheld the decision on the basis of a holistic assessment. The CJEU now confirms that the Commission is allowed a margin of error and that only a manifest error of assessment, casting doubt on the correctness of the analysis carried out, can lead to the annulment of the contested decision. Moreover, contrary to Orlen’s argument, the CJEU held that there was no breach of Orlen’s legitimate expectations by the Commission. The content of a statement of objections is only preliminary and provisional in nature and cannot give rise to any legitimate expectations about future action by the Commission. For these reasons, the CJEU dismisses Orlen’s appeal.

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Concept of undertaking cannot be used for service of summons on subsidiary entities that are not sued

Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 11 July 2024

On 11 July 2024, the CJEU answered the question of whether a parent company which is the subject of a claim for damage caused by a competition law infringement is validly served with a summons where the service was effected at the address of its subsidiary, which is domiciled in the Member State in which the action was brought and with which it forms an economic unit. The CJEU answers this question in the negative.

Swedish Volvo AB was sued before a Spanish court by Transsaqui, a Spanish company that purchased two trucks from Volvo during the infringement period of the trucks cartel and that subsequently requested compensation. However, Transsaqui served the summons on Volvo España, Volvo AB’s Spanish subsidiary, because, according to Transsaqui, they belong to the same undertaking.

The CJEU points out that an ‘undertaking’ does not have autonomous legal personality, which means that the legal entities that comprise it must be sued separately. Moreover, even if a subsidiary would form an economic unit with its parent entity, this does not imply that the subsidiary has been expressly authorised or designated by the parent company as a person empowered to receive on its behalf judicial documents intended for it. Nor does such a presumption arise from the concept of undertaking; this would prejudice the defendant’s rights of defence, according to the CJEU. The principles effectiveness of Article 101 TFEU and the right to an effective remedy under Article 47 of the Charter do not alter this conclusion, nor do the costs and time involved in foreign service allow for a different conclusion, according to the CJEU.

Finally, the CJEU notes that – in line with the Sumal judgment – a victim of a competition law infringement could also simply sue Volvo España itself and hold it jointly and severally liable for the damages suffered. This CJEU notes that, this way, time and costs of the service process would be saved.

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Concept of undertaking cannot be used on victim’s side in jurisdiction assessment based on Erfolgsort

Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 4 July 2024

In another judgment on the concept of undertaking, delivered on 4 July, the CJEU addressed the question of whether the concept can be used to allow a parent company to claim damages in its place of domicile for all its subsidiaries (which are located elsewhere). The case also concerned a damages claim following the trucks cartel, this time against Mercedes. The Hungarian company MOL claimed damages on behalf of all its subsidiaries that had purchased trucks during the cartel period. According to MOL, the Hungarian court had jurisdiction to rule on the claims pursuant to the Erfolgsort, as the place where the damages were suffered was in Hungary, MOL’s place of business.

The CJEU held that Article 7(2) Brussels I-bis cannot be interpreted that way. That jurisdictional ground relates to the place where the direct damages are suffered. However, not MOL itself but rather its subsidiaries bought trucks during the cartel period. The parent company therefore suffered at most indirect (financial) damage, according to the CJEU. The CJEU held that a mirror (or reverse) interpretation of the concept of undertaking – according to which a victim is considered an economic unit and it can act as such, as opposed to the infringing undertaking – cannot be used when assessing jurisdiction under Article 7(2) Brussels I-bis.

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Amsterdam court assumes jurisdiction over US pharmaceutical AbbVie due to existence of economic unity with Dutch anchor defendant

Amsterdam District Court, judgment of 17 July 2024

On 17 July 2024, the Amsterdam District Court assumed jurisdiction over US pharmaceutical AbbVie Inc (“AbbVie US”) because it forms an economic unit together with AbbVie B.V. (“AbbVie NL”). As a result, the claims against them are related within the meaning of Section 7(1) Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, the court said. The case concerned a class action (WAMCA) in which the claim vehicle Stichting Farma Ter Verantwoording (“FTV”) claimed a declaratory judgment that drug manufacturer AbbVie had acted unlawfully and abused its dominant position by overpricing Humira, a drug for rheumatoid arthritis. The ACM also investigated AbbVie’s prices for Humira in 2020, but this investigation was eventually closed after informal commitments were accepted.

FTV filed (identical) claims against AbbVie US, AbbVie NL and German AbbVie GmbH (“AbbVie Germany”). As AbbVie NL is domiciled in the Netherlands (Amsterdam), the court has jurisdiction over the claims against AbbVie NL. As for AbbVie US, the court emphasises that the conduct of a subsidiary (AbbVie NL) can be imputed to its parent company (AbbVie US). With AbbVie US holding 100% of the share capital in AbbVie NL, the court assumes the existence of decisive influence over AbbVie NL. AbbVie has not succeeded in rebutting the presumption of decisive influence. Moreover, it has not been refuted that AbbVie US is responsible for the pricing policy or that there is a specific link between the alleged infringement and AbbVie NL’s activities. As AbbVie US and AbbVie NL consequently form an economic unit, the court held that the claims are closely connected within the meaning of Article 7(1) Dutch Code of Civil Procedure. The similar basis for the claims also makes it foreseeable that AbbVie US will be sued in the Netherlands over a dispute relating to the Dutch market, according to the court.

However, the court did not assume jurisdiction over AbbVie Germany because FTV had not sufficiently argued the specific link between AbbVie Germany’s activities and the subject matter of the alleged infringement in the Netherlands.

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Supreme Court overrules Amsterdam Court of Appeal and Minister I&W; flight reduction at Schiphol should first past Brussels

Supreme Court, judgment of 12 July 2024

In the proceedings of IATA, KLM and several other airlines against the Dutch State and Royal Schiphol Group, the Supreme Court recently ruled that the Minister of Infrastructure and Water Management (“Minister”) could not decide (on an experimental basis) to reduce the amount of flights at Schiphol without following the prescribed (European) procedure.

In 2023, the Minister published a so-called ‘Experimental Regulation’ with the aim of reducing noise pollution around Schiphol Airport. In the Experimental Regulation, the Minister no longer uses the ‘New Standards and Enforcement System’ (NNHS) – which has been in used since 2010 on the basis of the use of those runaways that cause the least amount of noise – but reverts to the old enforcement system with specific ‘enforcement points’ around and near the runways. As a result, under the Experimental Scheme, the maximum number of aircraft movements at Schiphol would be reduced to 460,000 per year instead of 500,000.

On appeal, the airlines argued that the Minister was not entitled to simply limit the number of aircraft movements at Schiphol without following the correct procedure. Instead, in light of legal certainty and proportionality, the European consultation process described in the Noise Regulation – the so-called balanced approach procedure – should be followed first. The preliminary relief judge of the North Holland District Court ruled in their favour in April 2023, but was later knocked back by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal. In short, the Court of Appeal ruled that the Minister’s measures were only a clearly defined and time-limited experiment, for which the European procedure need not be followed.

Upon cassation, the Supreme Court took a more pragmatic approach, just like the court in preliminary relief proceedings, and ruled that the Experimental Regulation does (de facto) prescribe a limitation in the number of aircraft movements, or at least has that effect. As the term ‘operating restriction’ in the Noise Regulation is broadly defined, the Minister should therefore also go through the balanced approach procedure for the (perhaps not even so) temporary measures provided for in the Experimental Regulation. According to the Supreme Court, there cannot be a reasonable doubt in that regard. The Supreme Court therefore set aside the judgment of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal and referred the case back to the Hague Court of Appeal for further consideration and decision.

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Commission approves six Dutch aid measures for innovation, pharma and energy transition of several billion euros

European Commission, publications of July 2024

In July 2024, the Commission approved six State aid measures of the Dutch state. On 29 July, the Commission decided on two Dutch aid measures supporting renewable hydrogen production. The first measure concerns € 998 million in aid – granted through a competitive bidding procedure – to increase electrolysis capacity and support the construction of at least 200MW of electrolysis capacity. The second support measure is a direct grant of € 80 million to Djewels B.V. for the construction and operation of a ‘demonstration project’. The project aims at demonstrating the feasibility of producing renewable hydrogen with an alkaline electrolyser. According to the Commission, this project concerns the latest innovation and is deemed one of a kind. Both measures are considered by the Commission to be necessary, appropriate and proportionate whilst only having a limited effect on competition. These measures contribute to achieving the objectives set out in the EU Hydrogen Strategy and the European Green Deal.

On 26 July, the Commission approved another Dutch aid measure worth € 2 billion. This scheme supports the Pallas project for the production of medical radioisotopes for the diagnosis and treatment of cancer. The project involves the construction of a reactor and a nuclear health centre in Petten. The Pallas project will produce radiopharmaceuticals that can then be administered to patients for amongst others the diagnosis and treatment of cancer. It contributes to ensuring security of supply of essential and life-saving medicines, in line with the Pharmaceutical strategy for Europe.

In addition, the Commission approved a Dutch aid measure worth € 750 million on 25 July. This aid measure focuses on the decarbonisation of industrial processes in line with the Temporary crisis and transition framework for State aid. Through direct subsidies, the aid measure aims to encourage companies in the Netherlands to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from industrial production processes by at least 40% compared to the current situation. The Commission also approved a Dutch aid measure of € 700 million aimed at small and medium-sized farmers who voluntarily close their livestock farm sites in order to reduce nitrogen emissions.

Finally, the Commission approved more than € 10 billion in Dutch and French aid to Air France-KLM after its initial decisions were overturned by the General Court on 20 December 2023 and 7 February 2024. In these judgments, the General Court ruled that the Commission had wrongly considered Air France and KLM as the sole beneficiaries of the French and Dutch measures respectively, without looking at the whole group. The Commission has now reassessed the French and Dutch measures with the Air France-KLM group as beneficiary, concluding that the measures still comply with the Temporary Framework for the COVID-crisis.

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Nuctech may not hide behind Chinese servers in Commission dawnraid

President of the General Court, order of 12 August 2024

Recently, the President of the General Court (“President”) dismissed the application by Nuctech Netherlands and Nuctech Warsaw (hereinafter collectively “Nuctech”) for suspension of the Commission decision pursuant to which raids were carried out at Nuctech’s premises. Between 23 and 26 April 2024, the Commission carried out unannounced company visits at Nuctech, a company active in the production and sale of scanning equipment for (air)ports. The Commission suspected that Nuctech may have obtained anti-competitive subsidies in violation of the FSR (see also our earlier CF Q2 2024) and therefore carried out raids requesting, among other things, access to mailboxes of some employees.

Nuctech argued, inter alia, that it could not comply with these requests because the employees in question were Chinese nationals and their emails were not stored on local (European) servers, but on the Chinese servers of parent company Nuctech Hong Kong, and that the Commission was violating international and European public law by requesting it nonetheless. The President ruled that the Commission is free to investigate and request information from companies operating in the EU, such as Nuctech; indeed, otherwise the Commission could never hold non-European companies liable for conduct that disrupts the internal market. Furthermore, according to the President, Nuctech had substantiated in an “extremely laconic” manner why releasing the e-mails would violate Chinese law. Therefore, that plea also failed.

Regarding the urgency of the request, the President ruled that Nuctech had only alleged financial losses. Financial consequences do not qualify as serious and irreparable harm, so the required urgency was not considered proven. The President continued that, moreover, the freedom for an EU company to store information wherever it so wishes, cannot preclude an investigation into a possible violation of EU law. Nuctech’s requests were therefore rejected.

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CJEU upholds Commission decision and orders Ireland to recover € 13 billion from Apple

Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 10 September 2024

In its judgment of 10 September 2024, the CJEU ruled that Ireland must recover around € 13 billion in illegal State aid from Apple. In 2016, the Commission decided that two companies belonging to the Apple group had enjoyed tax benefits from 1991 to 2014 that constituted illegal State aid. This aid concerned tax benefits enjoyed by Apple through two tax rulings issued by Ireland in 1991 and 2007 in favour of two companies of the Apple group: Apple Sales International (“ASI”) and Apple Operations Europe (“AOE”). These entities were incorporated in Ireland but were not tax resident in Ireland. With the tax rulings, profits from the use of intellectual property licences by ASI and AOE were attributed to the parent company in the United States, although ASI and AOE were actually the only ones able to conduct the commercial activities concerning those licences. This unfairly excluded those profits from Irish taxes, which the Commission concluded to be State aid.

In 2020, the General Court annulled the Commission’s decision, ruling that the Commission had not sufficiently demonstrated the existence of a selective advantage that followed from the tax rulings. The CJEU in turn set aside the General Court’s judgment and upheld the Commission’s decision. The CJEU held – contrary to the General Court – that the Commission had sufficiently proved that the profits from ASI’s and AOE’s intellectual property licences were to be allocated to these Irish branches for tax purposes, given their activities regarding those licences. The CJEU thus confirmed the Commission decision and ordered Ireland to recover the unlawfully granted aid from Apple, which is estimated to be around € 13 billion.

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Tied up cash? ACM investigates Dutch savings market

Authority for Consumers & Markets, publication of 16 July 2024

On 16 July 2024, the ACM published an investigation into competition in the Dutch savings market. The investigation was prompted by a public debate that arose in 2023, following which the Dutch Minister of Finance asked the ACM to investigate the relationship between (the lack of) competition in the Dutch savings market and lagging savings rates. The perception was that customers were receiving little to no benefits while banks were making historically high profits. In particular, saving interest rates of the largest banks remained quite low compared to ECB policy rates.

The ACM concludes that there is a high degree of concentration in the savings market: indeed, the combined market share of the four largest banks (ABN AMRO, ING, Rabobank and Volksbank) – in a market where 23 individual banks operate – has remained the same at 90-95% since 2014. The ACM therefore qualifies the market as an oligopolistic market, characterised by the presence of a few large providers on the supply side, with possibly a group of smaller providers who have no influence on the policies of these providers.

According to the ACM, the fact that the market is oligopolistic explains the discrepancy between the lagging savings rates of the major banks compared to the higher savings rates offered by the other banks in response to ECB policy rates, which rose 10 times during the period 2022-2024. According to the ACM, the major banks keep their savings rates the same by only reacting to each other, without explicitly agreeing to do so. Internal documents, which the ACM requested as part of this investigation, show that the major banks mainly focus on the other major banks in their decision-making. The ACM’s conclusion is therefore that the oligopoly of the dominant banks has led to anti-competitive outcomes, namely that consumers have not been able to benefit from competition on savings rates.

Finally, the ACM examined why major banks experience little competitive pressure from other banks. It found, for instance, that consumers experience switching barriers that prevent them from switching to more favourable offers. Switching barriers include, for example, the cost and time associated with opening a new savings account, or not being able to carry over their IBAN number to a new account. Moreover, many consumers inform the ACM that they are satisfied with their current bank’s offer. However, according to the ACM, the majority of consumers are not adequately informed about alternative offers. The ACM therefore makes recommendations to remove these switching barriers with the aim of improving competition in the savings market.

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Volkswagen guilty of unfair and deceptive business practices in diesel scandal

Rotterdam District Court, judgment of 9 July 2024

Volkswagen is guilty of unfair and misleading business practices for manipulating mandatory emissions tests, the Rotterdam District Court confirmed on 9 July 2024 in the appeal against the €450,000 fine that the ACM imposed on Volkswagen in 2017. The case concerns the so-called diesel scandal; between 2009 and 2015, Volkswagen installed software in diesel cars that could recognise when the car was in a test situation and then caused it to emit less nitrogen than it normally did. At the request of Consumers Association, the ACM launched an investigation into the diesel scandal in 2017 and imposed the (then maximum) fine on Volkswagen. This was incidentally also the first case in which the ACM found that false sustainability claims were misleading.

Volkswagen appealed against that fine. Volkswagen argued, among other things, that the fine violated the ne bis in idem principle because it had also been fined in Germany for the diesel scandal. Since the German case, in which Volkswagen also invoked the ne bis in idem principle, was now before the CJEU, the court decided to await that judgment first. After, taking into account the CJEU judgment, the court ruled that, although the actual conduct of Volkswagen for which the ACM imposed the fine was described in the German fine, that conduct did not underlie the German fine. Thus, the German fine decision was not based on the same factual conduct as the Dutch fine decision. Thus, the ne bis in idem principle had not been violated.

The Rotterdam District Court then assessed whether Volkswagen’s business practices were actually misleading and unfair. The court upheld all three grounds on which the ACM fined Volkswagen. First, Volkswagen unlawfully claimed that its products had received approval from a public body (in violation of Article 6:193g(d) of the Dutch Civil Code), whereas it had obtained the approval only by manipulating the mandatory emissions tests. Secondly, by using, installing and concealing the manipulative software, Volkswagen violated the requirements of professional diligence (in violation of Article 6:193b(2) of the Dutch Civil Code). Finally, the green claims about the diesel vehicles were based on the manipulated emissions tests and were therefore misleading (in violation of Article 6:193c(1)(b) of the Dutch Civil Code).

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CJEU shines light on conditions for price indication of products

Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 26 September 2024

Responding to preliminary questions, the CJEU answered on 26 September 2024 that a price reduction, or discount price, must actually be lower than the lowest price at which the relevant product was offered in the previous 30 days and that it is not enough for the seller to merely mention that previous lowest price. The preliminary questions were raised in the context of a dispute between a German regional consumer protection association and Aldi Süd over two price reductions for bananas and pineapples in a weekly advertising brochure. A discount price was listed for both products, along with another (crossed-out) price indication in smaller figures. Under both offers, the previous lowest price at which the products were sold in the previous 30 days was also listed. However, the so-called “discount price” in these cases was not lower than the lowest price used in the previous 30 days.

In particular, the case revolves around the interpretation of Article 6a of Directive 98/6, which states that when announcing price reductions, traders must indicate the lowest price applied during the previous 30 days. The referring German court questioned whether this article also implies that the new price must actually be lower than that lowest price, or whether it is sufficient to clearly display the price indications. The CJEU held that although the directive does not explicitly require the new price to be lower than the lowest price from the last 30 days, this does follow from the objectives of the directive. These objectives include improving consumer information and ensuring a high level of consumer protection. The CJEU stressed that the term “price reduction” in its colloquial meaning refers to an actual reduction of a previous price. By requiring that the new price must be lower than the lowest price of the previous 30 days, consumers are prevented from being misled. This safeguards the aims of the directive, the CJEU said.

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Judge suspends charges for travel agents to curb price jumps*

Rotterdam District Court, judgment of 24 September 2024

The preliminary relief judge of the Rotterdam District Court recently suspended three orders subject to penalty payments (and publication decisions) imposed by the ACM on three travel agents. The ACM’s decision concerned ‘price jumps’ that may occur when searching for a package holiday online. The ACM reproached the travel agents that the starting price on the search page is not always bookable, but can change (higher or lower) after a price check. The ACM qualified this as a misleading omission.

The court agreed with the ACM that the ads on the search page constituted an invitation to purchase and the price was essential information, but casted its doubts as to whether the applicants actually engaged in an unfair commercial practice. This is because the ACM’s interpretation differs from that of the European Commission in the Unfair Commercial Practices Guidelines, and from the opinion of the Advertising Code Committee (Reclame Code Commissie) and the Board of Appeal which recognise that the travel industry is subject to sudden price changes. The travel agents explained that the starting price shown was correct and current, but may be outdated at the time of booking due to price fluctuations by suppliers of the travel elements. Other than the ACM stated in the orders, the travel agents have substantiated with reports that consumers are not (negatively) affected by the practice of price checks and that competition is not distorted. Accordingly, the court ruled that it is doubtful whether this practice causes consumers to make a commercial decision they otherwise would not have made, and thus whether there is a violation at all. Moreover, the court questions whether enforcement in this situation is proportionate and expedient. For this reason, the orders and publication decisions are suspended.

* bureau Brandeis assisted the applicants in these proceedings

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For all your questions regarding (EU) competition law, bureau Brandeis would be happy to assist.

Bas Braeken – Jade Versteeg – Lara Elzas – Timo Hieselaar – Demi van den Berg – Coen VermeijJoost van Belois

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Competition Flashback Q2 2021

This is the first Competition Flashback by bureau Brandeis, featuring a selection of some of the key competition law developments of the past quarter (see the original version here).

If you would like to receive the next Competition Flashback by e-mail you can subscribe to our mailing list here.


Overview Q2 2021

  • Notarial deed paper cartel; fine reduced from €2 million to €10,000
  • CJEU Recyclex: antitrust immunity only in the case of an extended infringement
  • Fine of €40 million for Dutch railway company NS struck down by Court
  • Private equity firm can recover cartel fine for incorrect information during due diligence
  • State Aid to KLM and Condor called into question as a result of inadequate reasoning
  • New ACM merger decision Sanoma/Iddink on the way after appeal by Noordhoff
  • Preliminary findings in the truck cartel damages case: claimants may go ahead
  • European Commission takes on Apple after Spotify complaint

 


ACM publishes notarial deed paper cartel four years later; fine reduced from €2 million to €10,000

ACM, press release of 1 July 2021 | Rotterdam District Court, judgment of 11 May 2021

Almost four years after the first fine decision, a long-running cartel case has been made public with the publication of a news release and a number of decisions by the Dutch Competition Authority (“ACM”). At the same time, the Rotterdam District Court also published two judgments in this cartel case (Rotterdam District Court judgments of 6 December 2018 and 11 May 2021, as published on 30 June and 1 July 2021).

At the centre of this case were (alleged) price and market sharing agreements on the market for notarial deed paper. This case revolved around agreements between one producer (of which the subsidiary that implemented the cartel agreements was separated from the parent company during the infringement period) and two distributors. All three parties supplied notary’s offices with notarial deed paper.

For the agreements concerning these sales the ACM imposed a fine of almost €2.8 million on the producer in a decision dated 17 February 2017 (whereby the parent company was held jointly and severally liable for the entire sum and the subsidiary for €2.06 million). One natural person, the de facto manager of the producer, was (initially) fined €200,000 (reduced to €80,000 after an objection). One distributor was fined €3,000 and the third distributor received full immunity from fines under the 2006 Notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (“Leniency Notice“).

Initially, the interim relief judge of the Rotterdam District Court suspended the decision of the ACM to publish the fine decision (judgment not yet published). The interim relief judge considered that the contentious agreements were vertical in nature and not horizontal. The Rotterdam District Court saw this differently and ruled that Article 2 (4) (a) of the Block Exemption for Vertical Agreements is not applicable. Based on this provision, agreements between competing companies (i.e. agreements of a horizontal nature) can also fall under the Block Exemption if there is a “non-reciprocal vertical agreement”, whereby the supplier is both a manufacturer and a distributor and the buyer is only a distributor. According to the Court, however, the agreements are (purely) horizontal in nature.

The Court also considered that in the case of object restrictions, no analysis of the counterfactual is required. The counterfactual refers to the market situation as it would have been without the alleged agreements. The producer had argued that without the distribution agreements it had entered into there would have been no competition at all. Indeed, until recently, the market for notarial deed paper was strictly regulated on the basis of rules of the Royal Dutch Association of Civil-law Notaries.

The District Court did not follow this line of reasoning. The Court, however, did rule that the ACM had set the gravity factor too high and lowered it from 2.75 to 1, and set the fine for the producer at €1 million and for the de facto manager at €60,000. A previously published judgment by the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal (“CBb“) shows that the producer’s fine was eventually reduced to €10,000. The difficult financial situation in which the company found itself as a result of the Covid 19 crisis was partly the basis for this reduction.


CJEU Recyclex: (partial) immunity from cartel infringement only if the scope of the infringement is extended

Court of Justice, judgment of 3 June 2021

On 3 June 2021, the Court of Justice (“CJEU”) delivered a judgment on the interpretation and application of the conditions set out in the third paragraph of point 26 of the Leniency Notice.

Recyclex had relied on the third paragraph of point 26 of the Leniency Notice when it provided the European Commission (“Commission“) with information about a particular meeting within the Car battery recycling cartel in which it participated. Recyclex submits that the Commission would have been unable to provide sufficient evidence of this particular meeting and therefore claims to be entitled to partial immunity. In this respect, according to Recyclex, it is irrelevant that the Commission was already aware of the fact that the meeting had taken place.

The CJEU does not share this view and holds that undertakings concerned can claim partial immunity only if they provide the Commission with evidence which “complement or supplement those of which the Commission is already aware and which alter the material or temporal scope of the infringement, as found by the Commission.

Therefore, in order to successfully claim (partial) immunity on the basis of the third paragraph of point 26 of the Leniency Notice a cartel participant must provide the Commission with information on new facts which alter the original scope of the infringement.


Fine for Dutch railway company NS struck down by Court because dominance was not proven

CBb, judgment of 1 June 2021

In its judgment of 1 June, the CBb struck down a fine of more than €40 million that the ACM had imposed on Dutch railway company NS. The ACM had adopted this fine in a decision of 22 May 2017 alleging that NS had abused its dominant economic position.

According to the ACM, NS used its economic dominance on the main rail network (“HRN“) of the Netherlands to hinder its competitors Arriva and Veolia in the province Limburg. Specifically, in 2016 NS had submitted what the ACM considered to be a loss-making bid in the tender for a 15-year public transport concession in Limburg.

The Rotterdam District Court ruled in its judgment of 27 June 2019 that the ACM had not convincingly proven that NS actually had a dominant economic position. In addition, according to the District Court, the link between NS’ position on the HRN and the concession in Limburg was uncertain after 2024 (the concession for the HRN expires in 2024).

The CBb largely confirmed the ruling of the Rotterdam District Court. The ACM did not prove that NS has a position of economic dominance. According to the CBb, there is (potential) competition as the barriers for entering the HRN market is not too high. The fine of more than €40 million that the ACM had imposed on NS has therefore been permanently struck down.


Private equity can recover cartel fine in case of incorrect information during due diligence

Rotterdam District Court, judgment of 26 May 2021

Between November 2004 and July 2011 private equity firm Bencis held 92% of the shares in flour producer Meneba (now acquired by Dossche Mills). During this period Meneba was fined by the ACM for its participation in the flour cartel. This decision was confirmed by the ACM after administrative objection, by the Rotterdam District Court on appeal and by the CBb on further appeal.

Almost four years after the first decision and under the influence of European developments, the ACM (also) imposed a cartel fine of over €1,2 million on Bencis because of Meneba’s participation in the flour cartel. The basis of Bencis’ liability was that it had decisive influence on Meneba due to their close economic, organisational and legal ties. Therefore, according to the ACM, the infringement could also be attributed to Bencis.

Bencis is later seeking to recover this fine from Meneba in a case heard by the Rotterdam District Court. To this end, Bencis primarily argued that only Meneba factually participated in the cartel agreements. In its judgement of 26 may the Rotterdam District Court did not uphold Bencis’ claim. It considered that there is no room for recourse on the basis of a joint obligation (Article 6:10 Dutch Civil Code (“BW”)) since Bencis and Meneba were not fined jointly and severally. It also considered that there is no room for a claim based on tort (Article 6:162 BW). The tort claim failed on the basis of the relativity requirement, since the right to compensation for cartel violations does not extend to the protection of other cartel participants (see Courage/Crehan).

However, the judgement of the Rotterdam District Court is unlikely to be the end of this matter. At the hearing, Bencis argued that Meneba, within the context of a due diligence investigation prior to the acquisition of the shares by Bencis, had allegedly stated that no infringements, including infringements of competition law, had taken place. If Bencis succeeds in proving this with documents, this could, according to the Court, constitute an unlawful act by Meneba towards Bencis.


State aid to KLM and Condor called into question as a result of inadequate reasoning

General Court, judgments of 19 May 2021 and 9 June 2021

On 19 May 2021, the General Court in Luxembourg held that the Commission wrongly approved the €3.4 billion state aid granted to KLM on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. This article provides for the possibility to grant aid to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State, such as caused by the COVID-19 crisis. In its decision, the Commission did not provide sufficient reasoning by failing to adequately take into account the fact that KLM and Air France, both part of the same group, have been the recipient of two aid measures.

In its decision the Commission states that the Dutch authorities ‘confirmed’ that the financing granted to KLM would not be used by Air France. However, in the General Court’s view, the Commission failed to provide sufficient reasons as to how this would be guaranteed. In that regard, the relationship between KLM and Air France within the group – and the aid granted to them – was not sufficiently taken into account. Although the decision has been annulled, the aid granted does not have to be recovered immediately. KLM may keep the aid at least until the Commission has adopted a new decision.

The decision in which the Commission approved the German aid to airline Condor was also annulled by the General Court on the ground that it contained insufficient reasoning. The aid, based on Article 107(2)(b) TFEU, was intended to compensate Condor for the damage caused directly by the COVID-19 pandemic.

However, the German authorities included approx. €17 million in additional costs in the aid for Condor, because the latter was under an insolvency procedure following the liquidation of its parent company (Thomas Cook). This procedure started well before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, though. The Commission did not explain how (the costs surrounding) the failed sale of Condor in the insolvency procedure were related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

In this case, too, the aid granted will not be recovered immediately. In order to avoid direct damage to the German economy, Condor is allowed to keep the amount until the Commission has taken a new decision.


New ACM merger decision in Sanoma/Iddink coming after successful appeal by Noordhoff

ACM, announcement of 17 May 2021

On 28 August 2019, the ACM decided that Sanoma Learning (publisher of Malmberg schoolbooks) may acquire Iddink Group, distributor of educational material, conditional upon commitments. Iddink Group owns Magister, an electronic learning management system that many secondary schools in the Netherlands use. The commitments ensure that competitors have equal access to Magister and data from Magister after the merger. In addition, the merging parties must guarantee that no commercially sensitive information from competing publishers will be shared with Malmberg via Iddink.

Noordhoff, a competitor of Malmberg, did not agree with the ACM and appealed the decision. In its ruling of 4 March 2021, the Rotterdam District Court annulled the ACM’s decision.

According to the Court, the ACM had not sufficiently substantiated that post-merger Sanoma/Iddink has no possibility to foreclose competitors by means of bundling and that therefore no conglomerate effects existed. The ACM has announced that it will take a new decision and has also appealed against the District Court’s ruling.


Interim position truck cartel damages case: green light for the time being

Amsterdam District Court, judgment of 12 May 2021

On 12 May 2021, the Amsterdam District Court rendered an interlocutory judgment in the damages claim proceedings instituted by, among others, CDC against participants in the Truck Cartel. This judgment is limited to (i) an assessment of the scope of the Commission’s penalty decision, and (ii) the truck manufacturers’ defence that the exchange of information did not have a price-increasing effect and that the infringement therefore did not result in any damage.

With regard to the first point, the Court finds that it is bound by (the operative part of) the Commission’s decision regarding (the temporal and geographical scope of) the infringing behaviour as well as the persons liable for it. However, this does not exclude plaintiffs from providing further factual interpretation of the infringing behaviour.

With regard to the second point, the Court considered that the truck manufacturers must demonstrate that it is generally impossible that the infringement could have resulted in damage. Based on the expert reports, the Court finds that this has not been established. It is therefore up to the plaintiffs – for the remainder of the proceedings – to make it plausible that they have possibly suffered damage as a result of the unlawful actions of the truck manufacturers. This is needed to meet the threshold for referral to the damages assessment procedure.


Commission takes on Apple after Spotify complaint – national authorities follow

European Commission, press release of 30 April 2021

In March 2019 Spotify lodged a complaint with the Commission accusing Apple of distorting competition on the market for music streaming services offered through the App Store. Spotify claims that Apple is abusing its full control over the iOS mobile operating system and the App Store to impose unfair terms on competitors, such as Spotify, and to favour its own music streaming service Apple Music.

On 16 June 2020, the Commission launched an investigation into Apple’s policies on the App Store. In its press release of 30 April 2021, the Commission stated that in the Statement of Objections it had reached the preliminary view that Apple was abusing its dominant position. The Commission accuses Apple of forcing competing music streaming services to use the App Store’s ‘in-app’ purchase mechanism and charging a 30% commission in return.

In addition, the Commission’s objections relate to so-called ‘anti-steering provisions’ that restrict app developers in their ability to inform customers of alternative purchasing options. National authorities such as the ACM and the British CMA have also started investigations into these practices by Apple.

 


For all your questions regarding (EU) competition law, bureau Brandeis would be happy to assist you. You can reach us via the links below.

Bas BraekenJade VersteegLara ElzasTimo Hieselaar en Berend Verweij

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An overview of Big Tech cases leading up to the Digital Markets Act (DMA)

The rise of Tech Giants such as Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple and Microsoft (“Big Tech”) and their integration into people’s lives has been interesting on many levels. Particularly in the context of fair and contestable digital markets, it raises many questions. The most pressing of these is whether ex-post enforcement of EU competition law is effective enough to keep up with rapidly evolving (digital) markets and Big Tech companies.

To expand its enforcement toolkit, the European Commission (“Commission”) published a proposal for a Digital Markets Act (“DMA”) in December 2020. Its overall objective is to complement antitrust intervention in digital markets with ex-ante regulation in the form of a set of obligations that platforms identified as “gatekeepers” should abide by.

This blog covers recent developments in the fight against Big Tech, followed by a more detailed analysis of the DMA and its implications for gatekeepers.

Ex-post enforcement of Big Tech companies

The fight against anti-competitive behaviour by Big Tech companies has kept both the Commission and national competition authorities (“NCAs”) quite busy over the last years.

Although the Commission was initially relatively passive towards Big Tech, its Google Android decision from 2018 seems to have been an important starting point for (EU) competition law enforcement towards Big Tech. In this case, the Commission concluded that Google had abused its dominant position by tying the Google Search app to the Android appstore. Not only did the Commission impose a massive fine on Google of €4.3 billion (the highest fine ever imposed), it also established guidelines for assessing dominance in the mobile ecosystem.

Margrethe Verstager, European Commissioner for Competition, indicated that it became her mission to counter the rise of increasingly powerful digital platforms. Subsequently, it did not take long for the Commission to launch two formal investigations into Amazon.

The first investigation concerned Amazon’s use of marketplace seller data. In the Commission’s assessment, by using such non-public data, Amazon is able to avoid the normal risks of retail competition and to leverage its dominance on the market. The second antitrust probe assesses Amazon’s practices regarding its “Buy Box” and “Prime” label, which enables it to favour its own retail offers and offers of marketplace sellers that use Amazon’s logistics and delivery services over the ones of third-party sellers. When digital platform providers play a dual role – in which they act both as platform provider for business users and as retailer in competition with business users – they are incentivised to engage in self-preferencing.

In June 2020, after Spotify filed a complaint, the Commission launched a formal antitrust investigation into Apple’s rules for app developers on the distribution of apps via the App Store. On 30 April 2021, the Commission published its preliminary finding that Apple was indeed abusing its dominant position by requiring app developers to use Apple’s own in-app purchase system.

The Commission also launched a parallel investigation into Apple Pay, Apple’s mobile payment app. The Commission has expressed concerns that Apple’s terms related to the integration of Apple Pay for purchases of goods and services may distort competition and reduce choice and innovation, because no other payment solution than Apple Pay can access the payment chip technology embedded on iOS mobile devices for payments.

Lastly, Epic Games, the creator of the global hit game Fortnite, has officially filed a complaint with the Commission earlier this year. Epic Games accuses Apple of foreclosing the market for app distribution as well as the market for iOS in-app payment processing, allowing Apple to charge a higher commission. Previously, Epic Games has initiated proceedings against Apple in the US, Australia and the UK.

Also on the national level digital platforms have been subject to numerous competition law investigations. The Bundeskartellamt (“BKartA”) has been very active in this regard. In 2015, for instance, the BKartA issued a decision in which it prohibited Booking.com from continuing to apply its ‘best price’ clauses (for further information on APPAs and MFNs and the BKartA’s decision see our previous blog “On APPAs, MFNs and a tenacious German competition authority”).

Another significant case brought forward by the BKartA, regarding Facebook, dates back to 2019. In this decision, the German competition authority concluded that Facebook abused its dominant position in the social networking market by excessively collecting and combining user data without the consent of its users.

In April 2021, the BKartA has received an antitrust complaint about Apple from nine associations representing German media, Internet and advertising industries. They claim that the iPhone maker is abusing its dominant position with its recently introduced App Tracking Transparency program. This feature on iOS requires apps to ask users for permission to collect their data. However, the complainants submit that Apple itself can still collect significant amounts of user data.

In addition, the Netherlands Authority for Consumers & Markets (“ACM”) has conducted an in-depth market study into the mobile app store market and its implications for competition. This study shows that the lack of realistic alternatives to Apple’s App Store and Google’s Play Store puts them in a position – at least in theory – to set unfair conditions. The ACM is now investigating specifically whether Apple is abusing its dominant position through its App Store by imposing certain conditions on app providers that do not compete with Apple’s apps.

Need for ex-ante intervention?

Competition authorities in the EU thus appear to be willing to act against distortions of competition caused by Big Tech. However, given the (legal and factual) complexity and length of investigations, it often takes a long time before a sanction can be imposed. By then, the (perceived) damage has often already been done. The question therefore arises whether these measures can restore competition in a timely and effective manner. In light of ‘prevention is better than curing’, the DMA was proposed in December 2020. With this Act, the Commission aims to prevent the manifestation of anti-competitive effects in the digital market.

Definition of “Gatekeepers”

The DMA is focused at gatekeeper platforms. A gatekeeper is a provider of a core platform service with a significant impact on the internal market, including, among others, online intermediation services (e.g. app stores, Amazon), online search services (e.g. Google), online social networking services (e.g. Facebook), video-sharing platform services (e.g. TikTok), number-independent interpersonal communication services (e.g. WhatsApp), operating systems (iOS, Android, Microsoft).

The DMA only applies to gatekeepers that meet the following thresholds:

  • An annual EEA turnover equal or above €6.5 billion in the last three financial years or an average market capitalisation that amounted to at least €65 billion in the last financial year.
  • To serve as an important gateway for business users to reach their respective end users the core platform service must have more than 45 million monthly active end users in the EU and more than 10 000 yearly active business users in the EU over the course of the last financial year.

A platform has to notify the Commission if it meets these thresholds and therefore potentially constitutes a gatekeeper (duty to notify). The Commission reserves the right to proactively designate a core platform provider as a gatekeeper when they meet the thresholds, even – or especially – in cases where it did not receive a formal notification.

Obligations for gatekeepers

Once a core platform provider qualifies as a gatekeeper (whether or not designated as such by the Commission), it has to comply with certain obligations as set out in Articles 5 and 6 of the DMA. Some of these obligations relate to (similar) conduct that has given rise to many Big Tech competition cases in recent years. The DMA also includes a provision that creates the power for the Commission to update the list of obligations as a result of market investigations (Article 10 DMA). This makes the DMA flexible in its application and suitable to account for the highly dynamic and innovation driven markets.

Some of the proposed obligations concern:

  • Third-party personal data: Gatekeepers must refrain from combining personal data sourced from their own services with personal data from other services offered by the gatekeeper or third-party services without the consent of the user pursuant to the GDPR (Art. 5(a) DMA). The Bundeskartellamt reached the same conclusion in 2019 in its case against Facebook.
  • MFN/parity clauses: Gatekeepers must allow business users to offer the same products or services to end users through third-party online platforms under different terms and conditions than those of the gatekeeper’s platform (Section 5(b) DMA). The cases of Amazon e-books and Booking.com involved this type of conduct.
  • Anti-steering prohibition: Gatekeepers must allow business users to promote their products in apps purchased through the platform’s core service, such as Apple’s App Store (Article 5(c) DMA). Business users will thus be able to conclude contracts with their end-users outside the core platform. This will, for example, allow Epic Games to offer and sell their in-app products through their own channel, rather than exclusively through Apple’s in-app purchase system.
  • Opening of the operating systems to third-parties: Gatekeepers must allow third-party apps and app stores within the operating system of the device (i.e. iOS and Android). Such practices also lie at the heart of the Commission’s Apple App Store case. This obligation will have far-reaching implication for Apple’s App Store and Google’s Play Store. At the same time, the DMA acknowledges that the gatekeepers can take proportionate measures to ensure that third-party software applications do not endanger the integrity of the operating system provided by the gatekeeper.
  • Bundling prohibition: Gatekeepers are no longer allowed to bundle several of their core platform services, such as Google did with the pre-installation of Google Chrome on Android devices (Art. 5(f) DMA).
  • Non-public data: Gatekeepers have to refrain from using, in competition with business users, any data not publicly available, which is generated through activities by those business users (Art. 6(a) DMA). Such practices are currently under investigation with regard to the Amazon Marketplace.
  • Self-preferencing: Gatekeepers will have to refrain from treating their own services or products more favourably than those of third parties (Art. 6(d) DMA). The ongoing investigation of Amazon’s “’Buy Box” option is an example of this.

If gatekeepers fail to comply with these obligations, the Commission may impose fines of up to 10% of the gatekeeper’s worldwide annual turnover. It may also impose periodic penalty payments of 5% of the gatekeeper’s average daily turnover. Finally, the Commission has the power to take structural and behavioural measures when, following a market investigation, it finds that a gatekeeper is systematically violating its obligations under the DMA. An example of a structural remedy is the mandatory divestiture of (part of) a business.

Powers for national competition authorities

In principle, the enforcement of the DMA will lie with the Commission. However, the presidents of the NCAs in the EU have stated in their view that they should be given a complementary enforcement role under the DMA. They argue that their knowledge and expertise will make the DMA’s enforcement more effective and faster. Whether the NCAs will eventually be assigned a role in the enforcement of the DMA is unclear at this time.

Conclusion

Once in place, the DMA will embody the shift from ex-post enforcement to an ex-ante regulatory approach. In doing so, the Commission aims to improve competition in the Big Tech landscape. This could have a significant impact on the operations of gatekeepers within the EU.

However, the DMA is currently only a legislative proposal. Given the scope and expected impact of the DMA, it will be subject to much debate. Thus, it is still uncertain what the DMA will ultimately look like upon its enactment.

For further questions, you may contact Bas Braeken, Jade Versteeg, or Timo Hieselaar.

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Competition law and M&A: navigating through a minefield

The (European) supervision of concentrations is in full development. Most notably, the European Commission (“Commission”) has been cracking down on violations of the Merger Regulation in recent years.

If concentrations meet certain turnover thresholds, the companies involved have a notification obligation (Article 4 Merger Regulation). The companies involved may then not implement the concentration until the competent authority has approved the concentration. This is the standstill obligation (Article 7 Merger Regulation).

There is strict enforcement of violations of the notification and standstill obligation – so-called ‘gun-jumping’. It is therefore important to know what is and what is not permitted under competition law in the case of (the preparation of) a concentration. This blog provides an overview of recent legal developments and clarifies what merging parties can do prior to the approval of a transaction to avoid gun-jumping.

Unexpected decisive control?

If a company intends to acquire decisive control of another company, the acquiring party must notify this, provided that the turnover thresholds are met. However, it is not always clear when decisive control exists. For example, in 2012, Norwegian fish farmer Marine Harvest (now Mowi) acquired 48.5% of the shares in its competitor Morpol. This was notified to the Commission with a notice that the voting rights would not be exercised by Marine Harvest until approval was granted by the Commission. Prior to the notification, Marine Harvest made a public offer for the remaining shares in Morpol. This transaction was notified to the Commission, which subsequently found that the notification and standstill obligations had been violated because Marine Harvest had already acquired de facto decisive control in the acquisition of 48.5% of the shares in Morpol. The Commission reached this conclusion by checking the usual attendance of shareholders at previous shareholder meetings. On that basis, the Commission found that Marine Harvest, with 48.5%, constituted a majority among shareholders and could therefore exercise decisive control.

Marine Harvest was subsequently fined €10 million for violating the notification obligation and another €10 million for violating the standstill obligation. Although these appear to be two sides of the same coin, they are two distinguishable obligations for which the Commission can impose separate fines. Thus, there is no violation of the ne bis in idem principle. The Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) upheld the fines, ruling that in this case it did not matter that Marine Harvest had not exercised the voting rights because de facto sole decisive control had already been acquired prior to the public offer.

Decisive control or customary protection rights?

In February 2015, the telecom company Altice notified a proposed acquisition of PT Portugal, which received conditional approval from the Commission in April 2015. However, it later turned out that Altice could already exercise decisive influence before the acquisition was approved. In fact, the acquisition agreement already gave the telecom company veto rights over the appointment of senior management, pricing policy and several important contracts.

While the acquiring company may protect the value of the (shares in the) target company, it may not exercise decisive control beyond the ordinary course of business before the concentration approval is granted. Factors that are relevant in assessing whether there is a normal course of business are (i) the degree of involvement of the acquiring party in the day-to-day operation of the business, (ii) the nature of the measures in the agreement in favour of the acquiring company, and (iii) the monetary thresholds for exercising a veto with respect to the value of the target or purchase price. When these thresholds are very low, the exercise of decisive control is more likely to occur.

In this case, Altice already exercised decisive control prior to the notification through its involvement in PT Portugal’s negotiation strategy and choice of suppliers and certain TV channels. On that basis, in April 2018 the Commission imposed a fine of €124.5 million on Altice for gun-jumping, whereof €62.25 million for violating the notification obligation of Article 4 Merger Regulation and €62.25 million for violating the standstill obligation of Article 7 Merger Regulation.

On 8 November 2016, Altice was again fined €80 million for gun-jumping, this time by the French competition authority. In 2014, Altice notified the proposed acquisition of two telecom companies, SFR and OTL, by its subsidiary Numericable. The French competition authority had launched an investigation into gun-jumping, which revealed that Altice already had access to strategic information from and could exercise decisive influence over both companies before the concentration was approved. Altice had thus already acquired decisive control prior to any approval of the concentration, thereby engaging in gun-jumping.

Inseparable step for transaction does not necessarily lead to decisive control

An example of a situation where no decisive control was acquired by the purchasing company concerned the proposed concentration of KPMG Denmark and EY. The consultancy firms entered into a merger agreement on 18 November 2013. Since the Danish branch of KMPG still had a cooperation agreement with the KPMG group, this agreement was terminated on the very same day. The Danish competition authority approved the concentration at the end of May 2014, but stated (in December 2014) that unconditionally and irrevocably terminating the cooperation agreement with the KPMG Group before the concentration was approved could be regarded as an act in breach of the standstill obligation. The CJEU disagreed, concluding that the termination of the cooperation agreement does not lead to a change in decisive control of KPMG Denmark, even if this termination is inextricably linked to the concentration and may constitute a preparatory or side transaction of this concentration. According to the CJEU, transactions that do not lead to a change in decisive control do not fall within Article 7 Merger Regulation.

Transactions consisting of multiple steps

The Commission decision on Canon‘s acquisition of Toshiba Medical Systems Corporation (“TMSC”) shows that the notification and standstill obligation also applies to so-called ‘special purpose vehicles’. Canon intended to acquire TMSC by means of a ‘warehouse construction’. A special purpose vehicle was established which acquired 95% of the shares in TMSC for €800. Canon then acquired 5% of the shares for €5.28 billion and obtained a stock option on the remaining shares. The proposed acquisition was then notified to the Commission on 12 August 2016. After the Commission’s approval, the remaining 95% of the shares were acquired. The Commission launched an investigation into this construction in July 2017. It concluded that a transaction in which an interim buyer – the special purpose vehicle – acquires decisive control until the company will be sold to the ultimate seller, can be seen as the first step of the (final) transaction. After all, the preparatory step as such contributed to Canon’s acquisition of decisive control over TMSC, so that prior to this first step, notification was already required. As this was not done, the Commission imposed a fine of €28 million on Canon.

Another type of two-stage rocket was used by the French company Veolia. Veolia, active in the water, waste treatment and energy sectors, wanted to acquire decisive control of Suez through two steps. First, it obtained 29.9% of the shares in Suez from energy company ENGIE on 6 October 2020. The second step involved making a public offer for the remaining shares in Suez. Suez believed that these two steps should be considered as one transaction and that therefore Veolia should have notified the transaction before acquiring the shares. The Commission agreed that this was one transaction and that the two steps were interdependent; the public offer would never have happened without the previous acquisition of ENGIE shares. However, the Commission argued that both steps fell within the exception Article 7(2) Merger Regulation.

Article 7(2) Merger Regulation provides an exception to this standstill obligation for two types of transactions: a public bid and a series of share transactions where decisive control is acquired from multiple selling parties. However, the concentration must then be notified directly to the Commission and the acquirer may not exercise the voting rights. The Commission considered that the exception of Article 7(2) Merger Regulation regarding the public bid was also applicable to the first step of the concentration – the acquisition of 29.9% of the shares in Suez.

The Commission’s decision is in line with the General Court’s judgment in Marine Harvest. Indeed, the General Court concluded that it is possible for the acquisition of a minority stake, not yet acquiring decisive control of the target company, followed by a public takeover bid, to form part of one concentration falling within the scope of Article 7(2) Merger Regulation.

The difference between Marine Harvest and Veolia/Suez is that in the first situation, de facto decisive control was already obtained at the first step, namely through the acquisition of 48.5% of the shares in Morpol. This was not the case with Veolia with a 29.9% stake. Therefore, the standstill obligation is only violated if the first step already leads to an acquisition of decisive control. Although Suez has filed an appeal against the Commission’s decision, it does not appear to be going forward now that Veolia and Suez have reached a merger agreement on 12 April.

Lessons for the future

The aforementioned case law shows that the following points are important in the preparation of mergers:

  • De facto acquisition of decisive control also triggers a notification and standstill obligation.
  • This also applies to special purpose vehicles that acquire (temporary) decisive control.
  • Always notify preparatory steps to a concentration if they as such contribute to the change of decisive control.
  • Do not exercise decisive control prior to the approval of a concentration, insofar it is not necessary to protect the value of the target company.
  • Decisive control may not relate to the day-to-day operations.
  • In the case of a pre-closing veto right, the monetary threshold for exercising it must not be too low with respect to the transaction values.

Clean Teams

In addition to the notification and standstill obligation for concentrations, the cartel prohibition also still applies in full. In particular, the exchange of competitively sensitive information plays a role in the preparation of mergers. In that context, it is advisable under certain circumstances to set up Clean Teams in order to limit the risk of violating the cartel prohibition. Clean Teams are particularly advisable in transactions between two competitors.

  • The exchange of information should not lead to the situation where the commercial market behaviour of parties could be influenced.
  • Assemble the Clean Team, if possible, from a closed group of individuals who are not (as of that moment) involved (anymore) in the day-to-day operations of the parties.
    • For example, independent consultants or specially appointed employees.
  • Treat information within the Clean Team as strictly confidential.
    • Establish (internal) protocols regarding what information is accessible and to whom.
  • Seek legal advice when in doubt.
  • Have individuals on the Clean Team sign a confidentiality agreement and monitor its compliance.

Finally, it is worth noting that the Commission has introduced a new policy expanding its supervisory role with respect to concentrations. In this regard, please read our blog on Article 22 Merger Regulation.

For all your questions regarding merger control, bureau Brandeis is happy to help. You can reach us through the links below.

Bas Braeken, Jade Versteeg and Timo Hieselaar

Vision

Competitor and buyer can now arm themselves against ‘killer acquisitions’

What to do when a dominant competitor takes over a promising start-up

Until recently, competitors and customers were left empty-handed in the case of a so-called ‘killer acquisition’. These are takeovers where a large, established company takes over a smaller, innovative and start-up competitor with the aim or effect of stifling innovation and/or eliminating potential competition. The reason for this was that many of these acquisitions do not have to be notified to a competition authority because the turnover thresholds are not met. Killer acquisitions could therefore not be assessed by the national competition authority or the European Commission. This has now changed.

On 26 March 2021, the Commission published new guidance on the application of the referral mechanism of Article 22 of the European Merger Regulation (“EU Regulation”). In addition to concentrations which are subject to notification to the national authorities, Article 22 of the EU Regulation also allows concentrations which are not subject to notification to be referred to the Commission for assessment.

The Commission is particularly interested in referrals of concentrations where the turnover of the parties does not accurately reflect their current or future potential. In practice, this will especially concern mergers involving new competitors and innovative companies. This will occur, inter alia, in digital, pharmaceutical, biotechnology and certain industrial sectors. The new policy is expected to have less impact on acquisitions in more traditional markets.

Background

On 26 March 2021, the Commission announced a major reform of the EU regulation. One of these major changes is a new policy on the application of Article 22 of the EU Regulation.

Old and new policy Article 22 EU Regulation

Article 22 of the EU Regulation allows one or more national competition authorities to refer a concentration to the Commission for examination when it may significantly affect competition in the internal market. The article dates back to 1989 when many Member States did not yet have a national merger control regime and therefore still had the possibility to have potentially anti-competitive concentrations examined by the Commission. Article 22 is also called the ‘Dutch clause‘ because it was introduced at the request of the Netherlands, which did not have merger control at that time. The article explicitly refers to concentrations that do not require notification. However, after almost all Member States had introduced a merger control regime, the importance of Article 22 significantly declined. It was even the Commission’s policy to discourage referrals of non-notifiable concentrations on the grounds that the concentrations would generally not significantly affect competition in the internal market.

The Commission’s new policy constitutes a major shift in the application of Article 22 of the EU regulation. The Commission now encourages Member States to refer certain concentrations to the Commission, even in cases where the referring Member State does not have jurisdiction to assess the concentration under the turnover thresholds. The Commission is free to decide whether to accept a referral request.

The new policy did not just come out of thin air. There had been a desire for some time by competition authorities to be able to assess killer acquisitions. The discussion was sparked in 2014 by Facebook’s acquisition of Whatsapp. The acquisition was not subject to notification in many member states because of Whatsapp’s low turnover. However, the acquisition was ultimately assessed by the European Commission because the acquisition was notifiable in three member states and was therefore qualified for a referral under Article 4(5) of the EU Regulation. The Commission approved the merger. This case was one of the reasons for Germany and Austria to adopt new laws introducing an additional notification threshold based on the value of the transaction. The Dutch Consumer and Market Authority (“ACM”), the Luxembourg Conseil de la Conucurrence and the Belgian Competition Authority (“BMA”) wrote a Benelux memorandum on the supervision of competition in the digital sector. This memorandum argued for a change in the notification thresholds, for example by introducing an additional threshold based on market power and/or the value of the transaction.

Test case: Illumina-Grail

Shortly after the Commission’s communication on the reforms of the EU merger control regime, it became known that the acquisition of Grail by Illumina was a test case for the application of the Commission’s new policy. For the first time since 1999, an Article 22 request was made without any of the expanding Member States having jurisdiction to assess the merger.

Illumina is one of the largest players in the world in the field of gene sequencing. Grail is a young company developing a blood test to detect about 50 types of cancer at an early stage by DNA sequencing. The company has no turnover in the EU, which means that, in principle, the concentration does not need to be notified to the Commission or the national authorities of the EU Member States. However, the acquisition had to be notified to the US Federal Trade Commission and is under attack there.

In February, the Commission expressed concerns about the potentially anti-competitive effects of the proposed merger in the field of cancer tests and encouraged national competition authorities to file a referral request in line with the new policy. The French Autorité de la concurrence has responded to the call and the ACM, BMA, and Greece Competition Commission supported the request. The acquisition was not subject to notification in any of those Member States. The Commission has accepted the request and will assess the proposed acquisition.

The referral request has caused quite a stir. Illumina brought lawsuits against the request in the Netherlands and France, but lost both cases. The case will undoubtedly be contested before the Court of Justice of the European Union. The new policy leads to much legal uncertainty in mergers and acquisitions in which a dominant competitor takes over a promising start-up. It is therefore important to take this into account during the (contract)negotiations of the acquisition. For example, when drafting the suspensive conditions in the contract, one should take into account the possibility of a referral to the Commission, even if the competition authorities in the Member States concerned do not have the power to assess the concentration themselves. On the other hand, the new policy also provides more opportunities for third-party stakeholders, such as competitors and purchasers, to complain.

What to do in case of a killer acquisition

Is a dominant competitor or supplier of yours taking over a promising start-up? Then take the following actions.

  1. Consider whether the turnover of the start-up gives an accurate view of its current or future potential. It may be that a start-up has little or no turnover yet, but is of great importance to the competition in the market or will become so in the near future. This can, among others, occur in the following situations:
    • the target is an important innovator or conducts potentially important research
    • the target is an important (potential) competitor
    • the target has access to important assets (such as raw materials, infrastructure, data or intellectual property rights)
  1. Contact as soon as possible the ACM and/or other Member States where the dominant competitor is active. The competition authority has a period of 15 working days to refer a concentration to the European Commission after the transaction has been ‘made known to the Member State concerned’. The period only begins to run when sufficient information is provided tot he Member State to make a preliminary assessment as to whether the criteria of Article 22 of the EU Regulation are met. Member States seem to have a fairly wide discretion in determining when the deadline starts running.
  1. Explain why the concentration affects trade between Member States. This is, for instance, the case if the dominant competitor is active in several Member States and/or (potential) customers are located in different Member States.
  1. Explain also why there is a real risk that the concentration will significantly impede competition within the territory of the Member State(s) concerned. A real risk exists where, as a result of the acquisition:
    • an important (potential) competitor is eliminated;
    • there is a merger between two important innovative companies;
    • competitors have fewer incentives or opportunities to compete because, among other things, market entry or expansion becomes difficult or even impossible;
    • there is an incentive or possibility for a strong market position in one market to be leveraged into another market through tying, bundling or other exclusionary practices.
  1. Contact the Commission. The Commission may encourage Member States to refer the acquisition.

Bas Braeken, Lara Elzas and Jade Versteeg

Vision

Competition law in vertical relationships: killjoy or life preserver?

In almost every supply chain, agreements are concluded between suppliers and buyers to make the cooperation more efficient. Although vertical agreements are in many cases exempted by the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (“VBER”) from the cartel prohibition under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) and Article 6 of the Dutch Competition Act (“Mw”), not every restriction is permitted. After all, the VBER does not apply to a number of hardcore restrictions of competition, or where market shares exceed 30%. The distinction between permitted and prohibited restrictions is not always clear to companies. This is evident, for example, from a survey conducted by the Benelux Secretariat in which at least 89% of the companies questioned indicated that they had been confronted with prohibited territorial restrictions. This blog provides an overview of enforcement and case law from 2019 and 2020, and discusses the most recent developments.

Enforcement by ACM

In September 2020, the Authority for Consumers and Markets (“ACM”) announced that it had completed its investigation into drug manufacturer AbbVie. From the end of 2018, AbbVie offered significant discounts to hospitals for the rheumatology drug Humira. The patent on the active substance in Humira expired in October 2018, allowing other manufacturers to market a generic product. To prevent its market position from declining as a result thereof, Abbvie gave discounts to hospitals if they purchased Humira for all their patients. ACM considered that AbbVie thereby factually imposed an exclusive purchasing obligation on hospitals which limited competition for new products. AbbVie agreed not to include exclusive purchasing clauses in its agreements with hospitals anymore.

Case law on vertical agreements

In March 2019, the Court of Appeal of Arnhem-Leeuwarden ruled on the legality of an exit scheme of Avebe. The articles of association of Avebe, a cooperative of farmers, stipulated that if members wished to transfer the shares to Avebe upon termination of their membership, they had to pay an amount of €681 per share to the cooperative. Six arable farmers did not agree with this withdrawal arrangement. The Court of Appeal agreed with the lower court and ruled that although the exit scheme was a restriction of competition, the scheme did not divide the market or impose price restrictions or other hardcore restrictions and was therefore allowed.

At the end of 2019, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal ruled in an (as yet unpublished) interlocutory judgment in the case between Prijsvrij and Corendon that the termination of an agreement can be an instrument to achieve resale price maintenance. Customers could book trips of Corendon through Prijsvrij, which used discounts on its website on trips of Corendon. The tour operator did not want Prijsvrij to apply such discounts and eventually terminated the agency agreement. Prijsvrij held that this termination should be regarded as a form of prohibited resale price maintenance. The Court of Appeal agreed and considered it proven (for the moment) that the termination of the agreement with Prijsvrij was particularly caused by the discounts offered by Prijsvrij to consumers.*

On 12 June 2020, Advocate General Drijber concluded – with reference to the appeal in cassation against a judgment of the Court of Appeal of The Hague – that a settlement agreement regarding a patent did not violate competition law. Jet Set and Brielle Industrie Services (“BIS“) in this case, both active in the field of cleaning techniques for oil tanks, had reached a settlement which, according to BIS, included a non-compete and non-challenge clause. BIS considered this to be a licence agreement with hardcore restrictions within the meaning of the Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation (“TTBER“). However, Advocate General Drijber concluded that it was neither a licence agreement nor a non-compete clause. A prohibition to use Jet Set’s technology follows directly from the patent on that technology. There was therefore no need to review the TTBER or Article 6(3) Mw. Although a non-challenge clause does not generally fall under the TTBER, there was no such clause in this case either. BIS had in fact (successfully) contested the patent. The Supreme Court did not reach a substantive judgment.

A case that did involve vertical licensing agreements concerned a dispute between Dromenjager, the company behind the well-known Woezel & Pip children’s figures, and toy manufacturer International Bon Ton Toys (“IBTT“). IBTT produces and sells toys for which it is allowed to use the Woezel & Pip (figurative) trademark. The licence agreement included a provision requiring approval from Dromenjager for sales by the licensees to a certain number of retailers, including Kruidvat. IBTT wanted to sell its remaining stock of Woezel & Pip products to Kruidvat and complained that the required approval was contrary to competition law. The President of the court reached the provisional conclusion that the approval provision in the licence agreement is a hardcore restriction of competition law. The judgment in summary proceedings has been appealed.**

Vertical agreements also often play an important role in the pharmaceutical market. In its judgment of 8 June 2020, the district court of Midden-Nederland ruled that health insurer Zilveren Kruis was allowed to use a ‘discount policy’ to encourage hospitals to purchase medicines from a manufacturer that was cheaper for Zilveren Kruis. Together with other health insurers, Zilveren Kruis entered into an agreement with Janssen-Cilag, the producer of a medicine for leukaemia (named Imbruvica). On the basis of this agreement, Janssen-Cilag supplied Imbruvica to the hospitals, after which the health insurers received discounts (based on subsequent calculation). Zilveren Kruis applied a mark-up of 49% if hospitals purchased Imbruvica from suppliers other than Janssen-Cilag. Eureco-Pharma, a competitor of Janssen-Cilag, argued that Zilveren Kruis was channelling the Imbruvica offer to Janssen-Cilag through its discount policy. The judge, however, concluded that Zilveren Kruis’ policy is aimed at always paying the lowest price. A competitive company is able to pursue this aim. Moreover, Eureco-Pharma was able to conclude a similar agreement with Zilveren Kruis. Therefore, there was no prohibited vertical restraint.

Finally, at the end of 2020, the Amsterdam District Court ruled that Trek Benelux – supplier of fast, lightweight bicycles – had to continue an agreement with its distributor. Trek Benelux terminated the agreement when the distributor applied a discount on top of the recommended retail price. According to Trek Benelux, such discounts harmed its brand image. The agreement also included an obligation to deliver assembled bicycles to customers. The distributor argued that the recommended retail price is in fact a minimum price and that the obligation to deliver assembled bicycles limits its passive (online) sales. The judge in preliminary relief proceedings ruled in line with the VBER that forcing distributors to adhere to the recommended retail price constitutes a hardcore restriction of competition law. Moreover, no justification had been put forward by Trek Benelux. Therefore, the agreement had to be continued. Trek Benelux was, however, able to demonstrate that the obligation to deliver assembled bicycles was necessary to protect the quality of the bicycles, which requires accurate assembly and adjustment. This provision was not contrary to competition law.

Evaluation of the VBER

The current Regulation, which has been in force since 2010, expires on 31 May 2022. The European Commission (“Commission“) intends to amend the Regulation. In this context, the Commission conducted a review, the findings of which were published on 8 September 2020.

The review shows that the VBER, albeit still relevant, is no longer adequate for application to online sales. After all, the retail sector has changed tremendously in recent years, particularly as a result of digitalisation and the subsequent increase in e-commerce (e-tailing). Entirely new types of restrictions on online sales have been imposed on buyers the past few years, such as a ban on the use of Google AdWords by Guess or the (re)sale of products on online marketplaces by Coty. The Commission has also imposed fines on, amongst others, Asus, Philips and Pioneer for imposing resale price maintenance on their online retailers. The interpretation of the rules on online sales restrictions varies widely in Europe. The new VBER will have to provide clarification. According to the Commission, there is still too much uncertainty about the use and lawfulness of ‘across-platforms parity agreements‘ (APPAs) as well. For the background and recent developments regarding APPAs, please read our earlier blog.

In addition, the collection and use of data has become crucial to the business operations of (online) companies in recent years. In this context, the Commission has also launched an investigation into Amazon. The American company is said to use data of sellers on Amazon – which it obtained in its capacity as a platform – to benefit its sales channel on the same platform. For this ‘self-preferencing’, the Commission previously imposed a fine of more than €2.4 billion on Google, which put its own services above those of competitors in Google’s search results.

Conclusion

Vertical agreements can often benefit from the exemption from the cartel prohibition, but not every restriction can be imposed. Dutch and European case law over the past two years confirms this. It is therefore essential to know what may and may not be included in a vertical relationship. It is, in this regard, of great importance what the new VBER will entail, especially with regard to online sales. However, the clarifications that the Commission seems to have in mind will only apply after May 2022. In any case, both civil and administrative enforcement of competition law in respect of vertical relationships has increased dramatically in recent years. It is likely that this trend will continue in the coming years.

* Bas Braeken and Jade Versteeg assist Prijsvrij in these proceedings.

** Bas Braeken and Timo Hieselaar have (first) become involved on appeal as Dromenjager’s lawyers.

 

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