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bB in Legal 500-rankings

We are delighted to share that bureau Brandeis has yet again been recommended in this year’s edition of the Legal 500 EMEA Guide. As many as 8 practice groups of our litigation firm are included in the rankings and 16 of our lawyers are individually recognized for their outstanding contributions.

We greatly appreciate this acknowledgement and remain committed to our clients and to the society we are so much a part of. Many thanks again for your support!

Our firm’s rankings:

Banking and finance: Financial services regulatory

Data privacy and data protection

Dispute resolution: Class actions

Dispute resolution: Commercial litigation

EU and competition

Industry focus: Media and entertainment

Industry focus: Telecoms

Intellectual property: trade marks, copyrights and design rights

A big thanks to all our clients and business partners for your continuous trust in our services!

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bureau Brandeis rises in rankings in Chambers Europe Guide

Over the past decade, bureau Brandeis has become the largest independent litigation firm in the Netherlands. As a litigation boutique, the firm of 42 lawyers also excels in a broad regulatory practice. We are delighted that our unique position in the Dutch market has been recognised in the newest edition of the Chambers Europe Guide.

This year, five different practice groups of our firm are included in the rankings: Dispute Resolution, Competition Law/European Law, Intellectual Property, Telecom and Media.

Many thanks to our clients, who call us “pragmatic and accessible”, “very good litigators” and “excellent lawyers”. According to Chambers, bureau Brandeis’ lawyers are “able to distil and express complex legal issues succinctly and persuasively.”

We are also very grateful with the individual recognition of four of our partners.

Christiaan Alberdingk Thijm
Intellectual Property
Media

Bas Braeken
Competition Law/European Law
Telecom

Frank Peters
Dispute Resolution

Machteld Robichon
Media
Telecom

Thanks again to all our clients and business partners for your support and trust in our firm!

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DMA-obligations come into force; a bird’s-eye view of the (technical) changes by the designated gatekeepers

Compliance Day; as of today, all gatekeepers designated by the European Commission (“Commission”) must comply with the provisions of the Digital Markets Act (“DMA”). In the run-up to this deadline, gatekeepers have been aligning their core platform services (“CPS”) with the provisions of the DMA. At the time of drafting, Apple and Meta have published their compliance reports. It is expected that more will follow in the course of today.

In addition to the adjustments required to comply with the DMA, there have been other interesting developments. In our previous blog, we already touched upon the appeals brought by Apple, Meta, and ByteDance against the designation of one or more of their services as CPS. Meanwhile, the Commission has alsop decided not to designate certain CPS, and new gatekeepers have reported themselves to the Commission.

This blog provides an overview of the recent developments and the adjustments that gatekeepers will introduce or have already introduced to comply with the obligations under the DMA.


Overview of general substantive obligations for gatekeepers

On 6 September 2023, the Commission designated the following gatekeepers and CPS:

source: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/nl/qanda_20_2349

Some obligations stemming from the DMA are only relevant to a particular CPS. For example, the interoperability of number-independent interpersonal communication services is relevant to WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger, but not to Chrome or iOS. However, a number of obligations from the DMA apply to, and are relevant to, any kind of CPS and/or concern the interrelationship between (the use of) different CPS. The following provisions are particularly noteworthy in that context.

  • Article 5(2) DMA generally prohibits gatekeepers from combining personal data obtained from various (core platform) services without the end-user’s consent. Gatekeepers must thus obtain prior consent to combine and use personal data from different services in order to personalise ads and content. On the basis of Article 15 DMA, gatekeepers should furthermore provide a yearly audited description of any techniques for profiling of consumers that they apply (see for example Meta’s first report here).
  • Pursuant to Article 5(4) DMA, gatekeepers are required to allow business users to make offers (free of charge) to end-users acquired through the CPS or through other channels, and to conclude contracts with those end-users. Put differently, a gatekeeper may no longer prohibit business users from contracting or making offers for their services to end-users outside of the CPS. Also, the gatekeeper must – in accordance with Article 5(5) DMA – allow end-users to access and use certain services, content, subscriptions, features or other items through its CPS, even though the enduser acquired such access from the relevant business user directly (outside the CPS).
  • Article 5(8) DMA provides that gatekeepers may not require users to subscribe to or register with other CPSs as a condition for using or accessing a CPS of that gatekeeper (such as tying and/or bundling practices).
  • For consumers (end-users), Article 6(9) DMA is particularly relevant. Under this article, gatekeepers must allow end-users (upon request) to transfer the data they have provided or generated, and end-users must be given continuous real-time access to that data (data portability). The equivalent of this data portability obligation towards business users is contained in Article 6(10) DMA.
  • Finally, in general, under Article 6(6) DMA, gatekeepers may not impose technical or other restrictions on end-users switching to other software applications and services accessed through the gatekeeper’s CPSs. In the same light, under Article 6(13) DMA, gatekeepers may not impose disproportionate general conditions for terminating the provision of a CPS. Moreover, these termination conditions must be exercisable without undue difficulty.

As these obligations apply in any case, they are not in principle elaborated in the overview below. However, the relevant provisions of the DMA are discussed when the gatekeeper has explicitly proposed adjustments to meet these obligations.

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Alphabet

 

Alphabet is the gatekeeper with the most CPS. As a result, there are many changes that need to be implemented to comply with the DMA.

To comply with Article 5(2) DMA, Alphabet will now let end-users decide whether to keep all CPS linked. If the CPS are linked, end-user personal data can be exchanged. In addition, a “consent or pay” option – where consumers consent to the use and combining of their personal data or pay a (monthly) fee to use the CPS – is still under discussion with the Commission.

In light of Article 6(9) DMA, regarding data portability, Alphabet has already been using Google Takeout for a while now. This tool allows users to download or transfer their data to another platform free of charge. To bring this process in line with the provisions of the DMA, Alphabet will soon test a new API (‘Application Programming Interface’) to facilitate the download and transfer of data. Alphabet has also announced to launch a data portability software in Europe this week, making it easier for developers to move user data to a third-party app or service.

Another significant change for Alphabet is the effect of Article 6(5) DMA, which in short prohibits self-promotion in rankings and requires the gatekeeper to use transparent, fair and non-discriminatory terms for those rankings. For Alphabet, this particularly affects the CPS Google Search, Google Maps, Google Shopping, and Youtube. For Google Shopping, Google Maps, and Youtube, Alphabet has announced that these services will henceforth no longer be linked to Google Search’s search results page by default. However, end-users can choose to link (one of) these services to (the search results of) Google Search by default.

As for Google Search itself, Alphabet says it is adding a tab to the search screen. This will not only allow users to filter by things like videos and images, but also by comparison services. In addition, Alphabet will remove its own specialised results window for flight searches (see below).

Instead, a carousel is displayed showing links to various comparison websites. Alphabet has shared the following possible examples.

For categories like hotels, Alphabet is starting to test a dedicated space for comparison sites as well as direct suppliers to display more detailed results, including images and reviews.

With regard to Alphabet’s advertising service, the tech giant’s most lucrative (core platform) service, Alphabet is required under Articles 5(9), 5(10) and 6(8) DMA to provide certain data to advertisers when they request it. The announced compliance plans for this are still being coordinated with the Commission.

For Google Android and Google Chrome end-users should be allowed to change their default settings pursuant to Article 6(3). End-users should also be allowed to switch browsers under Article 5(7) DMA. Alphabet has indicated that it will add a choice screen for the default search engine and browser during the initial setup of a device using Alphabet’s CPS, as illustrated below.

Finally, Alphabet must now also allow end-users to use other app stores under Article 6(4) DMA. As regards its Play Store, Alphabet has announced that app developers will be able to use alternative payment methods.

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Amazon

 

Like Alphabet, Amazon also has a lucrative advertising service. Thus, Amazon too has to provide certain data to advertisers upon request under Articles 5(9), 5(10), and 6(8) DMA. Amazon has indicated that from 7 March 2024, it will provide comprehensive reports detailing ad costs paid by advertisers and received by publishers, displayed on third-party websites and applications. According to Amazon, these reports provide insight into the financial transactions between advertisers and publishers. The reports can be accessed by advertisers through the ‘Amazon Ads dashboard’, and by publishers through the ‘Amazon Publisher Services portal’. In doing so, advertisers and publishers can choose whether to disclose their cost data, or whether the data will be included in standard aggregated metrics. This flexibility allows users to adjust the level of transparency based on their preferences and business needs, Amazon said.

Amazon’s main obligation with regard to its best-know service, Amazon Marketplace, can be found in Article 6(2) DMA. This article prohibits the gatekeeper from using non-public data generated by competing business users for its own CPS. Article 6(5) DMA furthermore contains a prohibition on self-preferencing relating to the ranking of competing products and services on the gatekeeper’s platform. These provisions reflect the Commission’s 2022 investigation into Amazon’s Buy Box and Prime Programme. The investigation was eventually concluded through commitments.

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Apple

 

Apple appealed its gatekeeper designation, as well as the App Store’s qualification as a CPS, on 16 November 2023. Nonetheless, Apple must comply with its obligations under the DMA as of today. It has therefore announced the following changes for its CPS. These will be briefly discussed below. In addition, Apple has published its first compliance report on 7 March. In this document, it sets out the specific obligations and (proposed) changes in more detail.

The App Store brings consumers and app developers together. For developers, the following will change. They will have options to use (other) payment services to finalise in-app purchases. Until now, Apple only enabled app developers to use its own payment system. In 2021, the ACM already imposed an order subject to a penalty payment on Apple for the mandatory use of its own in-app payment system for dating app providers. Apple eventually incurred the maximum amount of € 50 million in penalty payments. In accordance with Article 5(7) DMA, there will also be new options for processing payments via referrals: end-users can then complete a transaction for digital goods or services on the developer’s external website. There is still an ongoing discussion on the (other) conditions Apple imposes for the use of the App Store. For example, Apple envisages to maintain the ‘Core Technology Fee’ it charges to app developers in order to make use of the App Store.

These features are accompanied by a number of other changes. For example, Apple is introducing labels on the App Store product page that inform users when an app uses an alternative payment processing method (compared to Apple’s). There will also be so-called in-app ‘disclosure sheets’, which alert users when they are no longer making transactions through Apple, but using an alternative payment service. In addition, Apple is coming up with new processes to check whether developers accurately communicate information to end-users about transactions using alternative payment services. These changes are being introduced to protect consumers, Apple said.

Regarding the iOS operating system, Apple has indicated that new options are coming for distributing iOS apps through alternative app marketplaces. It will also become possible, using a new framework and new APIs, to develop alternative app stores and/or browser engines for iOS. Previously, only WebKit, the browser engine behind Apple’s Safari, could be used.

As for Safari itself, Apple is introducing a new selection screen that appears when users first open Safari in iOS 17.4 or later. On that screen, EU users are asked to choose a default browser from a list of options. It allows end-users to change their default settings and switch browsers (Articles 5(7) and 6(3) DMA).

All these CPS will also come with the ability to transfer/retrieve data, in line with Article 6(9) DMA. For instance, end-users will be able to retrieve and export new data on their use of the App Store to an authorised third party on Apple’s Data & Privacy site. App developers can use a form to submit requests for interoperability with iPhone and iOS hardware and software features.

Finally, Apple has indicated that it is introducing a number of adjustments in relation to iMessage, even though Apple’s service has not been designated as a CPS following a Commission investigation. Apple has pledged to improve iMessage’s interoperability with other communication services by implementing an RCS (‘rich communication services’) system. RCS includes features such as read receipts and type indication, which are already used with, for instance, WhatsApp. Green messages (messages between Apple and Android, for example) will also get these functionalities. Blue messages are those between devices of iOS users.

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ByteDance

 

ByteDance, the company behind social network TikTok, unsuccessfully sought an interim injunction to suspend its designation as gatekeeper. In short, the President of the European General Court ruled in his order that ByteDance had not claimed, let alone demonstrated, that the alleged financial damage was serious and irreparable. This lacks the urgency required for an injunctive relief.

Thus, ByteDance too has to comply with the DMA’s obligations from today onwards. On 4 March, ByteDance published several changes on its website relating to the DMA. With TikTok’s ‘Download Your Data’ tool, end-users can request a copy of their TikTok data for access and portability purposes. TikTok has also launched a new ‘Data Portability API’, which allows registered developers to request end-users permission to transfer a copy of their TikTok data. End-users can allow for either a one-time or recurring transfer, and will be able to select specific categories of data or their full archive. TikTok also offers certain in-app and web analytics allowing business accounts to measure their performance. This includes an ‘Accounts API’ where businesses can access data related to their TikTok accounts.

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Meta

 

Meta has also appealed the qualification of some of its services as CPS on 15 November 2023. For instance, Meta disagrees with the Commission that Facebook, Facebook Messenger and Facebook Marketplace qualify as CPS. Nevertheless, in the meantime, Meta must comply with its obligations under the DMA.

Meta shows its proposed changes on its website. On 6 March 2023, Meta has furthermore published its first consumer profiling report and compliance report in which it further explains and illustrates the changes, mostly applicable as of today.

First of all, with regard to all of Meta’s CPS, it is not allowed to combine personal data from different (core platform) services without end-user consent (Article 5(2) DMA). Therefore, Meta now gives its end-users the choice to exchange data between Meta’s different (core platform) services. For example, end-users who have already chosen to link their Instagram and Facebook accounts can now choose to keep their accounts connected via the ‘Accounts Centre’, so that their information is used between their Instagram and Facebook accounts, or to manage their Instagram and Facebook accounts separately, so that their information is no longer exchanged. The same goes for Facebook Marketplace, for example. The compliance report contains specific examples.

With regard to Facebook and Instagram, end-users also have the option to use these social networks for free with ads, or to subscribe for a fee to stop seeing ads. If people subscribe to stop seeing ads, their information will not (no longer) be used for ads. This had previously been introduced by Meta as a result of the Digital Services Act coming into force. Although under the Digital Services Act, the Commission has now sent a formal information request to Meta in response to these ad-free subscriptions.

For WhatsApp, Article 7(1) DMA is particularly relevant. This article requires interoperability between number-independent interpersonal communication services. That means, simply put, that end-users should be able to chat with each other on for example WhatsApp via Facebook Messenger, or Apple’s iMessage, discussed above. Meta has requested the Commission for a six-month extension to the obligation to make WhatsApp interoperable.

To comply with this, Meta envisages to add a section to WhatsApp’s messaging service. If the end-user goes to this section, they will arrive at third-party chat services. WhatsApp is now testing this feature on iOS and Android. The examples below show what this could look like.

Meta has not yet announced any concrete changes on Facebook Messenger’s interoperability with other number-independent interpersonal communication services.

Finally, in relation to its advertising services, Meta Ads, Meta is required to provide data to advertisers under Articles 5(9), 5(10), and 6(8) DMA. Meta’s compliance report contains the first suggestions in that regard.

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Microsoft

 

Microsoft has displayed and explained all its planned changes for Windows on its website and in a separate blog post.

Microsoft is prohibited by Article 5(2) DMA from combining personal data from different (core platform) services. This applies to both Windows and LinkedIn. Microsoft now asks users if they want to synchronise their Microsoft account with Windows so that their data is available on other Windows devices and in Microsoft products where users log in (see also the image below). The information stored in the Microsoft account of an end-user who also uses other Microsoft products is then also available in Windows. This makes it possible for an end-user to restore settings, apps and passwords from another device, as well as synchronise set preferences between devices.

With regard to Windows, Articles 6(3) and 6(4) DMA additionally require that end-users be given the option to change their default settings. Microsoft indicates that end-users will be enabled to remove the Microsoft Edge browser. It also adds new ‘integration points’ for applications in Windows, allowing end-users, for example, to add a search application to the search bar on the Windows taskbar. In this way, end-users can switch from the Bing search engine to another search engine of their choice.

Microsoft will also stop giving recommendations to set Edge as the default browser, including during the configuration process when users first set up or update Windows.

Finally, all (default) apps in Windows can be uninstalled, such as the camera and photo app, Cortana (virtual assistant), Bing’s web search, and Microsoft Edge.

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Possible new gatekeepers and CPS: Booking.com, X and ByteDance

Just before Compliance Day, Booking.com and X (formerly Twitter) notified the Commission that they meet the quantitative criteria to be designated as gatekeepers. ByteDance, already designated as a gatekeeper with TikTok as CPS, notified its advertising services, TikTok Ads, to the Commission.

Online intermediation service Booking.com said it expects to meet the DMA’s turnover thresholds from the end of 2023 and thus qualify as a gatekeeper. The reason that Booking did previously not meet the quantitative thresholds is probably mostly due to the (aftermath of the) COVID-19 pandemic, which put a heavy strain on the travel and hotel industry. Of particular relevance to Booking.com would be Article 5(3) DMA, which prohibits it from imposing (narrow or broad) parity clauses on corporate users. This use has already been investigated and fined at national level in recent years, and is now before the CJEU following a preliminary reference from the Amsterdam District Court (see our earlier blog for a further explanation of parity clauses). Regarding X, the most relevant obligation can be found in Article 6(12) DMA pursuant to which it has to apply FRAND criteria for access to its social network.

The Commission now has 45 working days to designate the companies as gatekeepers. If the Commission designates them as gatekeepers, the brand-new gatekeepers will have six months to comply with the obligations under the DMA.

Conclusion

With the substantive obligations for the first six gatekeepers coming into force, the Commission will be primarily occupied with their proposed and/or implemented amendments in the coming months. Especially the adjustments of Meta and Apple have received strong criticism so far. The coming period will show to what extent there is still room for a regulatory dialogue, or if the Commission has shut the door and will initiate enforcement. In addition, the new rules also enable third parties to initiate (private) enforcement against any of the Gatekeepers on the basis of (alleged) infringements of the DMA.

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Private equity under the microscope of competition authorities

In a recent radio interview with BNR, chairman of the ACM Martijn Snoep explicitly expressed its concerns regarding roll-up acquisitions, whereby private investment companies (“private equity firms”) successively acquire several smaller companies within a given sector. For a long time, competition authorities paid little attention to private equity firms. That has changed. Both the ACM and other national competition authorities announced that they will take a (more) critical look at the role of private equity firms in acquisitions. Apart from merger control, private equity firms must also take into account important developments including foreign direct investment (“FDI”)-screening legislation, foreign subsidies and public and private liability for cartel violations of portfolio companies.

In this blog, we dive into four recent competition law and regulatory developments that private equity firms and institutional investors should consider, namely:


Tighter scrutiny of roll-up acquisitions and gun-jumping

Roll-up acquisitions

Recently, competition authorities have focused their attention on private equity firms that sequentially acquire small firms within a specific sector. According to the authorities, these roll-up acquisitions can create or reinforce (local) dominant positions, which can lead to higher prices and/or a decrease in quality or consumer choice. In the Netherlands, there have been some concerns about a consolidation trend by private equity firms in the areas of childcare, veterinary clinics and specialised clinics in the healthcare sector (see for example the Parliamentary questions on the growing role of private equity in healthcare and childcare).

Although the ACM wishes to act against roll-up takeovers, its enforcement options are rather limited for the time being. Dutch merger control offers little or no relief. Many acquisitions by private equity firms do not fall under the notification obligation because they do not meet the Dutch turnover thresholds. The ACM does theoretically have the possibility to refer transactions that are not subject to notification in the Netherlands to the European Commission (“Commission”). Under a relatively recently introduced Commission policy on the application of Article 22 EU Merger Regulation (“EUMR”), one or more national competition authorities may refer a concentration to the Commission for examination where the transaction (i) affects trade between Member States, and (ii) threatens to significantly impede competition in the territory of the Member State(s) submitting the request.

In practice, however, Article 22 EUMR offers limited scope for the ACM to tackle roll-up acquisitions. This is because many of the companies acquired in a roll-up only operate on local markets. If the buyer and target are furthermore not active around border areas, the transaction will thus usually not affect trade between Member States. Such acquisitions would then not be eligible for referral. Yet, even if there would be a (potential) cross-border element, it remains to be seen whether the Commission is willing to assess such (generally rather small) transactions. The Commission has previously indicated that a referral under Article 22 EUMR is particularly intended for acquisitions of promising start-ups where the turnover of the start-up does not accurately reflect the current or future potential of the company. So far, the Commission also seems mainly interested in referrals of transactions in the pharma industry and digital markets. Therefore, it is relatively unlikely that the Commission will assess small and (very) local roll-up acquisitions under Article 22 EUMR. This also seems to be in line with the ACM’s position. For instance, the ACM’s board chairman said in a speech last year: “At the moment we cannot do anything about small transactions that fall below the notification thresholds, but that do lead to local competition issues (…) we cannot send a merger-to-monopoly in a small town to Brussels.” (freely translated)

At this moment, private equity firms engaging in small acquisitions do not yet have much to fear from the ACM. However, this may soon change with two legislative changes the ACM seems to be pushing for:

  • Removal of Article 24(2) Dutch Competition Act (“Mw”). In the Towercast-judgment, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) ruled that a non-notifiable concentration can constitute an abuse of a dominant position. At present, the Dutch Competition Act still provides that bringing about a concentration cannot be regarded as an abuse of a dominant position (Article 24(2) Mw). This deviates from European case law, which is likely to result in an amendment to the Dutch Competition Act.
  • Introducing a ‘call-in power’. In addition, the ACM argues for the introduction of a so-called ‘call-in power’, providing the ACM the power to indicate, within a certain period of time, that an acquisition must be notified despite the fact that the turnover thresholds are not met. Competition authorities in Sweden, Iceland, Norway, Italy and Ireland already have such a power. This legislative change is a lot more far-reaching and controversial than the first mentioned legislative change and is therefore unlikely to take place in the short term.

Gun-jumping by private equity

Concentrations that exceed certain turnover thresholds may only be implemented after approval is obtained from the ACM. Competition authorities have in recent years strictly enforced violations of the notification- and standstill obligations laid down in (European) merger control rules, so-called ‘gun-jumping’. Based on the latest case law, private equity firms should take into account the following points (for a detailed overview, see also our blog on gun jumping):

  • If a takeover is notifiable, parties may only exercise control over the target company upon the ACM’s approval. However, the buyer and seller may enter into agreements necessary to protect the value of the target. Recently, telecom company Altice did not comply with these rules and was fined € 124.5 million by the Commission. It established that, before the Commission’s approval, Altice already exercised decisive influence over PT Portugal as it was given certain veto rights regarding the appointment of senior management at PT Portugal, pricing policy and several key contracts. The fine was later upheld by the CJEU.
  • A so-called warehousing structure can entail significant competition risks. A warehousing structure involves temporarily ‘parking’ the target company with an interim buyer with a view to resell to the ultimate buyer once the relevant competition authority has given its approval. Warehousing structures are regularly used by private equity firms to minimise the time between signing and closing. Canon for example used such a warehousing structure in its acquisition of TMSC (a subsidiary of Toshiba). According to the Commission, both steps constituted one concentration within the meaning of European competition law. The implementation of the first step of the warehousing structure therefore already led to the partial realisation of the concentration. According to the Commission, this violated the standstill obligation under the Merger Regulation. Canon was fined EUR 28 million, which was upheld by the General Court.
  • Gaining de facto control also triggers a notification and standstill obligation. The Commission for example fined Norwegian salmon farm Marine Harvest for carrying out a concentration without prior approval. Marine Harvest acquired a 48.5% stake in Morpol. Marine Harvest then made a public offer for the remaining shares in Morpol and notified the transaction to the Commission. However, the Commission found that in acquiring a 48.5% stake, Marine Harvest had already acquired de facto control. Given the fragmentation of the remaining shares and attendance figures at previous shareholder meetings, Marine Harvest already gained a majority at those meetings, the Commission said. Marine Harvest was fined EUR 20 million, which was upheld by the CJEU.

Private equity firms operating in the healthcare sector should also bear in mind that, pursuant to Article 49a (1) of the Health Care Market Regulation Act, there is an obligation to report to the Dutch Healthcare Authority (“NZa”) if the concentration involves a company that employs or contracts at least 50 healthcare providers. In November 2023, a number of companies of the Dutch Pharmaceutical Pharmacy Fund were fined by the NZa for failing to report several concentrations.

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Increased FDI-screening

Over the years, more and more states have introduced specific FDI-legislation. On 1 June 2023, the Dutch FDI Screening Act (Wet Veiligheidstoets investeringen, fusies en overnames (“Vifo Act”)) entered into force. This law introduces a security test for investments, mergers and acquisitions that may pose a risk to national security. Below, we provide a brief explanation of what the Vifo Act’s implications are for private equity firms and other investors (for a more detailed description of the Vifo Act, see this blog).

On the basis of the Vifo Act, there is an obligation to report to the Bureau for Verification of Investments (Bureau Toetsing InvesteringenBTI”), part of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy, any acquisition activity in vital providers, managers of corporate campuses and undertakings active in the field of sensitive technology. This also applies when the acquirer is based in the Netherlands.

If a notification requirement applies, the BTI examines whether the acquisition activity leads to undesirable strategic dependencies, an impairment of the continuity of vital processes or an impairment of the integrity and exclusivity of knowledge and information. The BTI’s investigation focuses not only on the (direct) acquirer but also on the ownership structure and relationships with other parties. If a private equity firm is involved in a transaction covered by a notification obligation, the BTI specifically asks for detailed information on limited partners (whose involvement in an investment is often limited to providing capital to the company). The BTI wants to ascertain what the influence of these limited partners is and what their actual motives are. Sometimes it turns out that limited partners have greater influence than usual and, for example, that they have a strategic intent to combine the technologies of various companies in which they hold an interest. The BTI takes this into account in its assessment.

The BTI will then decide whether the acquisition activity poses a risk to national security. If such is the case, it may impose certain conditions or, as an ultimate measure, even ban the acquisition activity altogether.

The Vifo Act has a major impact on private equity firms, including venture capital investors, because it is in particular among companies developing innovative technologies that there is a high demand for venture capital, which is often provided by private equity and venture capitalists. The Vifo Act applies when acquiring or increasing significant influence over companies operating in the field of ‘highly sensitive technology’. The Scope of Application of Sensitive Technology Decree of 4 May 2023 qualifies as highly sensitive technologies certain specific dual-use and military products, in addition to quantum technology, photonics technology, semiconductor technology and High Assurance products (e.g. information security software). Significant influence already exists if the acquiring party can cast 10% of the votes in the general meeting and/or it can influence the appointment/dismissal of board members. Moreover, (another) subsequent notification must be made if the voting rights of the acquiring parties increase to 20% and to 25% of the votes. In short, only a relatively small investment in, for instance, a start-up or scale-up operating in the field of highly sensitive technology, can already trigger a notification obligation under the Vifo Act.

When making investment decisions, private equity firms should therefore consider the following points:

  • Check in advance whether the obligation to notify under the Vifo Act applies. It is not always obvious (at first glance) whether a duty to notify exists and this sometimes requires a more extensive analysis. It is important to seek advice on this in advance. Parties that fail to report a transaction risk a fine of € 900,000 or a fine of 10% of the annual turnover.
  • Be prepared for longer timelines for implementing the proposed transaction/investment. A transaction may be delayed up to nine months due to a BTI investigation. The transaction may not be implemented until approval is obtained. Private equity firms (as well as targets) will have to take these timeframes into account when choosing a long stop date in their transaction documents.
  • The outcome of the BTI’s investigation is generally difficult to predict. The BTI’s assessment does not include strictly defined investigative questions and is also influenced by (geo)political considerations. Parties should take into account that an extensive investigation may take place with the final verdict that the transaction may only take place under certain conditions or even be prohibited altogether.

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Notification obligation for foreign subsidies

In addition to merger control rules and FDI legislation, private equity firms must from 12 October 2023 onwards also take into account the obligation to notify concentrations or participations in public procurement procedures in light of previous funding from non-European governments (“third countries”). This notification obligation is laid down in the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (“FSR”), and applies if certain financial thresholds are met (for a detailed discussion of the FSR, see our blog). For private equity firms, the following thresholds are relevant:

  1. at least one of the merging parties (in case of mergers), the target company (in case of acquisitions), or the joint venture is based in the European Union and has a total EU turnover of at least € 500 million;
  2. the undertakings concerned have collectively received more than € 50 million in financial contributions from third countries during the three years preceding the conclusion of the agreement. For mergers, the undertakings concerned include the merging parties; for acquisitions, both the buyer(s) and the target; and for joint ventures, the joint venture partners and the joint venture itself.

In addition to these specific ‘triggers’, the Commission also has an ex officio power to examine certain foreign financial contributions (read more here).

Private equity firms would therefore do well to consider the following points:

  • While most FSR notifications will not be problematic and are approved in the first phase of a Commission investigation, private equity firms should be aware that the FSR may delay the proposed merger. For mergers, the Commission has 25 working days after the notification to decide whether to launch an in-depth investigation. This investigation can take 90 working days (which can be extended by 15 working days). The M&A process can therefore be delayed by 130 working days in some cases.
  • It is a lot of work to collect all information on foreign contributions and assess whether a notification is required. It is therefore advisable for companies to get their financial records in order so that it can be quickly assessed whether a notification is required and the required information for notifications can be gathered quickly. Foreign financial contributions are defined broadly and even include the supply or purchase of goods or services to third countries.
  • If a notification requirement applies under the FSR, provisions relating to Commission’s approval procedure will also need to be included in the purchase agreement.

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Public and private liability of private equity firms for cartel violations

Private equity firms are not only subject to ex ante merger control supervision and FDI-legislation, but may also increasingly face both public and private liability for cartel violations by portfolio companies.

Public liability

It has long been established that a parent company can be held liable for a cartel infringement by its subsidiary even if the parent company was not involved in the cartel (doctrine of attribution). For instance, in its 2009 Akzo-Nobel judgment, the CJEU ruled that there is a presumption of (indirect) decisive influence of a parent company over a subsidiary and thus liability for a cartel infringement of its wholly-owned subsidiary. However, it was unclear for a long time whether investment companies and private equity firms could also be held liable for a cartel violation of a portfolio company. In many cases, private equity firms are relatively distant from the (day-to-day) operations of portfolio companies. In 2021, the CJEU confirmed in the Goldman Sachs judgment that the doctrine of a parent company’s liability for a subsidiary’s antitrust infringement also applies in full to investments made through an investment fund (and thus also to private equity).

According to the CJEU in the Goldman Sachs judgment, a company that holds all the voting rights of the subsidiary’s shares is in a similar position to a company that holds (almost) 100% of the share capital. In both cases, there is a presumption that the parent company can exercise decisive influence over the subsidiary, the CJEU ruled. US investment bank Goldman Sachs held 100% of the voting rights in an indirect portfolio company that had participated in the so-called powercable cartel. At the start of the cartel infringement, Goldman Sachs initially held 100% of the share capital, but during the infringement period its stake eventually fell to just 33%. Even during the period that Goldman Sachs held only 33% of the share capital, it continued to exercise decisive influence over the subsidiary given its 100% voting rights, according to the CJEU. To reach that conclusion, the CJEU considered it important that the parent company could appoint and dismiss the board and convene the shareholders’ meeting. The Commission imposed a fine of € 37 million.

In the Netherlands, the attribution doctrine has been applied to investment companies before. In 2017, the Rotterdam District Court upheld a fine imposed on private equity investor Bencis for the participation of its subsidiary in the so-called flour cartel.

Private cartel damages claims

The extension of the attribution doctrine affects not only the liability of the parent company in the context of public enforcement (i.e. liability for a cartel fine) but also liability for private cartel damages claims. In the Skanska-judgment, the CJEU ruled that a subsidiary can, under certain conditions, be held liable for damages resulting from a cartel infringement committed by its parent company. This means that a private equity firm that is part of an undertaking held liable under an infringement decision of the Commission (or a national competition authority) can also be held civilly liable in follow-on cartel damages proceedings.

Key take aways liability private equity for cartel infringement

In light of this attribution doctrine, private equity firms would do well to specifically examine whether the target might be (or have been) involved in a competition infringement during its due diligence investigation However, it is not unlikely that infringements will not (directly) come to light when performing a due diligence investigation. It is therefore always advisable to include sufficient warranties and indemnities in the purchase agreement. Since both the competition authority and private parties have some discretion as to which entity to address for an infringement and can also choose to fine the buyer, even when it was not exercising control (yet) at the time of the infringement period, it is wise to take this into account when formulating any indemnities.

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Final remarks

Private equity firms are fully in the crosshairs of competition authorities. Key developments in merger control, FDI-legislation, foreign subsidies and private equity firms’ liability for cartel violations highlight the importance for private equity firms to take into account the competition rules when deciding on an investment. Although the ACM still has few options under the current merger control rules to review roll-up acquisitions, it is lobbying for legislative reforms that may bring about some fundamental (jurisdictional) changes rather soon. In addition, FDI-screening laws force private equity firms to take into account (additional) disclosure obligations and strategic risks when investing in critical sectors. Recent case law confirms that private equity firms can be held liable for cartel violations by portfolio companies.

In view of these developments, it is advisable for private equity firms to thoroughly investigate whether the proposed investment triggers any notification obligation under merger control, FDI rules and/or the FSR, and to investigate competition risks, including appropriate warranties and indemnities in the transaction documents.

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Untangling the DMA in seven questions and answers: a new phase in Big Tech regulation

On 6 September 2023, the European Commission (“Commission”) designated Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Meta, Microsoft, and ByteDance (the parent company of TikTok) as gatekeepers under the Digital Markets Act (“DMA”). The DMA imposes additional obligations on online platforms that enjoy significant economic power and act as an important gateway for business users to reach end users (see also our earlier blog on the DMA). The substantive obligations of the DMA will enter into force in March 2024, subjecting the undertakings designated as ‘gatekeepers’ to a stricter regulatory regime.

In the meantime, Apple, Meta, and ByteDance have already appealed their designation decisions to the General Court of the European Union (“General Court”), and the Commission is conducting market investigations into possible additional designations. ByteDance has also filed an application for the suspension of its designation with the President of the General Court. In this blog, we discuss the scope and obligations of the DMA through seven questions and answers. We also cover recent developments regarding the designations, enforcement issues, and the role of third parties.

  1. What is the DMA?
  2. To whom does the DMA apply?
  3. Which undertakings have been designated as gatekeepers so far?
  4. What obligations does the DMA impose on gatekeepers?
  5. When does the obligation to inform the Commission about concentrations apply?
  6. How is the DMA enforced?
  7. Does the DMA facilitate private damages claims?

1. What is the DMA?

The DMA is an EU regulation that seeks to safeguard competition on digital markets by ensuring that digital markets remain ‘fair’ and ‘contestable’. The previous years, several online platforms have become so sizeable and powerful that new entrants face significant challenges when competing with these incumbents. Moreover, large online platforms typically possess such a vast and all-encompassing ecosystem that provides them with a significant advantage in reaching end users and enables them to effectively exclude other market participants. Furthermore, the vast amounts of data the gatekeepers generate further reinforce the competitive advantage gatekeepers typically enjoy over their competitors. As a result of the foregoing, innovation and quality in digital markets are diminished as existing competitors are unable to keep up, and new entrants are discouraged from entering the market.

The use of Articles 101 and/or 102 TFEU has not always proven to be effective in tackling these structural issues. Although both the Commission and national competition authorities (“NCAs”) have pursued several investigations in digital markets in recent years (for the Commission, think about the Amazon Buy Box and three investigations into Google), these investigations are often complex and time-consuming. The Commission’s investigations into Apple Pay and Apple’s App Store (music services), launched in 2020, are for example still ongoing. Ex post enforcement action based on Articles 101 and/or 102 TFEU may thus – in the view of the European legislator – in some cases come too late to repair the harm to the competitive playfield. The DMA seeks to close this enforcement gap by providing an ex ante regulatory framework for large online platforms (see also our earlier blog on this subject).

 

2. To whom does the DMA apply?

The DMA applies to gatekeepers. A gatekeeper provides one or more so-called core platform services (“CPSs”) The DMA distinguishes the following CPSs:

A CPS provider qualifies as a gatekeeper if a number of qualitative requirements are met. A gatekeeper is not necessarily dominant within the meaning of EU competition law. Instead, an undertaking is qualified as a gatekeeper if it (i) has a significant impact on the internal market, (ii) it provides a CPS which is an important gateway for business users to reach end users, and (iii) has or is expected to have an entrenched and durable position. An undertaking is subsequently presumed to satisfy the abovementioned requirements if it meets the following quantitative criteria:

If an undertaking meets the quantitative criteria, it is obliged to notify the Commission within two months after those thresholds are met. Upon notification, undertakings that qualify as gatekeepers can try to rebut this presumption. So far, Alphabet, Microsoft, and Samsung have successfully argued that they should not be designated as gatekeepers as regards their Gmail, Outlook, and Samsung Internet Browser, despite meeting the DMA’s quantitative thresholds. The Commission conceded to the objections and refrained from designating Alphabet, Microsoft and Samsung as gatekeepers with respect to these services.

Where the arguments challenging a designation fall short of outright refuting the designation, but do cast sufficient doubt, the Commission may conduct a market investigation. The Commission is currently conducting investigations in order to establish whether Microsoft Bing, Microsoft Edge, Microsoft Advertising, and Apple’s iMessage ought to be designated under the DMA. In the reverse, the Commission can also designate an undertaking as a gatekeeper on the basis of a market investigation if the undertaking does not meet the DMA’s quantitative thresholds.

A designation by the Commission is not temporally limited. The Commission can, upon request or on its own initiative, reconsider, amend, or repeal a designation if there has been a substantial change in any of the facts underlying the designation, or where it is found that the designation was founded on incomplete, incorrect, or misleading information. The Commission may later also designate new gatekeepers. There is for example already some talk about the potential designation of Booking.com in the near future. So far, Booking eluded the DMA’s quantitative thresholds – in large part due to the COVID-19 pandemic – but is already considered to be a prime candidate for a gatekeeper designation in the media.

 

3. Which undertakings have been designated as gatekeepers so far?

On 6 September 2023, the Commission designated six undertakings as gatekeepers in respect of twenty-two CPSs. The image below provides an overview.

Source: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/nl/qanda_20_2349

The Commission’s gatekeeper designations could be appealed until 16 November 2023. Microsoft, Amazon, and Alphabet (Google) expressed that they will not appeal their designations. Apple, ByteDance, and Meta did appeal their designation decisions. In its appeal, ByteDance essentially argues that TikTok does not enjoy an entrenched and durable position and that it does not meet both the DMA’s turnover and capitalisation thresholds (unlike all other gatekeepers so far designated). Meta specifically appealed the designation of ‘Facebook Marketplace’ and ‘Facebook Messenger’. Apple, in its turn, appealed all gatekeeper designations and also filed a complaint against the Commission’s decision to initiate a market investigation into whether Apple’s iMessage should be included in the designation decision. These appeals will probably be decided on next year.

Third parties may join the appeal proceedings before the General Court if they can establish an interest in the General Court’s decision. The ongoing proceedings will reveal whether competitors, customers or other third parties have a sufficient interest already in the stage of the gatekeeper’s designation, or whether this interest only arises in the event of a gatekeeper’s non-compliance with the DMA.

 

4. What obligations does the DMA impose on gatekeepers?

Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the DMA introduce a wide range of obligations for gatekeepers. Many of the obligations relate to the collection, processing, and combining of (personal) data. Without the express consent of the end user, a gatekeeper is for example prohibited to collect the personal data of end-users using services of third parties for advertising purposes. Additionally, a gatekeeper is prohibited from cross-using personal data generated by a CPS in other services provided separately by the gatekeeper and vice versa. The gatekeeper is furthermore precluded from (re)directing end-users that access a specific service of the gatekeeper into signing on to other services of the gatekeeper with the aim of combining the user’s personal data. Gatekeepers must furthermore provide end users with effective data portability.

The DMA also contains obligations to provide business users, advertisers and publishers insight into the data generated by and/or for them. The gatekeeper may not use the non-public data generated by business users in competition with these users, for example on a downstream market. With regard to advertisers and publishers, there is also an obligation to provide daily information on the ads placed upon their request, free of charge. For online search engines (i.e. for the time being only Google Search), there is an additional obligation to grant third-party search engines, upon their request, access to anonymised ranking, query, click and view data under fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions (also: “FRAND”-conditions).

In addition to these rules on the processing and accessing of data, gatekeepers must abide by many different obligations that, at their core, concern the interaction between different services and the application of fair trading conditions. To this end, the DMA contains both certain do’s – for example, in the context of interoperability of certain hardware and communication services – and don’ts (think of the express prohibition of self-preferencing and the mandatory use of certain identification or (in-app) payment systems). Gatekeepers are also barred from engaging in tying and bundling practices, for example by making the use of one CPS contingent upon the registration or subscription to another. A gatekeeper should enable end users to easily install and uninstall software applications (including third-party app stores) and allow end-users to easily change the default settings. End users should not be (technically) prevented from switching to or additionally using other software applications or services, and should be able to terminate their service with the gatekeeper without undue difficulty.

Furthermore, the gatekeeper should not prevent business users from offering the same products or services to end users through their own direct sales channel and/or third-party services at prices or conditions that are different from those offered through the online intermediation services of the gatekeeper. More generally, the gatekeeper should not prevent business users and end users from going around the gatekeeper and contracting with other parties (e.g. also indirectly by denying access to certain content or features upon doing so). Specifically with regard to app stores, online search engines and online social networking services, the DMA includes the obligation to apply general FRAND access conditions for business users, which should also contain an alternative dispute settlement mechanism.

Finally, to encourage effective enforcement, the DMA explicitly prescribes that the gatekeeper may not restrict or prevent business users and end users from reporting breaches of the DMA or other EU law rules to a competent authority. A full overview of the obligations the DMA imposes can be found in Articles 5 – 7 of the DMA. The designated gatekeepers must bring their operations into compliance with the DMA by March 2024. Gatekeepers must also submit a compliance report to the Commission and establish an independent compliance function.

 

5. When does the obligation to inform the Commission about concentrations apply?

Another unique feature of the DMA that has so far received rather little attention is the obligation for gatekeepers to inform the Commission of any proposed concentration in the digital sector, regardless of whether the proposed concentration must be notified to the Commission under the EU Merger Regulation (“EUMR”) or to a national competition authority. This duty to inform reflects the increasing emphasis of the Commission on preventing so-called killer acquisitions. It complements the Commission’s use of Article 22 EUMR to examine mergers that do not meet EU and/or national merger thresholds (read more here), and the CJEU’s recent Towercast-judgment, where the CJEU ruled that certain non-notifiable mergers may qualify as an abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU.

As the DMA merely introduces a duty to inform the Commission, it does not provide the Commission with additional powers to investigate these concentrations, and hence, to potentially veto them. Upon ‘notification’, the gatekeeper is required to provide a description of the concentration and the activities of the undertakings involved, as well as the annual EU turnover, the value and rationale of the transaction, the number of annual active users and the number of monthly end users. This will allow the Commission to monitor whether new CPSs need to be designated. The DMA also explicitly states that this information could potentially be used for a subsequent Article 22-referral.

 

6. How is the DMA enforced?

The primary responsibility for enforcement of the DMA lies with the Commission. In addition to the market investigation mentioned above, the DMA provides the Commission with various investigative powers, such as the possibility to request information and conduct inspections (similar to those under Regulation 1/2003). In doing so, the Commission can also impose interim measures. In case of an infringement of the DMA, the Commission, after issuing its preliminary findings, can impose substantial fines and periodic penalty payments, as well as behavioural remedies. These fines can amount to 10% of an undertaking’s annual turnover and may be doubled to up to 20% for repeat offenders. In case of systemic non-compliance (more than three infringement decisions in eight years), the Commission may also impose structural measures (including, for example, a temporary ban on new acquisitions), following a market investigation.

NCAs only play a supporting role in the enforcement of the DMA by monitoring compliance. In the Netherlands, the Digital Markets Regulation Implementation Act (“Implementation Act”) designates the Dutch Competition Authority (Autoriteit Consument en Markt, “ACM”) as the competent national authority responsible for overseeing compliance with the DMA. The ACM possesses various supervisory powers and may initiate investigations into possible breaches of the DMA on its own initiative. Yet ultimately, the ACM reports back to the Commission, and only the Commission can initiate enforcement proceedings under the DMA.

The ACM’s supervisory powers end where the Commission’s investigation begins. It might nevertheless be difficult to establish clear boundaries as these supervisory and investigative powers could overlap. In its recent advice on the Implementation Act, the Dutch Council of State already indicated that the powers of the Commission, the ACM, and the Dutch Data Protection Authority’s (Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens, AP”) potentially overlap with one another (for example regarding the enforcement of the Platform-to-Business Regulation and the Data Protection Regulation). Also, many obligations from the DMA bear close similarities to (or even: mirror) previous cases that were addressed under ‘regular’ competition law (think of the specific ban on self-preferencing in the DMA following the Google Shopping case). At the same time, the DMA prevents national authorities from taking decisions contrary to a decision adopted by the Commission on the basis of the DMA. In light of these ambiguities, the Dutch Council of State has advised the (Dutch) legislator to complement the explanatory memorandum of the Implementation Act on these points.

Public enforcement of the DMA may also be initiated on the basis of complaints and signals from third parties, including competitors, business users, and end users. Under Article 27 of the DMA, third parties may directly report possible breaches of the DMA to both the competent national authorities and the Commission. The DMA also encourages whistleblowers to report infringements by gatekeepers to the competent authorities. The Commission stresses that whistleblowers can play a crucial role in the enforcement of the DMA as they alert the competent authorities of potential infringements. To encourage employees to ‘blow the whistle’, the Commission has asserted that whistleblowers need to be protected from retaliation. Consequently, the EU Whistleblower Directive is also applicable to the DMA.

 

7. Does the DMA facilitate private damages claims?

As of now, still little is known about private enforcement of the DMA. On the basis of Article 288 TFEU, all EU Regulations, hence including the DMA, enjoy direct effect throughout the Member States. Individuals can invoke the rights enshrined in an regulation in civil proceedings where the rights granted to the individual are sufficiently clear, precise, and relevant to the individual’s situation. Given that most obligations in the DMA are formulated in a rather specific and precise fashion, it can be assumed that such is the case (also confirmed by the Commission), although Article 6 of the DMA contains obligations that may “be further specified”.

If a third party suffers damages as a result of a gatekeeper’s infringement of the DMA, it may initiate civil proceedings before a national court. Article 39 of the DMA provides for cooperation between the national competition authorities and the Commission in the national application of the DMA. A national court may request the Commission to provide information and issue guidance when applying the DMA in national proceedings. The Commission can also intervene on its own initiative if the coherent application of the DMA so requires. Additionally, Member States must forward to the Commission a copy of any written judgment of national courts deciding on the application of the DMA.

Throughout the legislative process, it has been stressed that the DMA is not a competition law instrument. Also considering the legal basis of the DMA, the procedural guarantees and (material) presumptions that Regulation 1/2003 and the Cartel Damages Directive provide, are inapplicable. The DMA therefore explicitly stipulates that national courts shall not give a decision which runs counter to a decision adopted by the Commission under the DMA. It can thus be inferred that the unlawful conduct (as one of the elements for establishing a tort action under the Dutch Civil Code) is irrefutably established before a national court after a DMA- infringement decision by the Commission (just as it is on the basis of Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003). This will facilitate a follow-on damages claim following a non-compliance decision based on the DMA.

 

Conclusion

After many years of negotiations, the practical entry into force of the DMA is nearly in sight. Six undertakings have so far been designated as gatekeepers and the first legal proceedings challenging these designations are already pending before the General Court. In the meantime, the Commission is conducting market investigations to determine whether other services provided by these gatekeepers should be designated under the DMA. Given the thin dividing line between the DMA on the one hand and European and national competition rules on the other, national authorities will need to consider how to most effectively shape cooperation among themselves and with the Commission. Third parties such as the gatekeepers’ competitors and customers may also want to prepare for the new rules that are set to apply to their competitors/business partners in March 2024. During the legislative process of the DMA, the legislator strengthened their role in the enforcement of the DMA by providing for an explicit complaint option as well as by implementing several additional rules on how the DMA is to be applied in national civil proceedings. Third parties are therefore expected to play a crucial role in overseeing the enforcement of the DMA.

 

More questions about the DMA? Please contact one of our competition law specialists.

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Join our bB Litigators Sunrise Run in Paris on 1 November 2023

We are very excited to invite you to join our bB Litigators Sunrise Run during the IBA in Paris. An early morning run with colleagues from all over the world.

Together we will run through the city center of Paris, passing the Louvre, the Tuileries Gardens, the Musée d’Orsay, Place de La Concorde and le Grand Palais and more of the most beautiful sites accompanied by professional running tour guides.

Whether you are a casual runner or an Olympic athlete, join us for 5 to 7 km of celebrating health and newfound friendship.

You will be back in time to start your IBA conference day, fully energized!

 

What:  Guided running tour
When: Wednesday 1 November 2023
Start/end: (Petit) Arc de Triomphe du Carrousel in front of the Louvre 
Time: 7:00 AM
Duration: Approx. one hour with coffee and croissants afterwards

 

To ensure your spot please RSVP or send an email to sunriserun@bureaubrandeis.com

We look forward to seeing you on 1 November 2023 in Paris!

 

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Landmark case in the UK: standard third party funding agreements in collective actions appear to be unenforceable

On 26 July 2023, the UK Supreme Court rendered a landmark decision on third party funding agreements in collective actions proceedings. This case concerned follow-on damages proceedings in the renowned truck cartel case. In this decision, the Supreme Court qualified the (standard) funding agreements that the claimants use as “damages-based agreements” (“DBAs”), which is a type of contingency fee arrangement in UK law for ‘representatives and those providing other services in relation to the making of the claim’.  The Supreme Court now decided that funders offer such services and therefore should follow DBA regulations.

Under UK law, DBAs are regulated, especially in cases before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (“CAT”). Claim vehicles are not allowed to use DBAs at all in opt-out proceedings (where a claim vehicle starts proceedings on behalf of a defined group, but group members may opt-out) and they can only use them when they comply with a specific regulatory regime in opt-in proceedings (proceedings that parties should actively join). By qualifying standard third party funding agreements as DBAs, the agreements cannot be used to fund opt-out proceedings and should be changed in order to comply with the regime for opt-in proceedings.

Effect on the current funding practice in the UK

This decision therefore has far-reaching effects for all current and future cartel damages proceedings in the UK. At this moment, 31 collective action cases are pending before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (“CAT”). Most, if not all, of these cases are funded by a third-party funder using such agreements. Claimants and funders of these cases should now reconsider their funding agreements. They might have to renegotiate the funding agreements or even find new ways to fund class action litigation.

The impact of this decision is therefore enormous, as funders face difficulties in recouping their investment after a settlement or an award. That might lead to difficulties for claimants to find funding for their cases. That is acknowledged by the Supreme Court, but it does not change the decision. Lord Sales notes that the Court has been informed that “the likely consequence in practice would be that most third party litigation funding agreements would (…) be unenforceable as the law currently stands”. However, the fact that claimants and funders were under the impression that such agreements did not fall within the definition of a DBA when they concluded these agreements “would not justify the court in changing or distorting the meaning of ‘claims management service’”.

As for the current collective action proceedings, it cannot be ruled out that some opportunistic claimants at the end of proceedings with enough many in the bank will try to conclude the case without paying their funders. UK class action proceedings can cost up to several million pounds, which is normally paid by these funders in advance, so that can save a lot of money.

On the other hand, we need to add some nuance. Since proceedings are so expensive, it is unlikely that the current practice of third party funding will stop at all. However, if the UK parliament will not change the law – and funders are probably lobbying for that already – it might be more difficult to invest in such cases and it is well possible that funders shift their focus to more funder-friendly countries, such as the Netherlands.

What are the Dutch rules?

Under Dutch law, there are only rules on financing opt-out cases, which aim to protect damaged parties (often consumers) that cannot instruct the claim vehicle representing them. These damaged parties are possibly not even aware of the case. These rules, however, do not apply to opt-in cases where claimants litigate on the basis of assignments. This was confirmed in one of the trucks cases in July 2022. The Dutch Court of Amsterdam ruled that the opt-out regulations are not applicable to opt-in proceedings started by claim vehicles, as they claim on behalf of professional parties that made a free choice to join the proceedings and who may instruct the claim vehicle. They don’t need the legal protection that is provided for the opt-out cases.

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10 questions about the Digital Services Act

On 4 October 2022, the European Council adopted the final version of the Digital Services Act (“DSA”).Together with the so-called Digital Markets Act (“DMA“, see here), the DSA forms the basis of new European legislation for the digital economy.

The DSA contains EU-wide rules for online intermediaries, including online platforms and search engines. The DSA intends to update the more than 20-year-old E-Commerce Directive. Indeed, since 2000, digital technologies, business models and services have changed significantly.

The DSA contains important new rules for virtually all online services. However, some platforms and search engines operators are regulated more heavily. The aim of the DSA is, among others, to ensure that illegal online content is addressed quickly and that the fundamental rights of internet users are protected. The DSA aims to combat current digital challenges, such as illegal products, hate speech, disinformation and fake news.

For that purpose, the DSA contains rules, inter alia, on:

  • The liability of intermediary services;
  • Notice and action mechanisms;
  • Content moderation practices;
  • Online advertising, profiling and targeting;
  • The use of algorithms and recommender systems;
  • The traceability of traders; and
  • Systemic risks of very large online platforms and very large online search engines.

The DSA also introduces a new oversight mechanism.

Enough reason, therefore, to take a closer look at this important new regulation, which comprises over 300 pages. What will change with the DSA – and what won’t? What obligations apply to which services? A Q&A on the DSA.

 1)            What services are covered by the DSA?

The DSA contains new rules on the responsibilities and liability of “intermediary services“, or internet intermediaries. The DSA distinguishes between the following four different types of services:

  • Intermediary services, which can either be (i) mere conduit (transmission) services, (ii) caching (temporary storage) services or (iii) hosting services. According to the recitals of the DSA, these services may, inter alia, include online search engines, local wireless networks, DNS services, domain name registers, virtual private networks, cloud services, proxies and webhosting services;
  • Hosting services: services that consist of the storage of information provided by end users;
  • Online platforms: hosting services that, at the request of the user, not only store, but also disseminate information to the public. The latter means that the information, at the request of the user, is made available to a potentially unlimited number of third parties. Online platforms include, inter alia, online market places, social media services, and app stores.
  • Very large online platforms and search engines: online platforms and search engines with more than 45 million monthly active users in the EU. In other words: the Facebooks and Googles of this world.

The obligations with which these services must comply increase gradually. The very large online platforms are therefore subject to the heaviest due diligence obligations.

 2)           What happens to the liability safeguards contained in the E-Commerce Directive?

The liability framework in the E-Commerce Directive remain largely intact. This framework stipulates when an intermediary service cannot be held liable in relation to illegal content provided by the recipients of the service.

The existing liability exemptions for “mere conduit”, “caching” and “hosting” services are incorporated in full in articles 4-6 of the DSA. The prohibition on general monitoring (article 8) also remains in place.

This also means that the existing case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) concerning the liability exemptions and the measures that can be imposed on intermediaries, remains guiding. The cases L’Oréal/eBay, Scarlet/SABAM, UPC/Telekabel, McFadden, Eva Glawischnig and YouTube & Cyando thus remain relevant in practice.

At the same time, the DSA clarifies certain elements of the existing framework. One of these clarifications is the introduction of a so-called “Good Samaritan” clause. The fact that a service carries out voluntary own-initiative investigations or takes others measures to combat illegal content, does not lead to that service being ineligible for the exemptions from liability (article 7).

The DSA also makes it explicit that providers of intermediary services must comply with orders issued by judicial or administrative authorities to act against one or more specific items of illegal content (article 9) and to provide information about one or more specific individual recipients of the service (article 10). The service provider must inform the authority issuing the order of the effect given thereto, after which the authority shall transmit the order to the Digital Services Coordinator (see Question 8) from the Member State of the issuing authority. The order will then be shared with all other Digital Services Coordinators.

It is not entirely clear from the DSA whether these orders– stemming from inter alia law enforcement authorities (recital 32)– differ from the orders that can be issued to terminate or prevent an infringement pursuant to the relevant liability clauses, although it looks like they do. Indeed, the DSA stipulates that these orders “shall be without prejudice to national civil and criminal procedural law”.

 3)           What obligations will apply to all intermediary services?

The DSA contains a number of “due diligence” obligations that digital services must comply with. These requirements are proportionate to the size and risks of the service: the greater the service, the greater the responsibilities.

The DSA contains a number of obligations that all intermediary services must comply with, including the obligation to:

  • designate points of contact, both for supervisors and end users (article 11-12). Services established outside the EU must appoint legal representatives (article 13);
  • include information on content moderation, algorithmic decision-making and complaint handling systems in their terms and conditions (article 14);
  • publish public transparency reports with information on content moderation measures taken and the number of orders received from authorities (article 15). Additional reporting obligations apply to hosting providers and (very large) online platforms.

4)           What is “Notice and Action”? And how does it differ from Notice and Takedown?

The E-Commerce Directive dictates that hosting providers must have a so-called Notice and Takedown (NTD) system in place: upon receipt of a notice, there are obligated to remove (takedown) illegal information.

The DSA prescribes “notice and action mechanisms”, meaning that hosting providers should “act” when the receive a notice. Other than under the E-Commerce Directive, the DSA spells out what information a notice must contain. This includes a sufficiently substantiated explanation of reasons, the exact electronic location of the illegal information, and a statement confirming that the notice is made in good faith (Article 16). This system very much resembles the current DMCA-system in the U.S.

From article 17 of the DSA, it can inferred what the required “action” may entail, namely:

  • a restriction on the visibility of specific information, including the removal, disabling access or demotion of content;
  • a suspension, termination or restriction of payments;
  • a suspension or termination of the service; or
  • a suspension or termination of the account of the (alleged) infringer.

The hosting provider is obliged to notify both the user requesting the measures and the affected users of the decision it takes and the reasons therefore (article 17).

What is noteworthy is that the DSA does not contain a specific staydown obligation. In other words, it does not specifically require a hosting provider to prevent the same illegal content from reappearing again, although this may be inferred from the case law of the CJEU.

On the whole, Notice and Action resembles Notice and Takedown, be it that the procedure is made much more administrative under the DSA.

5)           What additional obligations apply to online platforms?

In addition to Notice and Action mechanisms, online platforms must:

  • have in place an effective internal complaint-handling system through which users can lodge complaints following a decision taken with regard to illegal content (article 20);
  • give priority to notices submitted by so-called “trusted flaggers” (article 22): entities with particular expertise and competence for the purposes of detecting, identifying and notifying illegal content. The status of trusted flaggers can be awarded by the Digital Services Coordinator (see Question 8);
  • take measures against repeat infringers (article 23), meaning users that frequently provide manifestly illegal content or frequently submit notices that are manifestly unfounded;
  • refrain from using so-called “dark patterns”: user interfaces that have been crafted to (subtly) trick or manipulate users into doing certain things (article 25);
  • provide transparency regarding online advertising (article 26, also see Question 6 below);
  • ensure that recipients of their service are informed about how recommender systems impact the way information is displayed, and how users can influence how information is presented to them. Platforms should clearly present the parameters used for such recommender systems, including the most important criteria in determining the information suggested to the recipient of the service and the reasons for their respective importance, including where information is prioritised based on profiling and users’ online behaviour (article 27). Very large platforms must offer an option for recommendations that is not based on profiling (article 38);
  • Vet the credentials of business users (article 29), in case the platform allows consumers to conclude distance contracts with traders (KYBC – “know your business customer”). Online platforms must further organize their online interfaces in a way that allows traders to comply with their information obligations towards consumers.

 6)           How does the DSA regulate online advertising?

Online advertising plays an important role in the online environment. The provision of online services is often wholly or in part remunerated though advertising revenues. Indeed, ads are Meta’s and Google’s main source of income.

Online advertising also poses significant risks, ranging from ads that are themselves illegal to the discriminatory presentation of ads with an impact on society (recital 68). For that reason, the DSA contains very important new provisions relating to online advertising, aiming to give online users more control and understanding over the ads they see online. For this purpose the DSA stipulates that:

  • Commercial communication must be clearly identifiable as such (though clear markers) and users will have to be clearly informed, for each specific ad, on whose behalf the advertisement is presented and who paid for the ad (article 26). Moreover, providers of online platforms that present advertisements must also provide “meaningful information” about the main parameters used to determine the recipient(s) to whom the ad is shown and. This includes information on the logic used and information about profiling techniques. This means that services should elaborate on the nature of their advertising activities: is it contextual, what profiling criteria are used? Services should also inform their users about any means available for them to change such criteria.
  • Targeted advertising based on profiling using special categories of personal data, such as sexual orientation or religious or political beliefs, is prohibited (article 26 paragraph 3). This provision thus significant limits services in using targeting techniques to optimize ads to match a user’s interests and potentially appeal to their vulnerabilities.
  • Providers of online platforms should not present advertisements based on profiling using personal data of the recipient of the service when they are aware with reasonable certainty that the recipient of the service is a minor (article 28).

For very large online platforms, the DSA prescribes additional measures to mitigate risks and enable oversight. These services will have to maintain and provide access to ad repositories, allowing researchers, civilians and authorities to inspect how ads were displayed and how they were targeted. Very large online platforms and search engines also need to assess whether and how their advertising systems are manipulated or otherwise contribute to societal risks, and take measures to mitigate these risks (see Question 7).

 7)           Which obligations apply to very large online platforms- and search engines?

Due to the particular risks tech giants such as Facebook, TikTok and Google pose in the dissemination of illegal content and societal harms, these parties are subject to the most stringent due diligence obligations.

  • They must conduct risk assessments to identify systemic risks stemming from the design and use of their services (article 34). Systemic risks include issues such as disinformation, illegal content, election manipulation, manipulation during pandemics and harms to vulnerable groups. In conducting the risk assessment, account must be had to all aspects of the service, including content moderation, advertisement and algorithmic systems.
  • They must prevent abuse of their systems by taking risk-based action, including oversight through independent audits (article 35, 37). These measures must be carefully balanced against restrictions of freedom of expression;
  • They must comply with a new crisis response mechanism, forcing them to act upon instruction of the Commission in cases of serious threat for public health and security crises, such as a pandemic or a war (article 36);
  • When Big Tech platforms recommend content, users must be able to modify the criteria used and be given the option to choose not to receive personalized recommendations (article 38).
  • They must comply with additional online advertising transparency obligations (see Question 6 above), including by offering a publicly available and searchable online register (article 39). This register must in any case include the following information per advertisement: (i) the content of the advertisement, (ii) the advertiser on whose behalf the ad was presented, (iii) the (legal) person who paid for the ad, (iv) the period during which the ad was presented, (v) whether the ad was specifically intended for a particular group of recipients and, if so, the parameters used to define that group and (vi) the number of recipients of the advertisements, broken down by Member State.

 8)           How will the DSA be supervised and enforced?

The DSA foresees in a unique oversight structure. Each Member State will need to appoint a Digital Services Coordinator, an independent authority which will be responsible for supervising the intermediary services established in their territory.

The European Commission will be the primary regulator for very large online platforms and search engines. In the most serious cases, it can impose fines of up to 6% of the global turnover of a service provider.

An EU-wide cooperation mechanism will be established between national regulators and the Commission.

The Digital Services Coordinators will cooperate within an independent advisory group, called the European Board for Digital Services, which shall provide advise to the Digital Services Coordinators and the Commission on matters covered by the Regulation.

 9)           When does the DSA apply?

All online intermediaries offering their services in the EU must comply with the new rules. This is regardless of whether they are established in the EU or not. A provider offers services in the EU if a “substantial connection” to the Union exists. This is the case when a service provider has an establishment in the Union or, in the absence thereof, when the number of recipients of the service in one or more Member States is significant in relation to the population thereof. A substantial connection can also exist on the basis of the targeting of activities towards one or more Member States. This may be derived, for example, from the availability of an application in the national application store, from the provision of local advertising or advertising in a language used in that Member State, or from providing customer service in a language generally used in that Member State.

The mere fact that a website is accessible from the EU, on the other hand, cannot in itself be considered as establishing a substantial connection to the Union.

 10)         When will the DSA enter into force?

Today, the Council formally adopted the DSA, which will now be published in the Official Journal of the EU. The DSA will be directly applicable across the EU after entry into force.

Very large online platforms and search engines will have to comply with the new rules within four months after their designated as such by the Commission.

All the other digital services will be obliged to comply with the DSA by 1 January 2024, or fifteen months and 20 days after the date on which the DSA is published in the Official Journal of the EU, whichever is later.

Vision

Court halves AFM fine issued to SBM for late disclosure of inside information

For the first time in a while, the financial supervision chamber of the Rotterdam District Court has dealt with a market abuse case. The Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) had imposed an administrative fine of EUR 2 million on SBM Offshore N.V. (SBM) for failing to timely disclose inside information. SBM appealed the fining decision and has now partly been proven right.

On appeal the court found that with respect to two of the four alleged violations the financial regulator applied an incorrect legal criterion in assessing whether the listed company had price sensitive information. The court has settled the matter itself by reducing the fine to EUR 1 million.

The matter dates back to SBM’s internal investigation into allegations of bribery and unlawful payments to international trade agents in 2012, in which context the company i.a. consented to an out-of-court settlement of USD 240 million with the Public Prosecutor’s Office.

Criteria for assessing if information is concrete are not to be mixed

Similar to previous market abuse matters (for example, in relation to Royal Imtech N.V.), the main question before the Rotterdam court was whether the information regarding possible unlawful trade practices in Brazil that SBM had on March 27, 2012 and May 27, 2014 was so “concrete” that it fell within the definition of inside information.

Pursuant to market abuse laws and regulations, issuers of financial instruments like SBM are to disclose inside information as soon as possible, insofar as it relates directly to the issuer concerned.

With reference to the Geltl/Daimler case of the European Court of Justice and CESR guidance on the Market Abuse Directive, the Rotterdam court distinguishes two criteria. To determine whether there is concrete information one can either depart from an existing situation that has occurred or from a future situation that may reasonably be expected to come into existence.

In assessing whether there is concrete information within the meaning of inside information, the AFM chose not to base its assessment on an existing situation or a situation that has taken place (for which, according to the guidance, there must be sufficient “hard” and objective evidence of that situation), but on a future situation or an event that may reasonably be assumed to occur.

The AFM takes the position that on March 27, 2012, and again on May 27, 2014, SBM had a reasonable expectation that bribery in Brazil would be identified in the future. In order to (have to) have that expectation, evidence is not required; a significant probability that this situation will occur is sufficient according to the AFM.

Evidence for the event to which the information relates is required

The Rotterdam court agrees with SBM and finds that the AFM used an incorrect legal criterion. In the opinion of the District Court, the facts and circumstances which the AFM used as a basis for two of the four alleged violations relate to an existing situation, namely the information known to SBM on March 27, 2012 and May 27, 2014 about possible bribery in Brazil.

According to the court, the AFM should have therefore proceeded on the basis of the existing situation – requiring firm and objective evidence – and not on the basis of a future situation in the form of the possibility that bribery (from the past) would be established in the future. In other words, if one criterion is used, the test of that criterion is to be used and vice versa. The two criteria and relevant tests are thus not be mixed, which also from a logical point of view seems to make sense.

The court repeals the AFM decision relating to the alleged violations on disclosure of unlawful trade pactices in Brazil and considers a total fine of EUR 1 million for the two remaining violations with regard to disclosure of SBM’s exclusion from a Petrobras tender appropriate and necessary.

Interestingly enough, the AFM could have imposed a fine of EUR 2 million on SBM for each violation separately. As it did not do so in this case but imposed one overall fine in the amount of the basic amount of EUR 2 million for four violations, this argument does not lead to a different conclusion on the adjustment of the fine, says the court.

District Court of Rotterdam, 21 June 2022, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2022:4948

Vision

Competition Flashback Q1 2022

This is the Competition Flashback Q1 2022 by bureau Brandeis, featuring a selection of the key competition law developments of the past quarter.

Would you like to receive the Competition Flashback news letter of bureau Brandeis by email in the future? That is possible! You will find the registration form here.

Overview Q1 2022

  • Enforcement of consumer rights by ACM: principle of legal certainty as a safety net
  • Court of Appeal nullifies non-compete clause in cooperation agreement between radiologists due to breach of cartel prohibition
  • ACM’s focus areas: digital economy, energy transition & sustainability, housing market
  • Further investigation into merger RTL/Talpa by ACM
  • The Data Act: European legislative proposal for far-reaching data sharing
  • EU General Court annuls billion euro fine for Intel for alleged abuse of dominance
  • Court of Justice clarifies the application of ne bis in idem principle in competition law
  • Roadshows by the Ministry of Economic Affairs for public company DVI violate the Dutch Act on Government and Free Markets
  • Acquisition of Kustomer by Meta approved by European Commission and Bka
  • Supermarket chains Coop and Plus may merge under condition of selling several supermarkets
  • No compensation for UPS after the European Commission wrongly vetoed the UPS/TNT merger
  • European Commission must also pay default interest after (partial) nullity of a fine

 

Enforcement of consumer rights by ACM: the principle of legal certainty as a safety net

Rotterdam District Court, judgment of 20 January 2022 | ACM, press release of 20 January 2022

Consumer rights in the energy sector have been on the radar of the Authority for Consumers and Markets (“ACM”) for some time now. An interesting development in this context is the judgment of the District Court of Rotterdam of 20 January 2022, concerning a fine imposed by the ACM for the application of unreasonably high cancellation fees to freelancers. According to the ACM, this group should have been regarded as consumers and not as (small) business customers. The court ruled, with due observance of the lex certa principle, that the legislation offers no starting points for the distinction made by the ACM in its guidelines between consumers and (small) business customers. The fine of EUR 1,25 million imposed by the ACM was therefore annulled. The ACM has announced that it will appeal the ruling.

This judgment provides insight into the relationship between policy rules of the ACM and higher legislation. Although the ACM frequently uses guidelines, directives and other soft law in its supervision, the principle of foreseeability requires that ACM’s policy must always be regarded in the light of the intention of the legislator, according to the court.

In this context, reference can also be made to the in-depth investigation into misleading sustainability claims made by two energy suppliers, as published by the ACM on 25 January 2022. Following the publication of the Guidelines on Sustainability Claims, the ACM started a broad investigation in the energy sector in May 2021. The investigation showed that energy suppliers do not sufficiently explain what is the basis of their claims about green energy and sustainability, and fail, for instance, to indicate what percentage of the gas actually consists of green gas or whether it is CO2-compensated gas. The (increasing) supervision of the ACM in the energy sector is thus (again) based on its own policy rules. In the event of judicial review, it might be relevant to assess whether and to what extent the ACM’s guidelines are in accordance with the law.

 

Court of Appeal nullifies non-compete clause in cooperation agreement between radiologists due to breach of cartel prohibition

Court of Appeal ‘s-Hertogenbosch, judgment of 8 February 2022

On 8 February 2022, the Court of Appeal of ‘s-Hertogenbosch (the “CoA”) handed down a judgment annulling a non-compete clause on the basis of Article 6 of the Dutch Competition Act (“DCA”). The appellant before the CoA is a radiologist working at a hospital operated by Zuyderland. Since 1 January 2015, the appellant transferred his radiology practice to MSB: a cooperation of medical specialists affiliated to Zuyderland. MSB concluded a members’ agreement (the “Agreement”) with the professional company of the appellant, which contains a non-compete clause prohibiting the appellant to perform work (in)directly for healthcare providers competing with MSB without MSB’s permission. In addition, the non-compete clause was to apply for another two years after expiry of the agreement, within a radius of 30 kilometres.

The judgment shows that the radiologist had repeatedly breached the non-compete clause during the term of the agreement. MSB therefore decided to terminate the agreement on 11 April 2018. On appeal, the radiologist argued that the non-compete clause in the agreement was null and void pursuant to Article 6 DCA. Therefore, it could not serve as a ground for termination.

The CoA ruled, first of all, that the non-compete clause is a restriction by object within the meaning of Article 6 DCA. The CoA added that, even if the non-compete clause does not qualify as a restriction by object, it is still a prohibited restriction. It referred to case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”), from which it follows that a non-compete clause for members of a cooperation is generally subject to the cartel prohibition. According to this case law, a non-compete clause may not go beyond what is necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the cooperation. The CoA considered that the non-compete clause at issue did not meet this criterion of necessity, as the proper working of MSB can also be achieved by means of a less far-reaching exclusivity obligation. The CoA therefore upheld the appeal and ruled that the non-compete clause is null and void on the basis of Article 6 DCA. As the other grounds for termination did not justify immediate termination either, the CoA held that MSB did not have a (legitimate) ground for termination.

 

ACM’s focus areas: digital economy, energy transition & sustainability, housing market

ACM, focus areas 2022-2023, publication of 24 January 2022

The ACM has put three ACM-wide topics on the agenda for the next two years:

  • Digital economy: this subject was already on the 2020-2021 agenda and remains topical according to the ACM. The ACM announces, inter alia, that it will take action against online service providers for the use of unfair terms and conditions, decide on access to fixed networks for telecom providers without their own network, and publish guidelines on competition rules for IT-providers in the healthcare sector.
  • Energy transition and sustainability: the topic of energy transition was also on the 2020-2021 agenda, but has been expanded to include sustainability. The ACM has announced that it will for example continue to enforce misleading sustainability claims in the energy sector.
  • Housing market: The housing market is a new topic on the ACM’s agenda. The ACM will intensify the supervision on rental agencies and realtors and conduct a market study into market power on the municipal-land market.

The coming years, these three topics will receive extra attention from the ACM. This means that we can expect more investigations regarding these topics, and that the ACM will assess tips and complaints in these fields with particular interest.

 

Further investigation into merger RTL/Talpa by ACM

ACM, decision of 28 January 2022

On 28 January, the ACM decided that a licence is required for the acquisition of Talpa Network by RTL Group. In its Phase I-decision, the ACM specifically foresees the possible creation or strengthening of a dominant position on the markets for (i) the sale of television advertising space, (ii) the production and procurement of audio-visual content, and (iii) the wholesale supply of television channels to distributors such as KPN and VodafoneZiggo.

Due to their strong positions on the market for the provision of television advertising space, RTL and Talpa might increase their prices for advertisers. The ACM even mentions the possibility to leverage their positions on the television advertising market to the radio advertising market (on which Talpa is active with its radio station Q-Music). With regard to the market for wholesale supply of television channels, the ACM also expects that the parties (with a combined market share of 70-80%) could raise prices for distributors and worsen the conditions of, for instance, on-demand services (such as recording television programmes/interactive television). Moreover, the bundling of the parties’ TV activities could place external content producers in a worse bargaining position, and have the result that RTL and Talpa will no longer, or under worse conditions, externally supply the programmes they produce themselves to other broadcasters. According to the ACM, this may come at the expense of the diversity of the television offer. The extensive investigation in the licensing phase will therefore focus on these three – according to the ACM, strongly interrelated – markets.

At first sight, the ACM does not foresee any competition issues in the markets for the procurement of journalistic services, the procurement of facility services and for the provision of retail television services. The ACM for example considers an increase of video on demand services such as Netflix and Disney+, which (may) exert competitive pressure on the retail television services of the parties (RTL XL, Videoland and Kijk), and potentially even on linear television services (live television).

 

The Data Act: European legislative proposal for far-reaching data sharing

European Commission, legislative proposal of 23 February 2022

On 23 February 2022, the European Commission (“Commission”) presented a new legislative proposal that aims to create a harmonised framework for data sharing by public authorities and companies (such as providers of data-generating products including connected devices and data-sharing services such as cloud/edge computing). The aim of the regulation is to create a level playing field between data holders and re-users of data, and to enable data portability in the event that a user switches to another provider. This way, the Commission seeks to promote data-driven innovation, in line with the Commission’s data strategy to form a single market for data.

The Data Act is a so-called ‘horizontal’ regulation which outlines a general EU-wide framework. The Commission is also considering to adopt more detailed (vertical) regulation in certain specific sectors, such as healthcare and transport.

The legislative proposal was publicly consulted last year and will be discussed by the European legislative bodies in the coming period. Given its far-reaching consequences, the Data Act is expected to lead to much political discussion. Criticism has already been voiced by, for example, Big Tech companies that also qualify as gatekeepers under the Digital Markets Act. Under the current proposal, gatekeepers are excluded from receiving data when a customer switches to one of their products.

 

EU General Court annuls billion euro fine for Intel for alleged abuse of dominance

General Court of the EU, judgment of 26 January 2022

On 26 January 2022, the General Court of the European Union (the “General Court”) partially annulled the Commission’s decision in which it held that chip manufacturer Intel had abused its dominant position. As a consequence, the fine of EUR 1,06 billion imposed on Intel was also annulled. The judgment marks a departure from the per se approach whereby certain conduct is considered inherently anti-competitive. If a dominant company provides (economic) evidence in the administrative procedure that its conduct is not capable of restricting competition, the Commission has to investigate the anti-competitive effects of the conduct.

Background

In 2009, the European Commission fined Intel for abusing its dominant position in the microprocessor market from 2002 to 2007. The Commission found that Intel holds a dominant position in the x86 processor market, with a market share of around 70%. Intel abused this position by (i) offering rebates to four computer manufacturers (Dell, HP, Lenovo and NEC) on the condition that they purchase all or almost all x86 CPUs from Intel, and (ii) making payments to manufacturers that would delay, cancel or restrict the launch or commercialisation of laptops with CPUs of Intel’s rival AMD.

According to the Commission, these so-called loyalty rebates restrict competition by their very nature, so that it is not necessary to analyse the anti-competitive effects. In other words, loyalty rebates are thus considered prohibited per se. The Commission still applied the ‘as-efficient competitor‘ test (“AEC test”) to show that the loyalty rebates made it impossible for equally efficient competitors to compete profitably. Intel appealed against this decision in 2014. Following a rejection of the appeal by the General Court, Intel appealed to the CJEU in 2017. The CJEU subsequently set aside the General Court’s judgment, as the General Court had not examined the Commission’s analysis of the AEC test and Intel’s arguments in relation to that test. The case was referred back to the General Court.

The judgment of the General Court

In the recent judgment, the General Court found that the Commission’s economic analysis was flawed and did not sufficiently demonstrate that Intel’s conduct was capable of producing actual and/or potential anti-competitive effects. Loyalty rebates may be presumed, by their very nature, to potentially have restrictive effects on competition, yet the General Court underlines that this is a rebuttable presumption. According to the General Court, loyalty rebates are therefore not per se illegal. Since Intel brought forward supporting evidence showing that its conduct was not capable of restricting competition and producing foreclosure effects, the Commission should have examined the specific effects of the loyalty rebates. The General Court found that the Commission did not sufficiently demonstrate that the loyalty rebates were capable of having foreclosure effects throughout the relevant period.

As a result, the Commission must repay the fine of EUR 1,06 billion plus an interest of 3,5% (see below). The Commission has announced that it will appeal this judgment.

 

Court of Justice clarifies the application of ne bis in idem principle in competition law

Court of Justice of the EU, judgments of 22 March 2022 (Nordzucker and Others v. bpost)

On 22 March 2022, the CJEU delivered two interesting judgments concerning the application of the ne bis in idem principle in competition law. In Nordzucker and Others, the CJEU clarified the applicability of the principle where multiple national competition authorities (“NCAs”) investigate a cross-border cartel infringement. After the German Bundeskartellamt (“Bka”) issued cartel fines to German sugar producers for market sharing with effects in both Germany and Austria (partly on the basis of Article 101 TFEU), the Austrian court rejected a subsequent request from the Austrian competition authority to establish a cartel infringement regarding the same undertakings and on the basis of the same facts.

The CJEU ruled that the national court must examine whether the previous decision of the NCA had the purpose of establishing a cartel on the basis of effects on both the German and the Austrian market. If such is the case, the duplication of proceedings cannot be justified under Article 52(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In order to justify duplication, the subsequent decision must in fact pursue a complementary objective relating to different aspects of the same unlawful conduct. As both the German and the Austrian authorities could (and should) apply Article 101 TFEU, they both pursue the same objective of general interest. The fact that one of the cartel members in the German proceedings participated in a leniency programme does not, according to the CJEU, affect the applicability of the principle.

In case of duplication of infringement decisions based on different types of legislation, pursuing legitimate and distinct objectives, a breach of the ne bis in idem principle could potentially be justified. In bpost, the CJEU ruled that a previous fining decision by the Belgian postal regulator for maintaining a discriminatory tariff system did not, in principle, preclude a subsequent infringement decision by the Belgian Competition Authority (“BMa”) on the basis of Article 102 TFEU, despite the fact that it concerned the same conduct. The CJEU considered that the postal sectoral rules are intended to ensure the liberalisation of the postal sector, whilst the proceedings conducted by the BMa are intended to ensure free competition in the internal market. If there are clear, precise and foreseeable rules, the two procedures have been conducted in a sufficiently coordinated manner are and closely linked in time, and if the overall penalties imposed correspond to the seriousness of the offences committed, a duplication of proceedings would be justified.

 

Roadshows by the Ministry of Economic Affairs for public company DVI violate the Dutch Act on Government and Free Markets

ACM, decision on objection of 21 December 2021; press release of 24 January 2022

In its decision on objection of 21 December 2021, the ACM found that the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy (“EZK”) violated the Dutch Act on Government and Free Markets (Wet Markt & Overheid, “M&O Act”) by favouring public company Dutch Venture Initiative (“DVI”) with regard to other investment funds. DVI invests in funds that, in turn, invest in innovative, fast-growing SMEs.

The Ministry of EZK tried to interest investors in the DVI by organising road shows, which, according to the ACM, constitutes an infringement of the prohibition on favouring companies within the meaning of Section 25j(1) DCA. The ACM holds that this prohibition is intended to prevent the government from providing competitive advantages to a company for the performance of economic activities in the same way as the prohibition on state aid in Article 107 of the TFEU. For this reason, the ACM assessed whether the attraction of investors to the DVI funds meet the cumulative state aid criteria of Article 107 TFEU, and eventually concludes that it does. Non-financial support can thus also qualify as preferential treatment within the meaning of the M&O Act.

 

Acquisition of Kustomer by Meta approved by European Commission and Bka

European Commission, press release of 27 January 2022 | Bundeskartellamt, press release of 11 February 2022

On 27 January 2022, the Commission conditionally approved the acquisition of Kustomer by Meta (formerly Facebook). In its in-depth investigation, the Commission envisaged that the acquisition of Kustomer, an innovative player in the market for customer service software applications, could potentially restrict competition in the market for customer service software and customerrelationshipmanagement (“CRM”) support software. Meta’s Whatsapp, Instagram and Messenger are popular messaging channels through which businesses interact with their customers, and therefore constitute important inputs for suppliers of customer service and CRM software. According to the Commission, Meta would, following the acquisition, potentially have the ability as well as the economic incentive to deny or degrade access to the Application Programming Interfaces (“APIs”) for Meta’s messaging channels to software providers competing with Kustomer.

To address these concerns, Meta has offered commitments with a 10-year duration. Meta undertakes to guarantee non-discriminatory access, without charge to its publicly available APIs for its messaging channels to competing customer service (CRM) software providers and new entrants. In addition, Meta offered to make available equivalent improvements and updates of the features or functionalities of its messaging channels to such providers.

The concentration was referred to the Commission under Article 22 of the Merger Regulation (“MR”) by Austria and supported by eight other Member States, including the Netherlands (find our blog on Article 22 MR here). The German Bka decided not to join the referral request and conducted a parallel review of the effects of the concentration. The parties also received approval from the Bka on 11 February 2022.

 

Supermarket chains Coop and Plus may merge under condition of selling several supermarkets

ACM, decision of 21 December 2021; press release of 6 January 2022

On 21 December 2021, the ACM decided that supermarket chains Plus and Coop may merge under the condition that they divest twelve supermarkets. The ACM has investigated whether the merger will result in higher prices or a less attractive supermarket offer for consumers. According to the ACM, this is not the case on a national level, due to the presence of strong competitors such as Albert Heijn, Jumbo and Lidl.

The ACM also investigated whether consumers have sufficient local supermarkets to choose from. It determined the definition of the local markets on the basis of customers’ willingness to travel to the supermarket by car within 10 minutes. In twelve areas, the ACM foresees that there may be no or limited choice for consumers, with a risk that prices will increase or the range of products and/or quality of service will deteriorate. To address the concerns of the ACM, Coop and Plus will sell their supermarkets in these twelve areas to a competitor.

 

No compensation for UPS after the European Commission wrongly vetoed the UPS/TNT merger

General Court of the EU, judgment of 23 February 2022 (UPS)

The world’s largest courier company, UPS, will not receive compensation from the Commission for the alleged damage resulting from the failed concentration of the Dutch parcel company TNT, the General Court ruled on 23 February 2022. The Commission decided in 2013 to prohibit the intended concentration between UPS and TNT. Subsequently, UPS decided not to go ahead with the concentration. However, in its decision, the Commission used an econometric model different from the one on which the Commission and UPS had exchanged views during the administrative procedure, without notifying UPS. The ECJ ruled in 2017 that this violated UPS’ rights and subsequently annulled the decision. The ECJ upheld the General Court’s judgment in 2019.

However, TNT had meanwhile been acquired by rival FedEx. This concentration was approved by the Commission on 8 January 2016. UPS therefore claimed damages of over EUR 1,7 billion from the Commission, consisting of inter alia a payment of EUR 200 million to TNT for terminating the proposed concentration, the costs incurred by UPS for being involved in the investigation of FedEx’s takeover of TNT, and the lost profits by not being able to complete the concentration.

According to the General Court, the failure to timely send the definitive version of the econometric model used during the administrative procedure constitutes a sufficiently serious breach of UPS’ rights of defence within the meaning of Article 266 TFEU. However, the General Court holds that there is no direct causal link between that infringement and the alleged damage. The damages stemming from the costs of being involved in the FedEx/TNT merger investigation and the termination clause are not the result of the Commission’s errors, but rather the result from UPS’ free choice to intervene in those proceedings and from a voluntarily agreed upon contractual obligation between UPS and TNT. Finally, there is also no direct causal link between the failure to send the adjusted econometric model and the alleged loss of profit. It cannot be assumed that the concentration would have been approved if the other econometric model had been used. Moreover, UPS itself decided to abandon the concentration after the Commission vetoed it and decided not to make a new offer for TNT to compete with FedEx.

UPS will therefore not be compensated for any of its losses. Although the judgment is understandable from the perspective of the regulators, it creates a high threshold for private parties by expecting them to still actively try to pursue a concentration after it has already been vetoed by the Commission. With this judgment, the General Court introduces a strict standard for successfully claiming damages for an unjustified veto of an intended merger.

 

European Commission must also pay default interest after (partial) nullity of a fine

General Court of the EU, judgment of 19 February 2022 (Deutsche Telekom)

The General Court ruled on 19 January 2022 that the Commission must repay more than EUR 1,7 million to Deutsche Telekom AG for refusing to pay default interest to the German telecom company. On 15 October 2014, the Commission fined Deutsche Telekom for abusing its dominant position in the Slovak market for broadband internet services. The Commission imposed a fine of approximately EUR 31 million on Deutsche Telekom. By judgment of 13 December 2018, the General Court reduced this fine by more than EUR 12 million. The Commission repaid this amount to Deutsche Telekom on 19 February 2019. Deutsche Telekom also claimed over EUR 1,7 million in default interest from the Commission for the period when it did not have that money at its disposal (i.e. 2014-2019). When the Commission refused to pay the interest, Deutsche Telekom claimed damages before the General Court.

By judgment of 19 January 2022, the General Court upheld that claim. First of all, the General Court concludes that there is indeed a sufficiently serious breach of Article 266 TFEU. The General Court confirmed the CJEU’s ruling in Printeos that Article 266 TFEU imposes an absolute and unconditional obligation to repay, with interest, payments collected in violation of European Union law. Second, the General Court holds that there is a causal link between the damage and the refusal to repay default interest. It points out that an undertaking may expect the Commission to reimburse it for the amount unduly paid, together with default interest, should the fine be annulled or reduced at a later stage.

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