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Competition Flashback Q3 2025 – EU and Dutch competition law developments

Bas Braeken & Jade Versteeg & Timo Hieselaar & Demi van den Berg & Joost van Belois & Lisanne Kooijman
21 Oct 2025

This is the Competition Flashback Q3 2025 by bureau Brandeis, featuring a selection of the key EU and Dutch competition law developments of the past quarter (see the original version here).

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Overview Q3 2025

Merger control and FDI

Damages claims for competition law infringements

Cartels and vertical restraints

Abuse of a dominant position

Digital markets (DMA)

Regulated markets

Consumer protection law

Article 24(2) Mw repealed: acquisition by dominant party can constitute abuse of power

Ministry of Economic Affairs, decision of 15 August 2025

The law repealing the second paragraph of Article 24 of the Dutch Competition Act (Mededingingswet, “Mw”) entered into force on 1 September (by decision of 15 August 2025). This provision previously excluded the national prohibition on abuse of a dominant position from being applied to concentrations. This exception to the prohibition of abuse was therefore at odds with the Court of Justice of the European Union’s (“CJEU”) judgment in the Towercast case . That judgment ruled that Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) – the European prohibition on abuse of a dominant position – can indeed apply to concentrations. Article 24(2) Mw prevented this European approach from being applied in purely national situations. The deletion of this paragraph brings the national and European frameworks back into line with each other on this point.

The amendment to the law means that the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (Autoriteit Consument en Markt, “ACM”) can also retrospectively investigate transactions that were not subject to notification on the basis of the turnover thresholds applicable to merger control, but where the acquiring party may be abusing its dominant position in relation to the transaction. This gives  the ACM an additional tool to assess mergers and acquisitions that potentially raise competition concerns.

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Commission investigates possible misrepresentation KKR acquisition NetCo

European Commission, press release of 24 July 2025

The Commission is investigating whether Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. Inc. (“KKR”) provided misleading or incorrect information during the assessment of its acquisition of NetCo. KKR is a global investment firm that offers alternative asset management, capital market and insurance solutions. NetCo is a newly  founded company consisting of the broadband infrastructure of Telecom Italia S.p.A. (“TIM”), which connects the central office to the street cabinets, and FiberCop S.p.A. (“FiberCop”), a joint venture between TIM and KKR responsible for the network between the street cabinets and the connections to end users’ premises.

On 30 May 2024, the Commission approved the acquisition unconditionally. The Commission did not foresee any problems in the market which it investigated, namely the Italian market for wholesale broadband access services, based, among other things, on KKR’s assertion that FiberCop’s long-term contracts with access seekers such as Fastweb and Iliad would be maintained after the acquisition. The current investigation focuses on whether KKR provided incorrect or misleading information regarding these contracts.

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Merger highlights European Commission

 

ADNOC / Covestro

On 28 July 2025, the European Commission (“Commission”) announced that it would launch an in-depth investigation into the foreign subsidies with which the state oil company, Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (“ADNOC”), intends to acquire the German chemicals producer Covestro. The Commission has raised preliminary concerns that the unlimited guarantee and committed capital increase from ADNOC may (i) adversely affect competition in the acquisition process and/or post-transaction (ii) adversely affect competition in the market in which the merging parties operate. The Commission will now investigate both aspects further in the second in-depth FSR investigation following a notified concentration. Earlier this year, the first in-depth FSR investigation into the acquisition of PPF Telecom by e& resulted in a conditional approval decision.

 

Brasserie Nationale/ Boissons Heintz

On 17 July 2025, the Commission announced its conditional approval of the proposed acquisition of Boissons Heintz by Brasserie Nationale. The Luxembourg brewer will acquire control of beverage distributor Boissons Heintz through its subsidiary Munhowen. According to the Commission, the original transaction would raise competition concerns in the Luxembourg market for beverage supply to the hospitality industry. Both companies are the main distributors to this market. The acquisition would sideline competitors and leave too few alternatives for hospitality businesses. The Commission also feared that Brasserie Nationale would give its mineral water brand Lodyss an unfair advantage over other brands.

To address these concerns, the parties offered to divest a majority of Boissons Heintz’s hospitality industry activities. The buyer would acquire all the necessary assets and personnel, as well as the right to use the Boissons Heintz brand name, the webshop and exclusive import contracts. This would pave the way for a new player to enter the market.

The case was examined by the Commission despite the fact that the turnover thresholds of the EU Merger Regulation were not met. At the request of Luxembourg, which does not have its own merger control mechanism, the transaction was referred on the basis of Article 22 of the EU Merger Regulation (see also CF Q3 2024). The Commission will approve the buyer of the divested business in separate proceedings. An independent trustee will monitor compliance with the commitments.

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Limitation period for damages national competition infringements starts when decision becomes final

Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 4 September 2025

On 4 September 2025, the CJEU answered preliminary questions concerning the moment when the limitation period for competition law infringements begins to run in light of Article 101 TFEU, the principle of effectiveness and Article 10 of the Private Damages Directive. The case concerns a follow-on damages action brought in March 2023 against Nissan Iberia SA (“Nissan”) by CP, a purchaser of a Nissan vehicle. The claim followed a decision by the Spanish National Commission for Markets and Competition (“CNMC”) of 23 July 2015 (published on 15 September 2015) finding an infringement of competition law. Nissan argued that the claim for damages was time-barred because the one-year Spanish limitation period applicable at the time had already started to run on the date of publication of the CNMC’s decision, regardless of whether that decision was final.

The CJEU emphasised that the principle of effectiveness requires that limitation periods must not render the exercise of the right to compensation impossible or excessively difficult in practice. This means that the limitation period may only start to run after the infringement has ceased and the injured party has become aware of the information indispensable for bringing the action for damages. The CJEU considered that, under Spanish law, a decision of the CNMC against which an appeal has been lodged is not binding on national courts. Therefore, if the validity of the decision is contested, the injured person cannot effectively rely on that decision to substantiate their claim for damages. Allowing the limitation period to start running before the decision becomes final would undermine the possibility of bringing follow-on damages actions and complicate the exercise of the right to damages.

The CJEU found that the alternatives of suspending the limitation period through extrajudicial claims or the court’s power to stay the proceedings are not sufficient to meet the requirements of the principle of effectiveness. Any suspension of the limitation period does not appear to be automatically possible due to the appeal lodged against the CNMC decision, nor is it certain that this suspension will continue until the decision is final. Although the limitation period may be suspended by extrajudicial claims or the initiation of mediation proceedings, these grounds for suspension are independent of the appeal for annulment of the decision, which means that they are not guaranteed to continue sufficiently until the decision becomes final. Furthermore, the civil court’s power to suspend the damages proceedings until the CNMC decision is final is not automatic, as the court has a margin of discretion. Since a request for suspension of the proceedings can only be made after the action for damages has been brought, this implies that the action must be brought before the expiry of the limitation period, as a result of which the possibility of requesting suspension does not comply with Article 101 TFEU and the principle of effectiveness.

The CJEU ruled that it cannot reasonably be expected that the necessary information to bring a claim for damages is available until the decision of the national competition authority has become final. In light of the principle of effectiveness, Article 10(2) of the Private Damages Directive therefore precludes national legislation that allows the limitation period for damages to start running before the decision of a national competition authority has become final.

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CJEU emphasises role national courts in reviewing CAS arbitral awards

Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 1 August 2025

On 1 August 2025, the CJEU answered preliminary questions from the Belgian Supreme Court concerning proceedings between the Belgian football club Royal Football Club Seraing (“RFC Seraing”) on the one hand and FIFA, UEFA and the Belgian football association RBFA on the other. This ruling follows a series of earlier judgments on the relationship between sports and European (competition) law, such as the ISU, Superleague, Royal Antwerp and Diarra cases.

This case concerns two financing agreements that RFC Seraing concluded with Doyen Sports in 2015, according to which the economic rights to four players were transferred from RFC Seraing to Doyen Sports in exchange for monetary compensation to RFC Seraing. According to FIFA, this constituted “third-party ownership”, which it had prohibited in its regulations. FIFA therefore imposed sanctions on RFC Seraing: the club was banned from registering players for one year and was fined by FIFA. RFC Seraing appealed through FIFA’s internal committees and ultimately the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”) as well as the Swiss federal court upheld the sanctions imposed. In the meantime, national proceedings were brought in Belgium, raising the question of the extent to which Belgian courts are bound by the CAS arbitral award and, therefore, the extent to which they had to reassess the compatibility of FIFA’s regulations and sanctions in light of EU law. It is relevant in that respect that neither the CAS nor the Swiss federal court are part of the EU legal order.

In its judgment the CJEU confirms its previous line as set out in particular in the ISU judgment, i.e., that national courts of EU Member States have the right and the duty to thoroughly review CAS thoroughly against the fundamental rules of EU law, including in particular competition law and the provisions on freedom of movement. This is particularly important because arbitration in sports is imposed unilaterally on clubs and athletes without their voluntary consent, in contrast to (purely) commercial arbitration, as is the case for FIFA.

The CJEU holds that national rules which extend the authority of res judicata to such an extent that judicial review of arbitral awards becomes impossible are contrary to EU law. Athletes and clubs are entitled to effective legal protection. This means that national courts must not only be able to review CAS arbitral awards, but also be able to take provisional measures and refer questions for a preliminary ruling, despite the existence of a (final) CAS award.

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CBb confirms cartel fines for tobacco manufacturers

Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal, ruling of 22 July 2025

On 22 July 2025, the Dutch Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal (College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven, “CBb”) declared the appeals lodged by Philip Morris, JT International, British American Tobacco and Van Nelle Tabak against the fines imposed by the ACM to be unfounded. In 2020, the ACM imposed fines totalling more than €82 million on the four cigarette manufacturers for exchanging information about future cigarette pack prices via wholesalers. According to the ACM, by asking wholesalers for future price information from competing manufacturers and/or not objecting to receiving this information, the manufacturers engaged in a concerted practice restricting competition on the Dutch cigarette market by object (also a single continuous infringement).

The CBb confirmed these qualifications and largely upheld the earlier ruling of the District Court of Rotterdam (see also CF Q3 2023). The CBb found that the evidence demonstrated  a long-standing practice of indirect information exchange and that none of the manufacturers had objected to this. In addition, the mutual communication went far beyond what is considered ‘normal market behaviour’ and was not solely motivated by the customers’ own interest in obtaining a better margin. Furthermore, no evidence of subjective intent is required to establish the existence of a concerted practice; it is sufficient that there is deliberate cooperation – which, according to the CBb, ACM has demonstrated. The CBb also confirmed the classification of the exchange of information as a restriction by object and as a single and continuous infringement.

The CBb further held that there was no violation of the rights of defence. Although the lack of access to the other manufacturers’ research data sets is, ‘in itself’, a shortcoming, the ACM adequately remedied this by setting up a data room, according to the CBb. The CBb also found the restrictions imposed on the data room procedure in terms of time, physical and technical aspects and due to the sensitivity of the competition to be lawful.

The CBb also rejected the manufacturers’ argument that the ACM should not have imposed a fine because the infringement was not foreseeable and culpable. Unlike the court, however, the CBb ruled that the ACM was entitled to apply the 2009 Penalty Policy Rules to the entire infringement. This is because, after the amendment of the 2009 Penalty Policy Rules (compared to the 2007 Penalty Code), the manufacturers continued to commit the infringement for a considerable period of time (approximately 60% of the infringement period). The application of the 2009 Penalty Policy Rules therefore does not lead to a violation of the lex mitior principle. The CBb further considers the classification as a serious infringement to be appropriate and sees no reason to further reduce the fines. By reducing the basic fines by 50%, ACM already applied a “substantial reduction”. In addition, the reasonable time limit had not been exceeded. Due to, among other things, the two data room procedures, the scope and complexity of the case have increased significantly, as a result of which exceeding the regular five-and-a-half years for cartel cases should not be considered unreasonable, according to the CBb. With this final ruling, the cartel fines therefore remain in full force.

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Comfort letters Commission for sustainability agreement and the automotive industry

European Commission, guidance letters of 8 and 9 July 2025

On 8 and 9 July 2025, the Commission published two guidance letters concerning, respectively, an agreement in the port sector for the joint purchase of electric container-handling equipment and a cooperation agreement in the automotive industry. These are the first guidance letters since the Commission’s revision of the Notice on informal advice. A guidance letter is informal written advice from the Commission on how EU competition rules may apply in new or complex situations. Companies may request guidance letters, but remain responsible for their own legal assessment. Guidance letters are not legally binding, but they provide valuable direction by indicating how the Commission views a particular cooperation or practice.

The first guidance letter concerns a cooperation between APM Terminals and other port operators on the joint procurement and standardisation of electric straddle and shuttle carriers. This should accelerate the transition from diesel to electric vehicles, reduce costs and improve interoperability. The Commission concludes that the agreement does not raise any issues under Article 101 TFEU, provided, among other things, that competition-sensitive information is restricted and joint purchasing volumes are limited. The guidance is valid for five years and is limited to the European Economic Area (“EEA”).

The second guidance letter concerns the establishment of the Automotive Licensing Negotiation Group (“ALNG”), in which car manufacturers want to jointly negotiate licences for standard-essential patents (such as 4G, 5G or Wi-Fi). The Commission considers that the formation and activities of ALNG do not raise any competition concerns, as long as the group remains open to other companies, remains voluntary for patent owners, and no sensitive business information is shared. According to the Commission, ALNG can actually contribute to more efficient licence negotiations and the transition to digital and sustainable mobility.

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Commission fines companies for providing incomplete information

European Commission, press release of 8 September 2025

On 8 September 2025, the Commission imposed a fine of €172,000 on Eurofield and its parent company Unanime Sport, which is the subject of a competition investigation, for failing to comply with its obligation to cooperate. In June 2023, the Commission sent Eurofield a request for information, to which it received an incomplete response compared to documents seized during a dawn raid. After a warning and a second request for information, Eurofield’s provision of information remained inadequate.

The Commission then launched an investigation into the suspected breach of the obligation to cooperate. During that process, Eurofield admitted its guilt, provided the missing information and cooperated proactively. Nevertheless, the Commission imposed a fine on Eurofield and Unanime Sport based on 0.3% of their combined global turnover, with a 30% reduction in the fine as they cooperated once they became aware of the breach of procedural rules. This procedure is entirely separate from the competition law investigation that is still ongoing.

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General court reduces Credit Suisse fine for participation in FX cartel by more than €50 million

General Court of Justice of the European Union, judgment of 23 July 2025

On 23 July 2025, the General Court of the European Union (General Court”) ruled that Credit Suisse participated in a cartel relating to foreign exchange trading (also known as Forex or FX) between 2011 and 2012, but that the Commission had incorrectly calculated the amount of the fine.

The case concerns one of three FX cartels that took place between 2007 and 2013 in which traders from major banks exchanged commercially sensitive information via online chat rooms. The Commission imposed fines totalling almost €1.4 billion in relation to three different cartels, named after the online chat rooms in question: Three Way Banana Split, Essex Express and Sterling Lads. A large number of banks participated in these cartels: UBS, Barclays, The Royal Bank of Scotland (now NatWest), Citi, JPMorgan, MUFG (formerly Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi), HSBC and Credit Suisse. UBS was granted immunity because it informed the Commission of the existence of the cartels. All other banks settled with the Commission, with the exception of Credit Suisse. It followed the standard procedure and was subsequently fined €83.2 million for its participation in the online chat room from February to July 2012. Its legal successor, UBS, subsequently appealed against the decision.

The General Court ruled that the Commission had correctly established that Credit Suisse was involved in the cartel. However, according to the General Court, the Commission had calculated the amount of the fine incorrectly: the Commission used incomplete and less reliable data in determining the value of the turnover concerned (‘proxy for the value of sales’), while Credit Suisse itself had provided the Commission with more adequate data during the proceedings. The General Court therefore reduced the fine from €83.2 million to €28.9 million, since the Commission had not correctly followed its own Guidelines on the method of setting fines.

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Rotterdam District Court confirms fine decision LG for vertical price fixing

Rotterdam District Court, ruling of 7 August 2025

The administrative court of first instance (in this case the Rotterdam District Court) fully upheld the ACM’s fine decision imposing a fine of almost €8 million on TV manufacturer LG. Most interesting is the discussion of the grounds for challenging the finding of an infringement. LG argued that the ad hoc nature of the communication did not justify classification as an agreement or a concerted practice. However, the court concluded that the retailers agreed in various ways to LG’s (sometimes adamant) requests to adjust prices, so that there was a common intention between the parties. Moreover, it follows from the file that this was not an isolated incident but common practice.

With regard to whether the vertical price restriction can be classified as a restriction of competition by object, the court stated that this requires sufficient experience that is so solid and reliable that an agreement can be considered harmful by its nature. An indication of this exists when similar behaviour has been sanctioned in the past. The fact that the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation classifies vertical price fixing as a ‘hardcore restriction’ is important, although, in view of the Super Bock judgment, even in the case of a hardcore restriction, it must still be examined whether competition is sufficiently harmed in the specific case (or whether, for example, price is a less important competitive parameter). Contrary to LG’s argument, it is not necessary to prove that interbrand competition is weakened in order to assume a restriction by object. According to the court, such an analysis belongs to the discussion of the existence of a restriction by effect.

The court appears to consider decisive that LG’s conduct restricted the freedom of retailers to determine their resale prices. It is irrelevant whether LG used coercion, sanctions or incentives (the file shows that LG did indeed exert pressure). Even the voluntary decision to give up such freedom is sufficient to constitute a restriction by object. In such a case, LG can still provide evidence of any pro-competitive effects of its actions, but these must be sufficiently significant and specific to the agreement/concerted practice in question.

All grounds relating to the calculation and amount of the fine are also unsuccessful. For example, the court ruled that the fine imposed was foreseeable because ACM did not introduce a new interpretation of vertical price fixing.

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Court of Appeal of The Hague questions compatibility New Dockers’ Clause with EU law

Court of Appeal of The Hague, judgment of 30 September 2025

On 30 September 2025, the Court of Appeal in The Hague (“Court of Appeal”) referred questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling concerning the compatibility of the New Dockers’ Clause with EU law and the balance between economic freedoms and social rights in the context of the internal market.

The New Dockers’ Clause forms part of the IBF Framework Agreement and stipulates that seafarers or other persons on board a seagoing vessel may not perform lashing services if dockworkers who are members of a trade union affiliated with the International Transport Workers’ Federation (“ITF”) are available. Only in case of a shortage of qualified dockers may the crew voluntarily perform the work after obtaining the prior agreement of the dockers’ trade union. Marlow Navigation c.s. and charterers argue that the clause infringes the free movement of services and competition law.

The Rotterdam District Court ruled that the clause falls outside the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU because it arises from collective bargaining between employee and employer organisations, which means that the so-called ‘Albany-exception’ applies. The Court of Appeal states that the fact that conditions are laid down in a collective labour agreement does not mean that they fall outside the scope of EU law. In view of the ECHR’s Holship judgment of 10 June 2021, the Court of Appeal examines whether invoking the economic consequences of an unjustified restriction on the free movement of services is sufficient to restrict the right to collective action and collective bargaining protected by the Albany case law.

In the present case, the Court of Appeal considered that the clause could be regarded as a restriction on the free movement of services. Marlow et al. and the charterers are entitled to challenge it, despite the fact that the clause stems from social dialogue and is included in the IBF Framework Agreement, because they are effectively forced by ‘ITF Affiliates’ to comply with the clause and use the services of port workers. The Court of Appeal doubted whether this restriction could be justified on the basis of overriding reasons of public interest. Although ITF et al. emphasise that the clause is intended to protect seafarers. The Court of Appeal rejected this interpretation as the primary objective. Various communications from Nautilus and FNV Havens indicated that the clause was primarily designed to safeguard the jobs of port workers. Furthermore, the protective effect is not applied systematically, coherently and consistently. If a lashing ban is necessary for safety reasons, it is difficult to accept that the crew is allowed to lash in ports where no dockworkers are available. Less restrictive measures to protect the crew are also conceivable, such as additional requirements regarding rest periods or the number of crew members available.

The possibility of obtaining ‘prior agreement’ was not considered sufficient to justify the lashing ban, because the key position of the ITF-affiliated trade unions for dockworkers prevents an objective and transparent assessment, based on criteria known in advance, of whether the use of the crew’s services is justified on safety grounds.

According to the Court of Appeal, this means that there appears to be no justification based on an overriding reason of public interest. However, in view of the tension between economic freedoms and social rights, the Court of Appeal considers it necessary to refer preliminary questions to the CJEU concerning (i) the compatibility of the clause with Article 101 TFEU, (ii) whether the restrictive clause should be accepted as part of collective agreements, and (iii) whether, in the context of the Albany exception, it should be assessed against the principle of proportionality.

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Commission accepts Microsoft’s commitments for Teams

European Commission, publication of 12 September 2025

On 12 September 2025, the Commission accepted commitments from Microsoft to address competition concerns regarding its collaboration and productivity tool Teams. The Commission launched a formal investigation into Microsoft in July 2023 following complaints it had received from competitors Slack Technologies Inc. and alfaview GmbH. The Commission provisionally found that Microsoft restricted competition by bundling Teams with its productivity software (such as Outlook and Word) by default. When Teams launched, Microsoft included it by default in Office 365 and Microsoft 365, its widely used SaaS productivity suites for business customers. This gave Teams an unfair distribution advantage, reinforced by limited interoperability with competing communication and collaboration tools. According to the Commission, this allowed Teams to quickly gain market share and further strengthened Microsoft’s dominant position in productivity software. After the investigation began in 2023 and 2024, Microsoft implemented changes, such as offering some packages without Teams. However, according to the Commission, these changes were insufficient.

To address the Commission’s remaining concerns, Microsoft therefore offered the following commitments:

  1. Office 365 and Microsoft 365 packages will be offered without Teams at a significantly lower price than packages with Teams, whereby the discounts on Teams packages may not be more favourable than those on packages without Teams.
  2. Customers will be given regular opportunities to switch to packages without Teams, which can also be rolled out globally in data centres.
  3. Competitors and third parties will be granted effective interoperability with Microsoft products, the ability to integrate Office Web Apps (Word, Excel, PowerPoint) into their own software, and to include their products visibly in Microsoft’s core applications.
  4. Customers in the EEA may export their Teams messages for use in competing solutions.
Following the results of the market investigation conducted by the Commission in 2025 into these commitments, Microsoft decided to supplement its commitments by:
  1. Increasing the price difference between Microsoft 365 and Office 365 packages without Teams and packages with Teams (including for business customers) by 50%.
  2. Clearly displaying the corresponding offer without Teams on its websites alongside every offer of a package with Teams.
  3. Publishing information on interoperability and data portability on all relevant developer websites.

The Commission concluded that Microsoft’s final commitments sufficiently addressed its concerns regarding Microsoft’s competitive behaviour. It therefore decided to make these commitments legally binding on Microsoft. The commitments regarding interoperability and data portability are binding for ten years, while all other commitments are binding for seven years.

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€2.95 billion fine for Google for abuse of dominant position in online advertising technology (Adtech)

European Commission, publication of 5 September 2025

On 5 September 2025, the Commission announced that it had imposed a fine of €2.95 billion on Google for abusing its dominant position in various markets relating to online advertising technology. Google is alleged to have favoured its own display advertising technology at the expense of competitors, advertisers and publishers.

Google generates most of its revenue from advertising and acts both as a seller of advertising space on its own websites and apps and as an intermediary between advertisers and publishers (websites on which the advertisements are placed). Advertisers and publishers use three digital tools: (i) publisher ad servers (systems for publishers to manage digital advertisements), (ii) programmatic ad buying tools (platforms and technologies that make the purchase of advertisements data-driven and automated) and (iii) ad exchanges (digital marketplaces where publishers and advertisers trade). Google itself is a provider of, among other things, the ad buying tools Google Ads and DV360, the publisher ad server DFP and the ad exchange AdX.
The Commission’s investigation shows that Google has a dominant position in both publisher ad servers (DFP) and programmatic ad buying tools (Google Ads and DV360) in the EEA. Between 2014 and the present, Google has abused this position by:

  1. Favouring AdX in the selection of advertisements via DFP, for example by informing AdX in advance of the highest bids from competitors.
  2. Favouring AdX when placing bids via Google Ads and DV360, thereby excluding competing exchanges.

According to the Commission, this behaviour was intended to favour AdX and may have led to the exclusion of AdX’s competitors. This strengthened AdX’s role in the adtech supply chain and enabled Google to charge higher fees to its users. The Commission has ordered Google to (i) cease its self-preferencing practices and (ii) take measures to end the inherent conflicts of interest in the adtech chain. Google now has 60 days to inform the Commission of its proposed measures. The Commission will assess Google’s proposed measures and, if they are insufficient, may impose further remedies.

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Commission accepts far-reaching commitments from Corning

European Commission, publication of 18 July 2025

The Commission has made Corning’s commitments binding, bringing to an end the abuse investigation into the American manufacturer of Alkali-AS glass (break-resistant glass for consumer electronics, among other things). The Commission found that Corning has a dominant position in the global market for Alkali-AS glass, with the exception of Apple products. The possible abuse would lie in the exclusive supply agreements with customers, such as manufacturers of portable consumer electronics. Corning has committed to refrain from exclusivity clauses in current and future agreements with customers not only for Alkali-AS glass but also for clear glass ceramics (as this type is expected to be used more frequently in the future). In addition, Corning will not apply purchase quotas at a reduced price (in the EEA) or oblige customers to purchase more than 50% of their demand from Corning (worldwide). The commitments are valid for a period of nine years and apply worldwide. As part of the commitments, Corning will publish a market communication in English and Mandarin, and a Mandarin-speaking monitoring trustee has been appointed.

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ACM launches investigation into major software supplier for suspected dominance abuse

Authority for Consumers and Markets, publication of 30 September 2025

The ACM has launched an investigation into a large, internationally active software supplier after being informed of suspected abuse in the pricing of certain software and in the conditions imposed by the company on customers in the Netherlands. The ACM has conducted a dawn raid, has requested information and will investigate in the coming period whether this company has violated competition rules. This is in line with the ACM’s efforts to ensure that markets in the digital economy function properly, as dependence on these companies is growing.

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Commission rejects Apple’s request to remove large part of the interoperability obligations for iPhones

European Commission, decision of 4 August 2025

On 4 August 2025, the Commission rejected a request from Apple to remove some of the interoperability measures imposed on it. The request concerned five of the nine specifications that the Commission imposed on Apple on 19 March 2025 in its Specification Decision to ensure  interoperability between iPhones running the iOS operating system and third-party devices. These specifications elaborate on the general interoperability obligation applicable to Apple as a gatekeeper under Article 6(7) of the Digital Markets Act.

The Specification Decision specifies measures relating to nine iOS features, namely: (i) iOS notifications, (ii) high-bandwidth peer-to-peer Wi-Fi connections, (iii) proximity-activated pairing, (iv) background execution, (v) short-range wireless file transfer solution features, (vi) automatic Wi-Fi connection, (vii) media casting features, (viii) automatic Bluetooth audio switching, and (ix) NFC controller in read/write mode.

In the Specification Decision, the Commission included an option to allow Apple, upon request, to deviate from certain obligations laid down therein (“Exemption Clause”). Such a request can only be granted if Apple demonstrates the existence of exceptional circumstances in which it is unable, for legal, technical or other reasons, to implement one or more of the measures imposed in the Specification Decision, in whole or in part.

The Commission examined Apple’s request in relation to each of the five measures individually. However, there were several aspects common to all five requests that led the Commission to conclude that none of the five requests were based on exceptional circumstances as required by the Exemption Clause. According to the Commission, Apple’s requests were too broad: the company requested the complete withdrawal of measures for more than half of the functions concerned, without providing concrete proposals to solve specific problems. The Commission argues that the Exemption Clause is not intended to remove entire obligations, but only to address exceptional and unforeseen implementation problems. Furthermore, Apple based its requests mainly on legal arguments that it had already raised previously and that are unrelated to the technical feasibility of the measures. The Commission emphasised that the Exemption Clause is not a means to reopen previous discussions or to challenge the decision again — a legal case is already pending before the General Court of the EU for that purpose. Finally, the Commission rejects Apple’s complaint that the company was not given sufficient time to respond: in its view, considering the deadline reasonable and Apple’s right to be heard fully respected.

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CBb refers questions CJEU on the interpretation PSO Regulation

Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal, interim judgment of 9 September 2025

On 9 September 2025, the CBb decided to refer preliminary questions to the CJEU in the context of the appeal by various transport operators against the decision of 21 December 2023 of the State Secretary for Infrastructure and Water Management (“State Secretary”) to award the main rail network concession for the period 2025-2033 directly to Nederlandse Spoorwegen (“NS”) (see also our Update railway law: the 4th European Railway Package and competition on European railway markets).

The introduction of the European Union’s Fourth Railway Package in 2016 changed the European regulatory framework for rail transport. The package aims to further open up the European rail market to competition. In this context, Regulation 1370/2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and by road (“PSO Regulation”) has been amended, limiting the possibilities for the authorities to directly award public service contracts and giving railway undertakings a so-called ‘right of access’ to the railway infrastructure.

The transport operators who have lodged objections to the award decision are of the opinion that, in making the decision, the State Secretary acted in contravention of the applicable transitional law under the PSO Regulation and, moreover, did not take sufficient account of the transport operators’ right of access in his decision-making on the imposition of a public service obligation. The State Secretary contests these views.

In light of the above dispute, the CBb has decided to refer preliminary questions to the CJEU. These preliminary questions relate to two key points:

  1. the interpretation of the transitional law for the possibilities of private contracting under the PSO Regulation, and
  2. the relationship between the State Secretary’s power to impose public service obligations on the one hand, and the right of access to the railways for railway undertakings on the other.

The CBb is withholding any further decision in this case until the CJEU has issued its ruling. However, the CBb has ruled as a provisional measure that the State Secretary must resume negotiations with Arriva on the Northern Lines with immediate effect and report the outcome thereof to the CBb by 8 December 2025 at the latest.

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PostNL will not receive subsidy for UPD

Preliminary relief judge of the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal, ruling of 5 September 2025

On 5 September 2025, the preliminary relief judge of the CBb ruled that the Minister of Economic Affairs (“Minister”) is not required to grant a subsidy to PostNL for the performance of the Universal Postal Service (Universele Postdienst, “UPD”). The UPD is PostNL’s legal obligation to provide a basic postal service throughout the Netherlands, such as the delivery of letters and parcels at uniform rates, including in sparsely populated areas. According to the judge, there is no urgency and no legal obligation for the Minister to provide financial support.

At the beginning of 2025, PostNL had applied to the minister for one-off subsidies of €30 million for 2025 and €38 million for 2026. The company argued that the postal market is shrinking structurally, while costs continue to rise. As a result, the implementation of the UPD would no longer be profitable. According to PostNL, the possibilities for cost savings have been exhausted, and the legislative process to relax the UPD obligations has been ongoing for six years without any concrete results. To prevent the postal service from coming under further pressure, the company asked the preliminary relief judge to suspend the minister’s decision to reject the subsidy and to grant an advance payment of €15 million per year for 2025 and 2026.

The preliminary relief judge ruled that the Minister is not obliged to grant PostNL a subsidy. According to the preliminary relief judge, the Minister has discretionary power under the Dutch Framework Act Subsidies of the Ministries of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy (EZK) and Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (LNV) and the Dutch General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht, “Awb”) to grant incidental subsidies, and the EU Postal Services Directive does not impose any obligation to provide financial support. Although PostNL invoked Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR, the preliminary relief judge doubts whether the statutory UPD obligation constitutes a violation of that right. Even if that were the case, the Minister has considerable discretion to determine whether and how compensation is provided, for example through measures other than subsidies. Furthermore, as it had not been demonstrated that PostNL’s financial situation was so dire that direct support was necessary. The preliminary relief judge has rejected the request for provisional relief.

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ACM postal market study: higher reliability but slower delivery speeds necessary

Authority for Consumers and Markets, publication of 24 April 2025

On 24 April 2025, the ACM published the results of its study into the Dutch postal market. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy commissioned this study as a building block for a new vision on postal services, which are under increasing pressure due to the decline in postal volumes. Between 2019 and 2023, the number of postal items sent fell by 22%. The ACM concludes that, without policy changes, the current postal service will become financially unsustainable in the long term. In its study, the ACM therefore also explored a number of options for changes to legislation and regulations.

The investigation covers all mail sent in the Netherlands. Approximately 15% of this falls under the UPD, which is mainly mail from the well-known orange postboxes. PostNL, designated as the operator of the UPD, must protect this mail in terms of reliability, delivery speed and affordability. Business mail, including mail from the government and the judiciary, is not covered by the UPD. One of the options ACM is considering is therefore to include business mail under the UPD.

Senders and recipients indicate that reliability – certainty that mail will arrive at the agreed time – is most important to them. However, the 95% reliability standard has not been achieved for years. In 2023, 89% of mail was delivered on time. In 2024, that percentage fell further to 86%. The ACM investigated several scenarios, with reducing the number of delivery days being mentioned as a logical adjustment. Currently, deliveries are made five days a week; this could potentially be reduced. However, the exact consequences of such adjustments for the financial position of the postal company – and thus for the affordability of the postal service – are difficult to predict.

In addition, the ACM investigated whether stimulating competition could contribute to an improvement in postal services. Although no new national competitor is expected to enter the market in the short term, the ACM does see a gradual shift towards a broader delivery market. Parcel services and leaflet distributors are also increasingly entering the field of postal delivery. In the long term, this could put further pressure on the traditional postal network, but for now, ACM considers policy adjustments to be the most appropriate means of ensuring sustainable postal services.

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ACM again rejects enforcement request against Lactalis

Authority for Consumers and Markets, decision of 29 July 2025

On 29 July 2025, ACM rejected a request from dairy farm Maatschap Selles to take enforcement action against Lactalis under the Unfair Commercial Practices in the Agricultural and Food Supply Chain Act (“Wet OHP Landbouw”) . Maatschap Selles (exclusively) supplies milk to Lactalis, which then processes the milk into cheese and exports it. Maatschap Selles is also chair of the Leerdammer Collectief Suppliers’ Association (“LVLC”).

This decision on the enforcement request follows a series of decisions in the dairy sector involving both Lactalis and LVLC. For example, on 23 September 2024, following (multiple) complaints from LVLC, the ACM decided that Lactalis had to adjust its pricing system or face a penalty. Both Lactalis and LVLC objected to this decision, but the ACM declared both objections unfounded. On 17 October 2024, the ACM declared ZuivelNL’s commitments binding, on the basis of which ZuivelNL adjusted its contribution collection system in line with the Unfair Trading Practices in Agriculture Act. This (commitment) decision also followed an enforcement request from LVLC against Lactalis in particular, which charged the contributions for ZuivelNL. On the same day, the ACM rejected LVLC’s complaint because the problems with the commitments had been resolved. LVLC then lodged an objection to the commitment decision, which the ACM declared unfounded on 10 April 2025. Subsequently, on 6 May 2025, the ACM decided not to disclose any documents about Lactalis’ new pricing system under the Dutch Open Government Act (Wet openbare overheid). The objection to that decision was also rejected by the ACM on 31 July 2025.

ACM has now also rejected the most recent enforcement request against Lactalis. This time, Maatschap Selles claimed that Lactalis is unilaterally changing the terms of delivery by terminating the delivery agreement between them. In addition, Maatschap Selles considers the termination to be a measure of commercial retaliation. Unilaterally changing the terms and conditions of delivery and taking retaliatory measures are contrary, respectively, to Article 2(1)(c) and (h) of the Wet OHP Landbouw.

The ACM concludes that there is no violation of the Wet OHP Landbouw. Lactalis was obliged to adjust its pricing system in response to the ACM’s order subject to a penalty. Maatschap Selles objected to this new pricing system, whereupon Lactalis (in compliance with the notice period) felt compelled to terminate the agreement. According to the ACM, this does not constitute a unilateral adjustment of the terms and conditions of supply. Nor does the ACM consider this to be a commercial retaliation measure. The termination of the supply agreement is the result of Maatschap Selles’ objection to the new pricing system. This is not, as Maatschap Selles claims, due to its role as chair of the LVLC. Moreover, Lactalis also terminated other supply agreements when suppliers objected to the new pricing system.

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Developments and risks in the agro-nutri sector

Authority for Consumers and Markets, publications of 12 and 18 September 2025

On 18 September, the ACM announced that it would launch an investigation into food prices in Dutch supermarkets in response to indications that the prices of some products in the Netherlands are higher than in neighbouring countries. The ACM is investigating the profit margins of both food suppliers and supermarkets. In addition, the ACM is seeking explanations for high or low margins and is indexing price differences with neighbouring countries. The results are expected to be published in the summer of 2026.

Research published by the ACM on 12 September 2025 has shown that cooperation in sustainability efforts can strengthen the earning capacity of primary food producers. The main advantage that identified in this research is the realisation of cost savings and certainty regarding the sale of products. Although cooperation can in some cases contribute to higher prices for sustainable products, this is limited by the considerable market power of downstream parties. The establishment of a Union of Producer Organisations (UPO) could potentially counterbalance this. This would involve several producer organisations working together, thereby strengthening their negotiating position. The risks of sustainability generally lie with the farmer, despite possible agreements on compensation or purchase guarantees. In addition, the ACM emphasises that stable government policy is an important condition for successful sustainability.

On 12 September 2025, the ACM also published the fourth Agro-Nutri Monitor. In the monitor, the ACM monitored the prices, costs and margins for regular, organic and other sustainable products and identified the obstacles and risks associated with sustainability for farmers. The results demonstrate that organic farmers are not always compensated for their sustainability costs, as the costs of organic products have risen faster than revenues. Although farmers with other sustainability labels are compensated for additional costs on average, 6 out of 10 consider the compensation insufficient. Cooperation between producers reduces costs and strengthens their negotiating position vis-à-vis buyers, while cooperation along the value chain helps to achieve a premium price and distribute production risks. Nevertheless, consumers’ limited willingness to pay and uncertainty about the government’s sustainability policy remain the main obstacles to further sustainability.

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ACM supplements reasoning withdrawal penalty orders against Dé VakantieDiscounter, Prijsvrij.nl and D-Reizen*

Authority for Consumers & Markets, decisions of 16 July 2025

On 20 December 2024, ACM withdrew three orders subject to penalty payments for an alleged violation of consumer law (and the corresponding publication decisions) it had imposed on virtual touroperators Dé VakantieDiscounter, Prijsvrij.nl and D-Reizen (“VTOs”) after these decisions had previously been suspended by the preliminary relief judge of the Rotterdam District Court (see also CF Q3 2024). Following objections from these VTOs to the withdrawal decisions, the ACM supplemented its reasoning for these decisions.

The ACM based the original withdrawal decisions on reasons of procedural economy. It considered the necessary further investigation in light of the preliminary relief judge’s ruling to be unfeasible in the context of an objection procedure and within a reasonable time period. The VTOs considered this reasoning to be incorrect and misleading. Following the VTOs’ objection, the ACM agreed that the original reasoning for the withdrawal decisions did not clearly demonstrate that the orders subject to penalty payments had been withdrawn because they had not been prepared with sufficient care and that, as a result, no violation on the part of the VTOs could be established.

The ACM added to its reasoning for the withdrawal decisions by stating that it had decided not to conduct a further investigation for reasons of procedural economy. It follows that, in view of the insufficiently careful preparation of the orders subject to penalty payments, the ACM was unable to establish any violations. The ACM upheld the rest of the withdrawal decision and finally proceeded to partially reimburse the VTOs for the legal costs they incurred.

* bureau Brandeis assisted the VTOs in these proceedings.

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ACM launches investigation into computer-controlled consumer prices aviation sector

Authority for Consumers and Markets, publication of 2 July 2025

Following the publication of its investigation approach for pet care (see also CF Q2 2025), the ACM has announced its approach to the market investigation into computer-controlled consumer pricing  in the aviation sector. ACM notes that consumer prices are increasingly being determined using data and algorithms (computer-controlled). This can take the form of dynamic pricing (the same price for everyone, but varying depending on the time) or personalised pricing (e.g. based on search history, location or type of device).

The ACM anticipates both positive and negative consequences and aims to use this market investigation to identify the specific effects on competition. Given that computer-controlled pricing is widely used for airline tickets and that the aviation sector is ‘socially relevant’ with a clear competitive structure, the ACM has specifically chosen the aviation sector for this investigation. Starting in July 2025, the ACM will engage in discussions with relevant market parties (particularly airlines) and request relevant data to better understand how pricing works in the aviation sector. The ACM will also conduct a consumer survey to gain insight into the decision-making process when purchasing airline tickets. The ACM expects to publish a preliminary report at the end of 2025.

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ACM’s carelessness leads to reduction of fine by CBb on appeal

Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal, ruling of 16 September 2025

On appeal, the CBb ruled that ACM had rightly declared objections by Allfree B.V. (“Allfree”) to an order subject to penalty payments for non-compliance inadmissible. The case concerns an order subject to penalty payments imposed by ACM on 21 July 2021 for misleading commercial practices. The ACM had found that locksmith services were being offered on Allfree’s websites with misleading and incorrect information. In addition, certain mandatory information (such as the address of the establishment, VAT identification numbers and registration in public registers) was not provided.

After ACM sent the order subject to penalty payments to Allfree together with a draft press release, ACM received an email from Allfree on 2 August 2021 in which it objected to the content of the draft press release. It was not until 22 November 2021, after the objection period had already expired, that Allfree indicated that this first email was also intended as an objection to the order subject to penalty payments. However, according to the CBb, the email only refers to the draft press release and does not contain any grounds for objection to the penalty payment order, which means that the email cannot be regarded as a timely objection. Allfree’s objection of 22 November 2021 was therefore submitted too late. The ACM was therefore right to declare the objection inadmissible, according to the CBb.

The CBb then ruled that ACM rightly found violations on Allfree’s websites. ACM was therefore entitled to collect the forfeited penalty payments. However, the CBb ruled that there were special circumstances due to which collection should be partially waived. The ACM acted negligently by checking the same ten URLs repeatedly from 16 November 2021 onwards without informing Allfree of the violations it had identified, even though it was likely that Allfree would have remedied them if it had been notified of them. In doing so, ACM deprived Allfree of the opportunity to remedy the violations in a timely manner and did not take sufficient account of its willingness to comply with the order. In view of the above, the CBb reduced the recoverable amount by the ACM from €89,000 to €26,900.

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ACM publishes guidelines for fair price display

Authority for Consumers & Markets, publication of 19 September 2025

To help sellers present prices in a clear and fair manner, the ACM has published Guidelines regarding price indications and comparisons (“Guidelines”). In these Guidelines, the ACM establishes a number of rules of thumb for displaying prices based on the Dutch Product (Price Indications) Decree (Besluit prijsaanduiding producten) and the Commission’s Guidelines on consumer protection in the indication of the prices of products offered to consumers, provides a number of examples, and explains a number of exceptions and specific situations.

The basic principle is that a seller may compare its discounted retail price with the lowest retail price that the seller has charged in the 30 days prior to the discount. In concrete terms, this means that: (i) only the lowest price of the past 30 days may be crossed out; (ii) a price may only be displayed as a discount if the reference price is the lowest price of the past 30 days; (iii) prices may not be artificially inflated; (iv) the meaning of a reference price must be clearly stated directly next to the price; and (v) discount promotions may not last for an excessive period of time. When a seller uses a recommended retail price as a reference, they must be able to demonstrate that this price is not only recommended by the manufacturer, but is also actually charged by other sellers in the market.

The ACM also mentions a few exceptions to the above rules of thumb in these Guidelines. For example, the basic rule described above does not apply to perishable or new products. The ACM also clarifies that the price indication rules also apply to platforms that act as sellers and that platform providers must enable sellers on their platform to comply with the rules as described in these Guidelines. For example, a platform will have to refer to relevant laws and regulations on price display on the platform and design the platform in such a way that discount indications (can only) comply with current laws and regulations.

In the coming period, ACM will check whether the price indications of both physical and online sales channels comply with the rules as explained in these Guidelines.

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For all your questions regarding (EU) competition law, bureau Brandeis would be happy to assist.

Bas Braeken – Jade Versteeg – Lara Elzas – Timo Hieselaar – Demi van den Berg – Joost van Belois – Lisanne Kooijman

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